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Abstract 
 
Since 2002, the government of post-Soviet Tajikistan has deployed its security 
apparatus outside of the state’s territorial borders at least 49 times, intimidating, 
kidnapping and monitoring its citizens. I use the term transnational authoritarian 
security governance to refer to these border-spanning security practices. 
Although both secular and religious opponents to the government have been 
targeted, in this dissertation, I examine how the government of Tajikistan 
attempts to manage the threat from Islamic ‘extremism.’ I trace the emergence 
of the securitisation of Islam back to the Soviet Union, explore its consolidation 
in the years following independence in 1991, and how it has become 
operationalised in the form of transnational authoritarian security governance. I 
argue that the regulation of religious life in Tajikistan is based on an assertive 
form of secularism, which posits that religion is only safe if it is closely controlled 
by the state.  
 In theorising transnational authoritarian security governance, I draw on 
the work of Michel Foucault. I argue that security governance is interwoven with 
relations of power. Governing Islamic ‘extremism’ in Tajikistan does not merely 
involve repressive life-taking sovereign power, it involves the moulding of 
obedient, secular subjects through disciplinary power and biopower. But as 
Foucault argues, where there is power, there is resistance. Those who are 
made subjects through security governance do have opportunities to resist it. 
Rather than being transformative and counterhegemonic, however, this 
resistance is momentary and anti-hegemonic. My findings are based on critical 
discourse analysis, a database of extraterritorial security incidents, semi-
structured interviews, and extensive ethnographic fieldwork conducted between 
2013 and 2015 in Tajikistan and Russia.  
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Note on Transliteration 
This thesis contains a large amount of source material in Russian and Tajik, as 
well as a few Uzbek, Arabic and Persian words. For transliterating Russian 
sources, I have used the BGN/PCGN Romanisation system. This renders ‘я’ as 
‘ya’, ‘ю’ as ‘yu’ and ‘e’ as ‘ye’ after vowels, soft signs and at the beginning of 
words. To make it easier for those unfamiliar with the Cyrillic alphabet, I have 
transliterated ‘ë’ as ‘yo.’ I have used common anglicised forms of popular 
Russian names, such as Gorbachev. For the names of interviewees, I have 
followed their own preferences for transliteration. I have used the more common 
anglicised words of concepts and publications. So I use perestroika rather than 
perestroyka, glasnost rather than glasnost’ and Komsomolskaya Pravda rather 
than Komsomol’skaya Pravda. 
For Tajik words, I have used the Romanisation system used by John Hayward 
and Azim Baizoyev in A Beginners Guide to Tajiki. This renders ‘ғ’ as ‘gh,’  ‘ӣ’ 
as ‘i,’ ҷ as ‘j,’ ‘ҳ’ as ‘h’ and ‘қ’ as ‘q.’ In the case of the letter ‘ӯ,’ I have opted to 
transliterate it as ‘ir’ instead of as ‘ü’ in order to help those who do not read 
Cyrillic. All of the translations, unless indicated, are my own. 
I have marked foreign text in italics. In cases of commonly used words – such 
as hijab, Allah or jihad – I do not use italics. I have not put the foreign names of 
groups in italics. So Hizb ut-Tahrir not Hizb ut-Tahrir and Tablighi Jamaat not 
Tablighi Jamaat. All words are Tajik, except for words accompanied by [Rus.] 
which are Russian, [Uzb.] which are Uzbek, [Arabic] which are Arabic and 
[Urdu] which are Urdu. 
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Note on Sources 
This thesis is based on a combination of discourse analysis, ethnography and 
semi-structured interviews. The transcripts and audio recordings of these 
interviews in their original language are held by the author for reference 
purposes. I collected sources for the discourse analysis at the Tajik National 
Library, Dushanbe, Russian State Newspaper Library, Khimki, and online. I 
have kept copies of the referenced newspaper articles for reference purposes. 
A list of textual sources can be found in Appendix III and a list of interviews can 
be found in Appendix IV. 
 
With a small number of exceptions, informant names have been changed; 
sometimes at the request of the informant, sometimes at my discretion, on 
occasions when I feel the way I am using the text might compromise an 
informant in their community. Those whose names are included gave their 
consent, and are individuals who have public profiles. 
 
Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are verbatim. Where indicated in a 
footnote with ‘author interview with…,’ they are transcribed and translated from 
recorded interviews. Where conversations and events were recorded in my 
fieldwork notes, I indicate this with a footnote. 
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Introduction 
Savriddin Jurayev was born in 1985 in the village of Navgilem, near the city of 
Isfara in northern Tajikistan.1 Between 2002 and 2005, he attended a mosque, 
studying the Quran under the guidance of mullo and member of the opposition 
Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT), Sadullo Marupov.2 On 3 May 2006, the 
police detained his teacher and subsequently started targeting his followers.3 
Fearing arrest, Jurayev fled to Russia in June 2006. He worked in various low-
paid jobs in the suburbs of Moscow. In November 2006, the Prosecutor 
General’s Office in Tajikistan brought criminal proceedings against Jurayev, 
accusing him of having been a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(IMU) since 1992, when he was just seven years old, and participating in an 
attack on three members of the regional parliament on 26 September 2006, 
despite the fact that he was in Russia at the time.4 In November 2009, Russian 
police arrested him based on a warrant issued by the Tajik Prosecutor 
General.5  The Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS) granted him 
temporary asylum in September 2011 and he was released from pre-trial 
detention. 
 On the evening of 31 October 2011, Jurayev was driving with a friend 
near Moscow State University. A mini-van blocked their path. Fleeing the scene, 
Jurayev was chased by four armed Tajik-speaking men, who bundled him into 
the van. They beat and tortured him for a day. He was then forced into a car 
with Russian government number plates and driven to Moscow’s Domodedovo 
airport.6 The men put him on a plane, foregoing any border and customs 
formalities. On 30 November 2011, Jurayev stood trial at Sughd regional court 
                                                          
1
 This account is based on court documents from the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). See Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia – 71386/10, ECtHR, 25 April 2013, 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=001-119416&filename=001-
119416.pdf The court transliterated Jurayev’s name as Dzhurayev. This is based on the 
Russian spelling of his name. In order to be consistent with other translations, I have opted to 
transliterate it from the Tajik.  
2
 The ECtHR documents refer to him as Marufov, but local news reports call him Marupov. 
3
 Marupov died one day after his arrest. Initially, authorities claimed that Marupov committed 
suicide by jumping from the third floor of the local Ministry of Internal Affairs building. The IRPT 
claims he was murdered by the police. See: “President Taking No Re-election Chances,” 
Transitions Online, 18 May 2006, http://www.tol.org/client/article/17180-president-taking-no-re-
election-chances.html  
4
 It accused Jurayev of breaking Articles 186.2 (participation in an armed group), and 187.2 
(participation in a criminal organisation) of the Criminal Code of Tajikistan. 
5
 The Deputy Prosecutor General of Russia also accused him of founding an IMU cell in Russia, 
and transferring $500 per month to members in Tajikistan.  
6
 This detail comes from a letter written by Jurayev. See Amnesty International, 2013. 
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with 33 others.7 The judge sentenced him to 26 years in prison.8 This is not an 
isolated incident.9 Since 2002, the government of Tajikistan10 has attempted to 
forcibly return citizens residing outside of the country without recourse to the 
law at least 48 times.11 Members of the opposition in exile have been detained, 
beaten and threatened by the Tajik authorities; in one case an opposition 
leader, Umarali Quvvatov, was assassinated.12  
Tajikistan, a republic of eight million people in former-Soviet Central Asia, 
constitutes an interesting site for studying transnational security.13 With over 
one million citizens, mostly young men, working as seasonal migrants in 
Russia, Tajikistan was the most remittance dependent economy in the world in 
2014.14 Remittances equal to an equivalent of 43 per cent GDP.15 Migration and 
the transnational links that come with it remain part of everyday life in Tajikistan 
(Ibanez-Tirado 2013; Mostowlansky 2013; Roche 2014). While Russia is a 
source of livelihood for many households, for the government it is potentially 
threatening space where both the ‘secular’ and the ‘religious’ opposition can 
agitate among the migrant community. In this thesis, I focus on the 
government’s concerns about religious migrants in particular. With 
approximately 98 percent of the population professing to be Muslim, the 
                                                          
7
 Soghd is one of the four regions (viloyat, Rus.: oblast) in Tajikistan. The others are Khatlon, 
Regions under Republican Subordination and Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO). 
For a map of the country, see Appendix I. 
8
 In addition to the initial charges, the court charged Jurayev with Article 244 (stealing), 189 
(arousing national, racial, local or religious hostility), and 306 (attempting to change the 
constitutional order) of the Criminal Code of Tajikistan. 
9
 Two others accused of being members of Jurayev’s IMU cell, were also detained by Russian 
police and later kidnapped and taken to Tajikistan. Suhrob Koziyev and Murodjon Abdulhakov 
were taken by men in plain clothes in Moscow on 23 August 2011 and flown to Khujand, 
Tajikistan. 
10
 I use the term ‘government of Tajikistan’ interchangeably with ‘regime.’ I do not wish to give 
the impression that the government is homogeneous, or that all agencies and individuals are 
equally involved in security governance.  
11
 This is based on a database that I compiled from open sources, media reports and court 
documents. For a list of incidents, see Appendix II. 
12
 I will return to this case in Chapter Five. 
13
 For an introduction to Tajikistan’s history, see Bleuer and Nourzhanov 2013, for an overview 
of post-independence politics, see Heathershaw 2009. For an overview of events in 2015, which 
form the backdrop to my fieldwork, see Lemon 2016. 
14
 According to the latest official statistics published by the Federal Migration Service of the 
Russian Federation (FMS), as of July 2015 there were just under one million Tajiks living in 
Russia. However, many Tajiks work without official registration. My interviewees differed in their 
estimates, some saying that over one million Tajiks work illegally, bringing the total figure to two 
million, or 25 percent of the population.  
15
 Farchy, J. Tajikistan and IMF in Talks over Bailout. Financial Times, 23 February 2016, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3dd384b0-da48-11e5-98fd-06d75973fe09.html 
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government is concerned about the danger of Islamic extremism.16 Although the 
government promotes ‘good,’ national Islam represented by the official clergy, 
registered mosques and an Islamic university, it warns against the dangers of 
‘bad,’ foreign (begona), ‘extremist’ Islam (Epkenhans 2011; Atkin 1994). It has 
introduced a range of measures to protect the secular state and prevent 
perceived radicalisation. These include banning children from praying in 
mosques, forcing men with beards to shave them and prohibiting the study of 
Islam in foreign madrassas. More recently, as I argue in Chapter Four, the 
government has linked the issue of citizens joining the Islamic State in Syria 
and Iraq to the leading opposition party, the Islamic Renaissance Party of 
Tajikistan (IRPT).17 This created the conditions for the Supreme Court to ban 
the party in September 2015. This governance of religion and security stretches 
beyond state borders; it is transnational. In this thesis, I examine security 
governance and how this affects people’s lives in two states, Russia and 
Tajikistan. Instead of comparing how Russia and Tajikistan govern ‘Islamic 
extremism,’ however, I will examine how the government of Tajikistan manages 
the perceived threat posed by citizens who adhere to ‘Islamic extremism’ and 
are living in Russia or Tajikistan. I label the emergence of these border-
spanning, authoritarian practices for governing security transnational 
authoritarian security governance (TASG). Unlike the U.S. rendition system, 
which primarily targeted foreign nationals who posed a threat to the homeland, 
TASG targets citizens living outside of state borders.18 While (il)liberal forms of 
security governance govern through freedom, TASG aims to create docile, loyal 
                                                          
16
 This figure is based on census data. Being ‘Muslim’ in Tajikistan does not necessarily mean 
actively practising Islam. Regardless of their faith, almost every non-Slavic citizen considers 
themselves to be ‘Muslim’ by birth. For a discussion of everyday understandings of Islam in 
Central Asia, see Montgomery 2007. 
17
 Formed as an all-USSR party in 1990, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan split from 
this in 1991. Led by Said Abdullo Nuri until his death in 2006, the party drew support from the 
Rasht Valley (also known as Gharm or Qarotegin) and families forcibly resettled from Rasht to 
the Vakhsh valley during the 1930s and 1950s (see Kasymbekova 2011). The IRPT formed part 
of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) which fought the government in the country’s civil war 
between 1992 and 1997. Following the peace accord, which allocated one third of government 
posts to the opposition, the party was legalised in 1998. After the civil war, the party’s leaders 
distanced themselves from violence and from the desire to establish an Islamic state. For a 
background on the party, see Olimova and Olimov 2001; Epkenhans 2015; Heathershaw 2009. 
18
 The Rendition Project records 130 individuals who were held in CIA “black sites” or rendered 
back to countrys where torture is widely practised. The list includes one British citizen, Binyam 
Mohammed, one German, Khaled al-Masri, one Canadian, Maher Arar, and no US citizens. All 
of those captured who carried ‘western’ passports had dual citizenship. See 
renditionproject.org.uk/prisoners/search.html  
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subjects (Dean 2010). Although overlapping in many ways, TASG is 
qualitatively distinct from more liberal forms of governance. 
As Pierre Bourdieu argues, “theory without empirical content is empty, but 
empirical research without theory is blind” (Bourdieu 1988: 774). This thesis is 
both theoretically and empirically driven. Rather than setting out a series of 
hypotheses and then testing them in the field, I adopt an inductivist approach, 
modifying existing theories to explore the emergence, consolidation and impact 
of TASG. I examine the following questions in this thesis: 
 
 Where did the discourse linking Islam to violence emerge from? How did 
it become hegemonic? 
 What is TASG? How is TASG different from liberal forms of security 
governance? How does the emergence of TASG shape our 
understanding of international security?  
 What are the practices that form Tajik exiles as subjects of security? How 
does TASG shape the lives of the subjects of security (those who need 
to be protected) and the subjects of securitisation (those deemed a 
threat)? 
 How do security subjects negotiate and resist TASG? 
Transnational authoritarian security governance incorporates a range of 
discourses and practices aimed at governing security threats. I identify three 
overlapping components of TASG: security as process, practice and 
subjectification. First, I examine security as process, the ways in which actors 
securitise objects and subjects through discourse, and how the audience of 
these security discourses respond to this. My approach is premised on the 
argument that security is ontologically unstable and actors engage in struggles 
to ‘fix’ the meaning of security, its referent object and what is threatening 
(Huysmans 1998; Zedner 2009; Dillon 1996). The securitisation of Islam in 
Tajikistan did not spring forth from nowhere; it has a specific geneaology 
(Foucault 1977; 1994c). Contemporary discourses on Tajik security developed 
during the Soviet Union and have been reformulated since Tajikistan gained 
independence in 1991. I argue that the government discourse rests on the 
division between ‘good,’ official, moderate Islam and ‘bad,’ unofficial extremist 
Islam. The state media argues that religion has the potential to be socially 
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regressive and politically dangerous. The situation in the Middle East serves as 
a warning of what can happen if religion and politics mix. An assertive form of 
secularism, in which the government tightly controls religious expression, it 
argues, is the best means to secure the state and society against this threat 
(Kuru 2007). But studying discourse alone does not fully explain how TASG 
operates. 
Second, I examine security as practice. As William Walters argues, 
“representational practice has to be studied in terms of its imbrication within a 
range of practices that are not reducible to the linguistic model” (Walters 2010: 
219). Discourse-focused approaches often neglect how threats are managed 
once they are identified. In other words, they neglect security governance 
(Hamieri and Jones 2015). Much of the literature on security governance is pre-
theoretical, taking security to be an objective fact; functional, focusing on how 
threats should be governed; and Eurocentric, framing Europe as a best-practice 
model to be emulated elsewhere (Krahmann 2003; Webber et al 2004; Kirchner 
and Sperling 2007, cf. Bevir 2013).  Instead, I adopt a sociological approach 
which places importance on the dialectic between discourse and practice 
(Balzacq et al 2010; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; Williams 2007; Huysmans 2006). 
Practices are only meaningful in so far as they are situated in discourse. I 
examine how the government of Tajikistan has responded to the ‘threat’ of 
radical Islam posed by migrants living in Russia. Such measures include 
arrests, rendition, close regulation of religion and promotion of secular forms of 
subjectivity. I argue that these practices contain elements of the “triangle of 
power” introduced by Michel Foucault: sovereign power, disciplinary power and 
biopower (Foucault 1981; Dean 2010).19 
Indeed, through the thinking of Michel Foucault, I argue that security 
governance is a process of subjectification undercut by relations of power.20  
Power lies at the heart of Foucault’s intellectual project. For him, power “is 
                                                          
19
 Foucault is certainly not the ony theorist to conceptualise biopower, sovereign and 
disciplinary power. In Homo Sacer (1998), Giorgio Agamben argues that since ancient times 
sovereignty has rested on the distinction between zoe, ‘bare’ life, stripped of rights and bios, 
‘qualified’ life. In Empire (2000), Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt expand Foucault’s notion of 
biopolitics to the international system, arguing that a biopolitical order has emerged. Whilst 
these contributions are important, I think that the ideas of Foucault better reflect the findings 
from my fieldwork.  
20
 This study is Foucauldian in the sense that I draw inspiration from some of Foucault’s 
writings. Rather than taking his entire oeuvre, I have selected the texts and ideas which further 
our understanding of the dynamics of security governance. This approach is in full accordance 
with Foucault’s own characterisation of his work as a “toolkit” (Foucault 1980: 145). 
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never localized here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as 
a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a 
net-like organization” (Foucault 1994b: 98). Rather than being something that 
actors possess and wield, according to Foucault, power is a relation between 
agents. To study power, according to Foucault, we need to examine the 
“interplay between the terms of the relationship” between different institutions, 
objects and subjects (Foucault 2003: 168). Power, therefore, is decentred and 
polyvalent, rather than hierarchical. Power is not always destructive; it can be 
productive too. Foucault was concerned with uncovering how practices of power 
produce political subjects.  
Whether by executing a criminal for murder or promoting healthy lifestyles 
that will benefit public health, power is inherently linked to security. It is about 
securing the ruler, the individual and/or the entire population.  As Foucault 
argues, security practices aim to “achieve an overall equilibrium that protects 
the security of the whole from internal dangers” (Foucault 2003: 249). 
Exercising power involves securing the majority of the population against 
abnormalities in an attempt to prevent “all the possible forms of the irruption of 
danger” (Castel 1991: 288). As Michael Dillon and Andrew Neal argue in the 
introduction to Foucault on Politics, Security and War, “sorting life requires 
waging war on behalf of life against life forces that are inimical to life.” (Dillon 
and Neal 2008: 8). This is the central paradox of security: in attempting to 
achieve security, actors must use violence and thus make others insecure. 
Indeed, TASG involves the practice of the three forms of power identified by 
Foucault - sovereign, disciplinary and biopower - which combine to produce 
political subjects. 
Sovereign power, focuses on maintaining the “safety (sûreté) of the Prince 
and his territory’ (Foucault 2003: 65). Sovereign power limits, bans and 
prevents certain behaviours, claiming a monopoly on violence. It is therefore a 
destructive form of power. Disciplinary power attempts to render visible the 
spatial distribution of bodies in order to exert control over them. Elites use 
disciplinary power to define and police the norm; those deviating from the norm 
– the vagrant, the insane, the homosexual, the extremist - are subject to 
corrective treatment. Disciplinary power shapes and normalises subjects. 
According to Foucault, “discipline makes individuals; it is the specific technique 
of power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its 
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exercise” (Foucault 1991: 170). The final, and most recent, form of power that 
Foucault examines is biopower. This involves the management of populations 
and individual subjects through practices of self-regulation. Whereas 
disciplinary power isolates, concentrates and is essentially protectionist, by 
contrast biopower is said to be centrifugally oriented in favour of expansion, 
circulation and movement. Instead of focusing on the safety of the sovereign, 
biopower focuses on the security of the population, granting the right to make 
live and let die. Biopower has two main characteristics (Rabinow and Rose 
2006). First, it involves discourses about the vital characteristics of being human 
(being healthy, productive etc). Second, it involves specific interventions that 
manage the health and life of the population. Efforts to promote sexual health 
and healthy lifestyles all constitute forms of biopower. Biopower is “pastoral.” 
Institutions care for subjects as a shepherd tends his flock. Disciplinary and 
biopower are unified by their goal: regulating political subjects. Foucault argues, 
“rather than asking ourselves what the sovereign looks like from on high we 
should be trying to discover how multiple bodies, forces, energies, matters, 
desires, thoughts, and so on are gradually and materially constituted as 
subjects, or the subject” (Foucault 1980: 121). This process of subjectification, 
and how it relates to security, forms the central focus of this thesis.  
The Tajik state narrative on radical Islam contains all three forms of 
power identified by Michel Foucault. It is sovereign as it aims to protect the 
government and Tajikistan’s territory. But Tajik counter-terrorism is not based on 
repression and destruction alone. It is productive in so far as it aims, through 
discourses and practices, to create loyal secular subjects. Ultimately, the Tajik 
government’s response indicates that efforts to shape consciousness (shuur) 
are more important than repressive measures. Indeed, the Tajik government’s 
response to radical Islam is disciplinary as it calls for the punishment of those 
who are accused of “extremism,” offering a warning to others who may take this 
path. And it is biopolitical because it involves discourses about the vital 
characteristics of being human, as well as the management of populations and 
individual subjects through practices of self-regulation. Indeed, the responsibility 
to govern extremism does not solely fall on the government; it falls on citizens 
as well. Citizens are encouraged to work on themselves and monitor others for 
suspicious behaviour.  
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But my Foucauldian reading of TASG is not nihilistic; security subjects do 
have opportunities to resist relations of power. Power and resistance are not 
opposites. Power is not possessed by the elite and resisted by those who do not 
have it (Foucault 1981). Instead, resistance exists wherever there is power. 
Power only becomes intelligible when it is resisted. In this thesis, I chart the 
ways in which Tajik citizens can resist TASG. Whether by growing a beard, 
continuing to organise illegal prayer groups or using the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) to resist being rendered, Tajiks do resist TASG. This 
resistance is not counter-hegemonic and transformative, it is anti-hegemonic, 
decentralised and momentary (Lemon 2014; Cooper 1995).  
My thesis supplements the existing literature in security studies in at 
least four ways. First, security studies, even in its more critical guises, remains 
biased towards elite discourses and exceptional measures (McDonald 2008). 
My research attempts to move away from this bias. In this thesis, I bridge the 
practical and scholarly divide between ‘exceptional’ and ‘everyday’ politics of 
security (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2015; Huysmans and Guillaume 2013; 
Bigo 2008). In doing so, I offer an interdisciplinary study, drawing on insights 
from a range of disciplines including international relations, anthropology, 
sociology and linguistics. Rather than setting the ‘everyday’ and ‘exceptional’ in 
opposition to one another, I look at how the exception becomes the norm, how  
discourses and practices of security impact upon the lived realities of those who 
have been labelled a security threat. Studying security from both the top-down 
and bottom-up, follows Foucault’s argument that power is everywhere (Foucault 
1981). By focusing on local perspectives on security, I shift attention away from 
the top-down production of security threats and the practices this entails, 
towards the consumption of (in)security in everyday life. Using ethnography, 
researchers can uncover how the meaning of security and who it is for is just as 
contested amongst ordinary people as it is among elites (Goldstein 2010).  
Lastly, through an ethnography of the everyday experiences of (in)security, I 
offer a “thick description” of how the people  I am researching experience being 
a migrant, being religious and feeling (in)secure, and the relationship between 
each of these categories of becoming. 
By focusing on the ways security subjects are affected by TASG, I also 
draw attention to the ways in which they can resist the oppressive politics of 
security. Many studies set power and resistance in opposition to one another; 
  
28 
 
power is possessed by the elites, and the dispossessed subalterns resist this 
domination (Balzacq 2014).  But a Foucauldian understanding of power and 
resistance does not set them in opposition to one another. Instead, power and 
resistance exist in an agonal, mutually-constitutive relationship (Foucault 1981). 
To paraphrase Foucault, where there are power relations, there are relations of 
resistance. Unlike other studies that have examined resistance to occupation 
(Ochs 2011; Ryan 2015), or in liberal democracies (Salter 2011; Balzacq 2014), 
I examine resistance by emigrants against the practices of their home state. 
Indeed, rather than looking at how the receiving state securitises 
immigrants, I examine how the sending state attempts to control emigrants. 
Although a number of academics have looked at this “transnationalization of 
state practices,” the ways in which states spilling over borders by reaching out 
to own people abroad, most of these focus on the ‘positive’ dimensions of this 
(Ragazzi 2009; Ho 2011; Delano and Gamlen 2014). Instead, I examine how 
the government of Tajikistan exports its security apparatus abroad, abducting, 
intimidating and assassinating opponents in exile. 
Lastly, a Eurocentric bias exists within security studies (Barkawi and 
Laffey 2006). Most studies examine security in liberal democracies. Instead, I 
examine security governance by an authoritarian state which has been ruled by 
the same president, Emomali Rahmon, since 1992.21 Although similarities exist, 
I argue that authoritarian security governance does differ from liberal security 
governance. Both liberal and authoritarian systems of rule combine elements of 
biopower, disciplinary power and sovereign power. Power is exercised with the 
view to moulding political subjects. But where liberal governance involves 
governing through freedom, thus allowing for the possibility of critique, 
authoritarian rule is based on the subject’s complete obedience to political 
authority (Dean 2010; Sigley 2006). Whereas liberal security governance allows 
for the existence of counter-narratives from civil society and rival political 
parties, authoritarian governments attempt to maintain a monopoly on security 
discourses. Unlike liberal governments who view space as a source of 
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 Born Emomali Sharipovich Rahmonov in Danghara in southern Tajikistan in 1952, he served 
in the Soviet navy, worked as an electrician and studies economics at the Tajik National 
University, before becoming chairman of the Lenin sovkhoz (collective farm) in his native 
Danghara in 1987. He became a people’s deputy to the Supreme Soviet in 1990. During the 
civil war in November 1992, members at the 16th session of the Supreme Soviet Rahmonov as 
chairman (effectively head of government). He became president following the November 1994 
presidential elections. As part of the process of nation-building, he removed the suffix –ov from 
this name in 2007, becoming Emomali Rahmon. 
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economic, social and political competition, illiberal regimes see space as a 
securitized resource that the state must closely control (Cerny 1997; Lewis 
2015: 143). My thesis, then, draws attention to the ways in which security is 
practised in authoritarian states and empirically demonstrates the differences 
between liberal and authoritarian security governance. Before, I outline the 
chapters, I will offer an overview of the process by which I chose my object of 
research, my methodology and the ethics of my study. 
Methodology 
In analysing TASG, I utilise four methods: discourse analysis, semi-structured 
interviews, a database of extraterritorial security incidents and ethnography. I 
conducted a “multi-sited” study, with ten months of fieldwork between 2013 and 
2015 in Russia and Tajikistan (Marcus 1995). Before starting my PhD in 2012, I 
spent two years living in Tajikistan, working for an NGO and as a part-time 
journalist. These two years allowed me to travel extensively in the country, learn 
Tajik and Russian, and gain a detailed understanding of Tajik culture. During 
those two years, I gradually forged relationships with academics, journalists, 
current and former government employees and members of the opposition. 
After starting my PhD at Exeter in 2012, I returned to Tajikistan for three months 
in the summer of 2013, living in the village of Vanj, just a few miles from the 
border with Afghanistan.22 In Vanj, I improved my Tajik while conducting 
ethnographic research. I established contact with two people who feature 
heavily in the later chapters of this thesis – spiritual leader from the Rasht valley 
Abdulrahmon and young legal clerk Ravshan. I abandoned plans to return to 
Tajikistan for a long period fieldwork in the summer of 2014 after Alexander 
Sodiqov, who was working as a research assistant as part of a research project 
led by my PhD supervisor, was detained by the security services and accused 
of “spying.”23 With Tajikistan no longer being an option for safely conducting my 
fieldwork, I travelled to Moscow in July 2014, spending two weeks establishing 
contact with informants and meeting with a number of experts.24 My thesis 
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 Vanj is a district (nohiya) and town located in a valley. Although located in Gorno-Badakhshan 
(GBAO), where the majority of people speak Pamiri languages and are Shia Ismailis, the people 
of Vanj speak Tajik and are Sunni Hanafi. Vanj sided with the opposition during the civil war. 
23
 Thankfully, Alex was released in September 2014. For background on his arrest, see: 
“Authorities Detain Tajik Researcher, Whereabouts Uncertain,” EurasiaNet, 17 June 2014, 
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/68641 
24
 These included a number of journalists, academics and members of the Tajik diaspora. 
  
30 
 
evolved as a result of this shift in research site; instead of conducting a largely 
domestic study of how security governance affects Tajiks living in Tajikistan, I 
switched attention to how transnational security governance affects both those 
living inside the country and those living beyond its borders.   At this time, I met 
Parviz, who later performed the role of a ‘fixer,’ helping me to establish contact 
with individuals associated with the religious and political opposition. I returned 
for a longer period of fieldwork in Moscow between January and June 2015. 
Moscow, with a population of over 12 million, constituted a vastly different 
research environment to my original intention of conducting fieldwork in a rural 
mountain valley.25 Establishing contacts, infiltrating networks and travelling to 
meet with my research subjects all consumed much more time than it did in 
Vanj in 2013. Despite these logistical challenges, Moscow provided an 
opportunity to examine transnational, rather than domestic, security 
governance.  
 Given the focus of my research, researcher, and research subject, safety 
were a key concern (Koch 2013).26 I adopted a number of strategies to minimise 
the risk to both parties. I have used pseudonyms for all those I have profiled. 
When arranging meetings, I kept conversations brief and did not mention details 
about my research. Most of our meetings took place in public places, with many 
conversations taking place whilst walking along Moscow’s streets. In the case of 
the interviews, in a few cases, the interviewee insisted that I record his or her 
full name. For my own safety, and that of my respondents, I never complied with 
these requests. Having outlined my journey as a researcher, I will now discuss 
the four methods that I adopted in detail. 
Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis is both a theory about the importance of language to the 
construction of social reality and a method for studying this process (Phillips 
and Jorgensen 2002). A wide range of different approaches to the study of 
language and power exist and each has its own notion of what the relationship 
between discourse and social reality is and how to approach this 
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 Conducting fieldwork in rural Tajikistan is certainly not easy either. For an illuminating 
overview of one researcher’s experiences, see the introduction to Jesse Driscoll’s Warlords and 
Coalition Politics in Post-Soviet States (2015). 
26
 Researcher safety in the former-Soviet Union has become an area of lively scholarly 
discussion, with a special issue in the journal Area in 2013 and a report compiled by the Central 
Eurasian Studies Society (CESS 2016). 
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methodologically.  These range from content analysis, which involves 
transforming qualitative, textual data into quantitative, numerical data in order to 
analyse how language reflects reality, to discourse theory which negates that 
‘reality’ exists outside of language (Denscombe 2007; Howarth 2000). In this 
thesis, I use Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA).27 
Critical Discourse Analysis is a critical theory of language that views the 
use of language as a form of social practice (Wodak and Meyer 2009; 
Fairclough 2003). For Teun van Dijk, “critical discourse analysis is a type of 
discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, 
dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted within text and 
talk in the social and political context” (Van Dijk 2001: 352).  CDA therefore 
focuses not only on discourses, but also on the social structures that produce 
and are produced by them.  CDA takes interest in the power relations that 
underpin the ideological, ontological and epistemological assumptions of a 
given text (Fairclough 1989). As such, power is partly discourse and discourse 
is partly power.  Critical discourse analysts place emphasis on tracing and 
explaining the process by which certain lexicalisations dominate over alternative 
narratives. Indeed, as leading proponent Norman Fairclough argues, the aim of 
CDA is to denaturalise knowledge assumptions that are “taken for granted” 
(Fairclough 2010). CDA is characterised by a realist social ontology. It regards 
both abstract phenomena and concrete social events as part of social reality. 
Discourses that achieve hegemony are those that have a high level of 
correspondence with the reality they selectively represent.  
CDA can best be described as a loose coalition of different theorists 
rather than a cohesive approach. These approaches range from Van Dijk’s 
cognitive discourse analysis (Van Dijk, 2001) to David Altheide’s ethnographic 
content analysis (Altheide 1987) and Reiner Keller’s sociology of knowledge 
approach (Keller 2005). Each differs in its methodological approach, as well as 
the way it conceptualises the relationship between discourse and practice. 
Despite the differences, there are five assumptions common to most 
researchers who conduct CDA (Wodak and Fairclough 1997): 
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 Critical discourse analysis emerged from 'critical linguistics' developed at the University of 
East Anglia in the 1970s. For an overview of the theory’s development and research agenda 
see Wodak and Meyer 2009. 
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1. The character of social and cultural processes and structures is partially 
discursive; 
2. Discourse constitutes and is constituted by identities, social relations and 
meaning; 
3. Language should be empirically studied within its social context; 
4. Discourse functions ideologically- it reproduces unequal relations of 
power; 
5. CDA is critical- it is not objective, but aims for emancipation of those 
subjugated by the dominant relations of power. 
CDA is particularly influenced by two schools of thought. From Michel Foucault 
they draw their conceptualisation of the relationship between knowledge and 
power (Foucault 1998). Second, from the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, 
they draw their commitment to the emancipation of those subjugated by these 
power relations.28 Rather than being a neutral reflection of the social world, 
“theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox 1981: 129, 
emphasis in original). And, according to critical theorists, it is the responsibility 
of the academic to provide research that helps the political subjects of power 
become aware of their situation and seek to liberate themselves. CDA follows 
this tradition blurring the line between academia and activism, and adopting an 
overtly normative agenda. According to Van Dijk, CDA is always driven by the 
need to solve socio-political problems and is therefore “ultimately political” (Van 
Dijk 2001: 253). 
In order to utilise CDA as a research method, Fairclough suggests three-
step approach (1992: 73).First, researchers need to analyse the text itself, 
focusing on its formal structures such as rhythm, syntax and grammar. Second, 
at the level of the discursive practice, researchers need to examine how the text 
fits in with the larger discourse of other texts. This refers to the central concept 
of intertextuality, or the influence of history on a text and a text’s influence on 
history (Kristeva 1986). Third, at the level of social practice, the researcher 
examines whether the text reproduces or challenges the dominant relations of 
power.  
According to theorists within CDA, discourses are not fixed and natural, 
discourses are contingent and fluid. Fairclough outlines how discourses evolve 
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 The Frankfurt School incorporates a diverse set of thinkers including Jurgen Habermas, 
Walter Benjamin, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse. 
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in four stages over time. They emerge from previous discourses, consolidate 
themselves as a dominant way of thinking, recontextualise as they disseminate 
to different settings, and operationalise as they shape social practices and 
subjects. In the empirical chapters of this thesis, I examine all four stages of the 
evolution of Tajik state discourses on religion and security. In Chapter Three, I 
examine how the Soviet authorities securitised Islam creating a dichotomy 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ forms of religiosity. In Chapter Four, I map how in 
post-independence Tajikistan this discourse has consolidated itself and been 
recontextualised by elites as they respond to the changing environment. In the 
final two chapters, I use ethnography to examine how the government of 
Tajikistan has operationalised the discourse on religion, shaping security 
practices in the country and among migrant communities in Russia.  
My analysis is based on a range of sources in English, Tajik and 
Russian.  Rather than merely describing the events all of the articles I selected 
script, spin and frame the situation. In tracing the emergence of a discourse on 
security and religion during the Soviet Union, I analyse 39 newspaper articles 
published between 1979 and 1993. I selected these through BBC Monitoring, 
and then found the original articles at the Russian State Newspaper Library in 
Khimki. To analyse the dynamics of the post-independence hegemonic 
discourse on religion and security, I conducted discourse analysis of 58 articles 
about Tajik citizens radicalising and going to fight in Syria and Iraq. I also 
analysed nine speeches by President Rahmon and four laws relating to radical 
Islam.29 In order to find the articles, I searched the websites of the President 
(president.tj), leading state newspaper Jumhuriyat (jumuriyat.tj), state news 
agency Khovar (khovar.tj), and the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(mvd.tj) for a number of keywords.30 I searched for the time period between 
October 2013, when the Tajik government first acknowledged that its citizens 
were fighting in the Syrian Civil War, and September 2015, when the 
government labelled the IRPT a terrorist organisation.31 My initial search 
generated over 300 results, so I conducted purposive sampling to remove those 
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 For a full list of sources see Appendix III. 
30
 The keywords were: Islam (Islom), secularism (dunyavat), security (amniyat), extremism 
(ifrotgaroi) ISIS (DIISH- Davlati Islomi Iroq al Sham), terrorism (terrorizm), IRPT (HNIT- Hizbi 
Nazhdati Islomi Tojikiston). 
31
 “Tajikistan Confirms Reports of Fighters in Syria,” RFE/RL, 29 October 2013, 
http://www.rferl.org/content/tajik-fighters-syria-government-rebels/25151440.html. 
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articles that were factual rather than analytical and those that did not pertain to 
my topic.  
Whereas some theorists have argued that nothing exists outside of 
discourse, examining language alone remains of limited utility in explaining 
social relations (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). In essence, discourse analysis 
remains hermeneutical, an exercise in interpretation; analysts cannot ‘get 
inside’ the minds of the authors who produce the discourse. Therefore, by using 
discourse analysis alone analysts would struggle to identify the reasons a text 
was written or why an issue was framed in a certain way. A tendency thus 
arises to overestimate the profoundness of meaning and infer malign interests 
behind a discourse (when none may be present) (Howarth, 2000). Fairclough 
argues that CDA is best used as part of a multi-method approach.  
Indeed, CDA does not ignore practice either. An understanding of the 
links between language, power and social practices forms the centre of 
Fairclough’s approach to discourse. For Fairclough, semiosis and practice are 
linked in at least three ways (Fairclough 1992). First, certain social activities - 
such as attending a funeral, working as an auctioneer or being a shop assistant 
- require a particular use of language and entail a certain set of practices. 
Second, semiosis figures in representations of actors own practices and those 
of other actors.  Last, discourses constitute ways of being and thus ways of 
behaving in the world. Advocates of CDA argue that it can usefully combined 
with other methods such as interviews, ethnography or surveys. I use 
ethnography to examine how political subjects are shaped by the hegemonic 
discourse and how they try to resist this process of subjectification. 
 
Ethnography 
 
Ethnography involves close, face-to-face contact with people who are being 
studied. It involves the researcher immersing themselves in their rituals, 
practices and life-worlds as a participant observer. Sherry Ortner describes 
ethnography as “the attempt to understand another life world using the self - as 
much as it is possible – as the instrument of knowing” (Ortner 1995: 173). For 
Daniel Miller (1997: 16-17) ethnography constitutes a “particular perspective” 
which requires a researcher:  
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1) To be in the presence of the people you are studying; 
2) To evaluate people based on what they actually do, and not merely what 
they say they do; 
3) To have a long term commitment to an investigation;  
4) To evaluate behaviour within the social, historical and political context of 
the research site(s).   
 
Ethnography can involve “learning a local language or dialect; participating in 
the daily life of the community through ordinary conversations and interactions; 
observing events (meetings, ceremonies, rituals, elections, protests); examining 
gossip, jokes, and other informal speech acts for their underlying assumptions; 
recording data in fieldnotes” (Schatz and Bayard de Volo 2004: 267).  
As Raelene Wilding concludes, with globalisation, “conducting research 
within a geographically bounded social group no longer seems as possible as it 
once did” (Wilding 2007: 335). To examine transnational flows an ethnographer 
needs to focus on “being there, and there, and there,” following the process that 
they are studying as he, she or it crosses borders (Hannerz 2003). George 
Marcus refers to such a research practice as “multi-sited ethnography” (Marcus 
1995). This refers to the situation in which the researcher “moves out from 
single sites and local situations of conventional ethnographic research designs 
to examine the circulation of cultural meanings, objects and identities in diffuse 
time-space” (Marcus 1995: 96). Multi-sited fieldwork allows researchers to 
examine social networks with nodes in different sites. It facilitates studies that 
examine how people encounter, experience and perceive mobility, border 
controls, biometrics and transnationalism (Johnson 2014). Such research has 
the potential to challenge some of the key binaries of migration studies: place 
and space; home and homeland; integration and assimilation. Through 
transnational ethnography, researchers can measure “whether concepts, ideas 
and understandings are translatable across the sites in a way that is 
meaningful” (Johnson 2014: 362). It helps challenge the myth that marginalised 
people are ‘local’ and the ‘global’ is a realm for the elite. Instead, people 
encounter both the local and the global in their daily lives.  
But how does ethnography enrich our understanding of politics and 
security? As Edward Schatz argues, “person-to-person contact that is attuned 
to the worldviews of the people we study is invaluable for the science of politics” 
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(Schatz 2008: 4). Ethnographic methods give researchers an emic perspective 
on how people understand their existence, social setting and abstract concepts 
such as ‘security.’ Ethnography is not only a method (participant observation), it 
is also a sensibility. It forms a commitment to placing human experiences at the 
centre of research agendas, recognising that politics is multi-vocal, complex, 
multi-layered- locally produced. In international relations and security studies, 
the use of ethnography involves a shift away from the study of the macro-level 
state system, towards the micro-level of everyday experiences. Through 
ethnographic methods, researchers can bridge the constructed divide between 
formal and informal institutions. Ethnography, Jan Kubik argues, “is the best 
method to study the complex interplay between (formal) social structures and 
(informal) social organization” (Kubik 2008: 33). Researchers can use 
ethnography to trace relations between power and meaning in daily practices. 
For Lisa Wedeen, who has studied resistance to authoritarian regimes in Syria 
and Yemen, “ethnography also charts the forms of contestation and sources of 
unbelief that may be particularly difficult to discern in authoritarian regimes” 
(Wedeen 2008: 85). Indeed, ethnography is a particular useful research tool in 
more closed research environments where “government statistics are suspect 
[or inexistent], media outlets are closely controlled by political interests, [free 
media are also inexistent or strongly repressed] (Schatz and Bayard de Volo 
2004: 269). By placing lived experience at the centre of their research agenda, 
ethnographers give voice and agency to those being studied. Ultimately, 
ethnography forms a phenomenological encounter that permits research 
subjects to cease being ‘objects of study’ and bring to life their individual 
experience of (in)security. Ethnography offers insights into how people deal with 
the challenges of everyday life.  
 My ethnography of the effects of TASG is based on the opinions and 
experiences of eight people. Most are men, only two are women. They 
represent a variety of ages (the oldest is 63 and the youngest 22), backgrounds 
and occupy a variety of positions regarding the current regime. I spent a great 
deal of time with them, drinking tea, going to the mosque and attending events. 
While as a white, British, Anglo-Saxon, agnostic, man I was never an ‘insider,’ I 
built up a rapport with most of them. Building a relationship of trust takes time 
and I spent long hours talking about a range of topics that do not pertain to my 
research interests. After these initial meetings, I managed to start to steer the 
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conversation towards the topics relating to my research. With my fieldwork 
coinciding with a period of unprecedented pressure on opposition in Tajikistan 
and abroad, I found myself transcending the, constructed, researcher/subject 
divide. I ended up writing opinion pieces supporting the opposition’s right to 
exist, helping Parviz secure funds to register his NGO and offering advice to 
those seeking political asylum in Europe. Rather than presenting barrier to 
objective data creation, my position as a researcher and activist helped me to 
produce valid data. Once the people I was profiling realised that I cared about 
their plight, and took their safety seriously, they began to become more candid 
in their responses. I took notes but never recorded our conversations, and 
followed up our conversations with regular Skype calls after I returned to the UK 
in September 2015.  
 In this thesis, I profile eight individuals, six of whom are men, two of 
whom are women. Three of the individuals in particular – Farrukh, Abdulrahmon 
and Suhrob – feature extensively in the empirical chapters. Farrukh was born in 
1973 in Shahrinav near Dushanbe.32 The son of a school teacher, he had a 
‘secular’ upbringing. He spent large parts of the country’s civil war (1992-97) in 
Russia, moving there permanently in 2003.33 Following the accession of 
Muhiddin Kabiri as leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party in 2006, he joined 
and is now one of its most active members in Moscow. Born in 1988, 
Abdulrahmon is from a village in Nurobod district in the Rasht Valley, an area 
associated with opposition to the government.34 As a young boy, he studied at a 
hujra, a non-registered Islamic school in his village. A seasonal migrant, he 
spends much of the year in Moscow, leaving his wife and two young children 
back in Tajikistan. He now works selling fruit at a bazaar in Moscow region, 
using his knowledge of the Quran to lead a small prayer group at the bazaar 
attended by other Tajik migrants.35 Suhrob, born in 1976 in Vanj, has been 
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 Shahrinav is located on the road between Dushanbe and the border with Uzbekistan. 
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 The Tajik Civil War started in May 1992 and ended in June 1997. To simplify an exceedingly 
complex conflict, it pitted the Popular Front, consisting of the government, supported by people 
from Khujand (Leninabad) and Kulob against the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), consisting of 
the IRPT, Democractic Party and supporters from Gharm and the Pamir. For summaries of the 
conflict, see Heathershaw 2009; Epkenhans 2014; Bleuer and Nourzhanov 2013; Mullojanov 
2014; Hall 2002. 
34
 The United Tajik Opposition drew much of its support from residents in the Rasht Valley, 
situated in the country’s east, and families from the valley who the Soviet government forcibly 
resettled in the Vakhsh Valley (See Lemon 2013). 
35
 Moscow region (Rus.: Moskovskaya Oblast’), commonly referred to as podmoskov’ye, refers 
to the city of Moscow and surrounding towns. When Russians refer to podmoskov’ye they are 
usually referring to places that are outside of the Moscow city limits. 
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living in Moscow since 2001.36 He works as a perfume seller in a market. 
Interested in religion from a young age, Suhrob was drawn to the prosteletyzing 
movement Tablighi Jamaat after meeting its members after Friday prayer at the 
Moscow Cathedral Mosque in 2012.37 Having been initiated into the movement, 
Suhrob started preaching amongst the migrant population. The five others 
whom I profile include Adbujabbor, born in 1962, a former colonel in the GKNB 
with whom I lived in the summer of 2013 in Vanj. Ravshan was born in 1989 in 
a village near Vanj, he studied at the Tajik National University, working as a 
legal clerk before moving to Russia in 2011. Parviz, born in 1977 in Khujand, 
acted as my ‘fixer’ but is also a human rights lawyer who was attempting to set 
up an NGO. Firuza was born in the early 1950s in Khujand. She moved to 
Moscow in 1976, has lived there ever since and now runs an NGO centred on 
promoting Tajik culture. Marhabbo, an ethnic Pamiri from Dushanbe, also runs 
a Moscow-based NGO supporting migrants’ rights. Muzaffar, born in 1964 in 
Nurobod, fought with the opposition during the civil war and now drives a taxi in 
Gharm. Although discourse analysis and ethnography form the primary 
methods in this thesis, I used two further methods to link my macro-level 
discourse analysis to my micro-level ethnography. First, I conducted semi-
structured interviews with a range of actors involved in, and affected by, TASG. 
Second, I compiled a database of known cases in which the government of 
Tajikistan has deployed its security apparatus beyond its borders.  
Extraterritorial Security Incident Database 
The database, which contains 49 entries, covers the period between 2002 and 
June 2016. I created this in collaboration with John Heathershaw, Alexander 
Cooley and David Lewis, and their research assistants, who have been 
compiling the “Central Asian Political Exiles Database,” due to be released in 
late 2016.38 My database contains incidents of assassination, attack, 
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 Kulob, sometimes transliterated from the Russian spelling as Kulyab, is the fourth largest city 
in Tajikistan. 
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 Founded in 1927 in India, Tablighi Jamaat is a Sunni Islamic proselytizing and revivalist 
movement. Originally formed as an offshoot of the Deobandi movement, which itself was 
formed in response to the failure of the Indian Rebellion of 1867, it now claims millions of 
followers worldwide. Leaders of the movement have distanced themselves from politics and the 
use of violence. The Prosecutor General of Tajikistan banned the group in 2006.  
38
 This project emerged from research conducted by David Lewis (2015) and Alex Cooley and John 
Heathershaw’s forthcoming book Dictators Without Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia. 
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arrest/detention, ‘voluntary’ return, exile, and rendition.39 I compiled the 
database from Russian, English and Tajik-language media reports, reports from 
human rights groups and court documents from the 12 cases that have been 
heard in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).40 I included three cases 
where the government is suspected, but has not been proven, to have played 
an active role. This includes attacks against journalists Bakhtiyor Sattori and 
Dodojon Atuvullo, and the assassination of opposition leader Umarali Quvvatov 
in Istanbul in March 2015. The date listed for each incident in Appendix II refers 
to the most serious incident. For example, if an individual is detained in Russia 
in 2014 and rendered to Tajikistan in 2015, then I have put the date as 2015. 
The list of 49 cases is unlikely to be exhaustive; many cases go unreported. 
The database nonetheless offers a useful complement to my other methods in 
analysing TASG. 
Semi-structured Interviews 
During my fieldwork, I conducted 32 interviews with journalists, lawyers, 
religious leaders and NGO employees.41 To select interviewees, I relied on 
personal contacts and snowball sampling. Some of these personal contacts 
were developed through my ethnography, such as attending events sponsored 
by NGOs or the Muftiate of European Russia, where I would meet a range of 
people. I contacted others via email or phone. Generally, having a personal 
introduction made it more likely that I would secure an interview. With the 
exception of five interviews in Dushanbe in 2013, where I conducted the 
interview with the help of an interpreter, I conducted all of the interviews on my 
own. Where possible I recorded the interviews on a dictaphone. But 
occasionally interviewees asked me to refrain from recording them and so I had 
to take written notes during the meetings. Although I tailored my questions for 
each interview, I tried to allow the conversation to develop as naturally as 
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 ‘Voluntary’ return refers to cases where the individual returned to Tajikistan following threats 
against family members at home. ‘Exile’ refers to the case of leader of the Islamic Renaissance 
Party Muhiddin Kabiri, who has been accused of financial crimes in Tajikistan and exiled to 
Europe. 
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 For a list of these cases, see Appendix V. 
41
 For a list of interviews, see Appendix IV. 
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possible.42 I took notes throughout the interview, probing the interviewee to 
elaborate on certain points. I transcribed and translated the interviews myself. 
Before outlining the chapters, I would like to mention a few caveats 
relating to my approach. First, although I adopt a critical approach to the 
government of Tajikistan’s management of security, I do not mean to valorise all 
members of the political opposition and denigrate government officials en 
masse. Many of those who oppose the regime seek to replace it with an equally 
authoritarian government, not all of those in government agree with all of its 
policies. Second, although I have profiled a range of individuals their views are 
not necessarily representative of their position as ‘women,’ ‘young people’ or 
‘Muslims.’ I do not seek to generalise from my ethnographic analysis to 
comment broadly on what is happening in Tajikistan. Instead, I explore how 
power works in specific sites of TASG. Lastly, I do not claim to ‘speak’ for the 
Tajik people and emancipate them from unjust power relations. Nonetheless, 
my study remains an exercise in political critique and I have used my research 
findings to publish numerous pieces criticising the government for cracking 
down on Muslims and the IRPT. I worked as a blogger at EurasiaNet.org and 
Exeter Central Asian Studies Network, written pieces for OpenDemocracy, the 
Jamestown Foundation, World Politics Review and The Diplomat, covering 
many of these issues with a critical gaze. I have maintained a dialogue with 
policy-makers, speaking at Chatham House, Royal United Services Institute, 
the State Department and Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I have also 
provided testimony for the asylum case of a Tajik citizen held in Guantanamo 
Bay. In other words, I do not claim to be an objective, disinterested observer; I 
am engaged, at least in part, in undermining both the dominant western 
representations of Central Asia and the excesses of Tajikistan’s security 
governance. To this end, I agree with Judith Butler that studying power forms 
“the very precondition of a politically engaged critique” (Butler 1995: 39). I have 
adopted a critical approach to TASG, which should be clear throughout this 
thesis. 
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Chapter Outline 
My thesis is broken down into six chapters, two of which are theoretical, and 
four of which are empirical. In Chapter One, I examine three features of TASG: 
security as process, practice and subjectification. I argue that the current 
literature on security governance remains largely pre-theoretical, normative and 
Eurocentric (Krahmann 2003; Webber et al 2004; Kirchner and Sperling 2007, 
cf. Bevir 2013). Rather than existing independently of human action, I argue that 
security is socially produced (Zedner 2009; Huysmans 1998; Buzan et al 1998). 
Studying securitisation – the process by which actors frame subjects and 
objects as threats – is not sufficient however. Drawing on insights from the 
sociological approaches within critical security studies, I argue that it is also 
important to examine the practices through which security is managed (Balzacq 
et al 2010; Bigo 2002; Husymans 2006). Having outlined my critical approach to 
security discourses and practices, I examine how security governance is 
undercut by relations of power which produce political subjects (Foucault 1981). 
In the final section of Chapter One, I outline authoritarian security governance, 
despite overlapping with liberal security governance, differs in important ways. 
Crucially, although liberal governance seeks to rule through responsible 
freedom, TASG is posited on the obedience of subjects (Sigley 2006; Dean 
2010). I also outline the relationship between security and the transnational, 
examining the limited literature on state security practices against citizens living 
abroad (Ragazzi 2009; Shain 1989). Finally, I examine the relationship between 
security, secularism and religion (Gutkowski 2014; Mavelli 2013). I argue that 
state-led securitisation of Islam is based on “assertive secularism” which frames 
religion as backwards, dangerous and in need of state regulation (Kuru 2007).  
 Having examined security governance from the top-down in Chapter 
One, in Chapter Two I turn my attention to the ways in which TASG shapes 
everyday life and the ways in which subjects can resist this. I situate my work 
within the recent ‘everyday’ turn in security studies and outline an approach to 
studying how security governance ‘works on the ground’ (Vaughan-Williams 
and Stevens 2015). Following Foucault, I argue that where there is power, there 
is resistance (Foucault 1981). Contrary to his critics, Foucault did not argue that 
subjects of power are necessarily docile (Pickett 1996; Heller 1996; Vinthagen 
and Lilja 2014). Instead, he developed an approach to the polyvalent, 
dispersed, anti-hegemonic practices of resistance enacted by political subjects. 
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Although a handful of studies of resistance against security exist, this literature 
remains relatively limited at present (Ryan 2015; Balzacq 2014; Guillaume 
2011). Resisting TASG involves resisting sovereign, disciplinary and biopower. 
Resisting sovereign power can involve open acts of defiance, or turning the law 
against those who are using it against you, for example by using human rights 
law to prevent being extradited. Resisting disciplinary power involves persisting 
with ‘abnormal’ behaviour. Finally resising biopower involves rejecting the 
pastoral care of elites.  
 In Chapter Three, I move on to the study of TASG in Tajikistan. I argue 
that the contemporary discourse on religion and security in Tajikistan remains 
post-Soviet in so far as Soviet ways of thinking and doing persist (Khalid 2003). 
To re-enforce this argument, in Chapter Three I use material from Soviet 
newspapers to examine the assumptions about the relationship between 
security and Islam which emerged at this time. Central to this is the 
government’s dichotomisation between ‘good,’ official, national Islam and ‘bad,’ 
unofficial, ‘foreign’ Islam. According to the hegemonic narrative, this latter form, 
often labelled as extremist, is backwards, potentially dangerous and backed by 
foreign powers. Instead of challenging these assumptions, much of the literature 
written by Sovietologists – Western experts on the USSR – reproduced them.43 
I argue that a large degree of intertextuality exists between Soviet and 
Sovietological writings on Islam and security in the Soviet Union (Saroyan 
1997). 
 In Chapter Four, I bring my analysis of the official discourse on religion 
and security up to the present. I use a Critical Discourse Analysis of 58 state 
media reports and nine presidential speeches to map the hegemonic narrative 
on Tajik citizens joining Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. I argue that this 
narrative resembles the Soviet discourse, but builds on this in a number of 
ways. Not only is radical Islam bad, it is foreign (begona). This alterity exists on 
three levels. Spatially, radical Islamists learn their ideas abroad or outside of the 
state’s gaze, whilst studying in ‘underground’ mosques, working as labour 
migrants in Russia or studying at madrassas in Pakistan. Morally, those who 
join radical groups betray their nation and bring shame on their families. Those 
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Soviet  Russia. Sovietology refers to the study of politics of the entire Soviet Union and 
communist eastern Europe.  
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who display signs of piety – such as wearing a hijab or beard - are accused of 
foreigner-worshipping (begonaparasti). Temporally, the Tajik government 
argues that the Tajik people are inherently peace-loving. Memories of the 
country’s civil war serve as a potent reminder of what happens if “alien” 
religious ideas are allowed to influence politics. This discourse sets the 
conditions for the emergence of TASG, legitimising the exercise of sovereign, 
disciplinary and biopower. It distinguishes between normal, ‘good’ Islam and 
abnormal, ‘bad’ Islam, securitizing the latter and calling calling for exceptional 
measures to be taken against individuals who participate in such ‘extremist’ 
practices. But it is not only destructive; it brings new forms of subjectivity into 
being, calling for Tajiks to embody secular, national values.  
 Having examined the emergence and consolidation of the security 
discourse, in Chapter Five I examine the range of measures used to govern 
radical Islam. These include examples of sovereign power, such as arresting 
‘extremists,’ forcibly returning those detained in Russia and banning certain 
groups deemed too radical. TASG also involves disciplinary power, the policing 
of ‘abnormal,’ ‘foreign,’ ‘bad’ Islam. In Tajikistan, the police have forcibly shaved 
men’s beards and forced women to de-veil. Finally, TASG involves biopower; 
the state promotes “healthy,” secular lifestyles as a bulwark against 
radicalisation. The aim is transform citizens into secular subjects who monitor 
themselves and engage in horizontal surveillance against other members of 
their community. Using ethnography, I explore how these practices shape 
everyday life and create insecurity for those subjected by them. 
 Nonetheless, even though power pervades the system, security subjects 
do have the opportunity to resist even in authoritarian settings. In Chapter Six, I 
examine the myriad ways in which pious Tajik migrants can challenge the 
oppressive politics of TASG. Using ethnography, I examine the ways in which 
subjects can resist the relations of sovereign, disciplinary and biopower that 
underpin transnational authoritarian security governance. Rather than being 
transformational, centralised and counter-hegemonic, I argue that resistance is 
often opportunistic, momentary, decentralised and anti-hegemonic.  
 I conclude the thesis with some statements about the implications of my 
research for studies of Central Asia, international relations and security studies. 
I suggest questions that arise from the research and explore the potential for 
further scholarly inquiry into these. 
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Chapter 1: Dynamics of Transnational Authoritarian Security Governance 
In this chapter, I develop an approach to the ways in which elites construct and 
manage security threats. I examine what security is, the ways in which 
hegemonic discourses create objects of security that need to be protected: the 
“people,” “society,” the “state,” and the “nation,” how security is managed and 
how this shapes political subjects. In other words, I examine security as 
process, security as practice and security as subjectification. Ontologically, 
security is essentially contested (Baldwin 1997; Huysmans 1998). Actors 
disagree over what security is and who, or what, it should protect. Security is an 
objective state of being, but a subjective process of becoming. Threats do not 
exist outside of the discourses that frame them in the language of security 
(Campbell 1998). Whilst the ‘Copenhagen School’ of security studies offers a 
ground-breaking analysis of this process of securitisation, a focus on discourse 
alone is not sufficient (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998). Practices are 
equally important to the politics of security (Balzacq et al 2010; Neumann 2002). 
Once a threat has been identified, action must be taken. Governments, NGOs 
and private companies have developed security governance regimes to address 
security threats (Krahmann 2003). Many of these governance regimes are 
transnational, spanning state borders. In approaching security governance, I 
argue that the sociological approaches outlined by adherents of the ‘Paris 
School’ offer a way to think through both security discourses and security 
practices (Bigo 1996; Bigo and Walker 2007; Guzzini, 2000; Huysmans 2006; 
Adler and Pouilot 2011; Leander 2005; Adler-Nissen 2008). The management 
of threats is undercut by relations of power. These relations of power divide 
citizens into those who are threats – the extremists, terrorists and illegal 
immigrant – and those who are threatened; it subjectifies citizens. Security 
discourses and practices shape the subject-positions of both those labelled a 
threat – the subjects of securitisation – and those deemed to be threatened – 
the subjects of security.  
 The term security governance captures this complex interplay of 
securitising discourses and security practices, which are undercut by relations 
of power that create political subjects. Rather than examining how Tajikistan 
should manage the threat posed by radical Islam, an aspiration that would be in 
keeping with the normative, functionalist agenda set by many traditional 
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scholars of security governance, I am interested in how Tajik security 
governance functions and how it is related to regimes of power. In theorising 
TASG, I draw on the work of Michel Foucault.  For Foucault, power was not 
something that agents posess and wield. Instead, power exists in relations 
between subjects and objects. Power is not always about destruction; it can be 
productive too. Foucault theorised three types of power. Sovereign power 
protects the ruler by seizing life and using violence. Disciplinary power trains, 
disciplines and forces subjects to conform to the norm. Biopower focuses on 
promoting the life of the population, making life live (Foucault 1981).44 All three 
forms of power work within TASG. 
The chapter unfolds as follows: in the first section, “Approaching 
Security,” I outline debates surrounding the ontology of security, security as 
process, security as practice and security as subjectification. I introduce the 
Foucault’s triangle of power: sovereign, disciplinary and biopower. In the next 
section, I critique the atheoretical, Eurocentric security governance literature. I 
outline how, despite similarities, authoritarian security governance differs from 
its liberal counterpart. Having outlined my approach to the interrelationship of 
security as discourse, security as practice and security as subjectification, in the 
second section of the chapter I start to theroise the relationship between 
security and the other concepts that form the focus of my thesis: the 
religious/secular and transnationalism. I argue that migration has been 
securitised and that Muslims have been singled out as a group that resists 
assimilation and whose values conflict with secular modernity (Croft 2012). This 
response to religion and religious migrants, I argue, is based on a secularist 
understanding of security (Mavelli 2013). Before, examining these concepts, I 
start my analysis by looking at the central theme of this thesis: security. 
 
Approaching Security 
The Concept of Security 
‘Traditional,’ realist-inspired scholars of security focus on the ways in which 
rational, self-interested states, existing in an anarchical system, used military 
force to pursue their political aims, the most important of which was survival 
                                                          
44
 For an overview of biopower and the ways it has been conceptualised by Foucault and 
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(Waltz 1959; Mearscheimer 2001; Walt 1987).45 As a field of inquiry, ‘traditional’ 
security studies limits itself to “the study of the threat, use and control of military 
force” (Walt 1991: 212). According to theorists associated with ‘traditional’ 
security studies, the state constitutes the referent object of security and warfare 
the main threat to the security of the state system (Baldwin 1995). Although 
liberal theorists have questioned the state’s propensity to use restraint rather 
than force, they retain the state-centric focus on national security (Keohane and 
Nye 1989; Baldwin 1993). As Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin note, “for better 
or for worse institutional theory is a half-sibling of neo-realism” (Keohane and 
Martin 1995: 3). Both liberalism and realism remain rationalist, state-centric, 
ontologically essentialist and epistemologically positivist. Following these 
approaches, security can be objectively measured by examining a state’s 
military and economic capabilities.46 Actors can precisely define security; it 
exists objectively of human interaction rather than being a derivative of it.  
In recent decades, a number of critical scholars have sought to challenge 
these assumptions.  Critical approaches to security have challenged traditional 
conceptualisation of the nature and type of security threats, the narrow 
definition of security centred on survival and the referent object that security 
measures seek to protect: the state. Influenced by post-structuralist and 
constructivist thinkers, theorists within critical security studies have argued that, 
rather than existing independently of social relations, security threats are inter-
subjectively constituted within discourses (Ashley 1984; Ashley and Walker 
1990; Shapiro and Der Derian 1989; Wendt 1999; Krause and Williams 1997; 
Waever et al 1993; Campbell 1998; Weber 1996; Weldes et al. 1999).47  
Security is a slippery, essentially contested concept (Zedner 2003; 2009; 
Valverde 2011; Huysmans 1998; Baldwin 1997). Indeed, by looking at the 
definition and etymology of the word security, the ‘traditional’ objective reading 
appears misplaced. Security derives from the Latin securitas, meaning freedom 
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 I use the term ‘traditional,’ following Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams and 
others, to refer to positivist theories of security, most notably realism and liberalism (Peoples 
and Vaughan-Williams 2015). The realist literature is vast and diverse. For an overview of 
different approaches and assumptions within realism, see Donnelly 2000 and Glaser 2009. 
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 Ashley Tellis, for example, identifies three spheres that, taken together, constitute national 
power: national resources, national performance and military capability (Tellis 2000). 
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 Critical Security Studies is a broad field, with a range of different perspectives and 
approaches some of which I pick up on in subsequent sections. For overviews of the 
interllectual history of critical approaches to security, and debates within and between 
approaches, see, Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2015; Fierke 2015; Williams 2010; Sheehan 
2005). 
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from concern, care or anxiety, and a state of self-assurance or confidence. At its 
most basic level security involves “being and feeling safe from harm and 
danger” (Fierke 2015: 7). It is therefore inherently subjective, based on an 
individual’s lived experiences, feelings and emotions. Security is always site 
specific; it’s ontology is dependent on local understandings of what security is 
and who it is for. Nils Bubandt uses the term “vernacular security” to refer to this 
situatedness of security. Local politics matter, Bubandt argues: 
 
When the global concept of security is contextualized in terms of 
local political histories, it becomes apparent that ‘security’ as a 
political problem is neither unchanging nor semantically 
homogenous. Complex processes of accommodation, rejection and 
reformulation take place in the interstices between global, national 
and local representations of security. These processes, in turn, are 
related to the political history of the local ontological ways in which 
danger, risk and (in)security are defined (Bubandt 2005: 276). 
 
Bubandt calls for an anthropological approach to security that “does not reduce 
local ontologies of uncertainty to current political (and political science) 
conceptualizations of security” (Bubandt 2005: 278).  
Security is ontologically unstable; actors can contest what security is, 
who or what it is being secured and who or what constitutes a threat.  Security 
and insecurity are interlinked terms; “we can never think security without 
insecurity,” (Dillon 1996: 120).  Traditionally, academics have considered 
security and insecurity as antonyms. Security is defined in negative terms; it is 
characterised by an absence of threat or danger. Insecurity, conversely, is 
theorised as a lack that can be solved by the provision of security objects (Nye 
and Lynn-Jones 1988). As such, in its objective form, “security is nothing but the 
absence of the evil of insecurity” (Wolfers 1962: 488). Rather than considering 
the relationship between security and insecurity as diametric, I argue that they 
exist in a relationship of mutual definition, an agonal relationship (Dillon 1996). 
As Anthony Burke argues, the binary between security and insecurity “breaks 
down when we consider that because ‘security’ is bound into a dependent 
relationship with ‘insecurity,’ it can never escape it: it must continue to produce 
images of ‘insecurity’ in order to retain meaning” (Burke 2002: 20). What 
emerges is a view that rather than being binary categories, security/insecurity 
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exist on a semantic continuum (Huysmans 2006). In order to reflect this 
relationship, Michael Dillon suggests the term “(in)security” (Dillon 1996).  
 In this thesis, I am interested in the practices of governance which 
appeal to ‘security.’ I agree with Mariana Valverde that we should not think 
about security as a “thing, a concept or a condition but rather as an umbrella 
term under which one can see a multiplicity of governance processes” 
(Valverde 2011: 5).  It is these processes of security governance that I examine 
in the empirical chapters. In addition to questioning the objective nature of 
security, scholars have also called for a broadening of security studies to 
include a wider array of threats such as environmental degradation and 
migration, and a deepening of security to incorporate a broader spectrum of 
actors operating at different levels in the international system, including sub-
state groups and supra-state organisations (Krause and Williams 1997).  As Ole 
Waever has argued, the division between ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ obscures the 
large amount of internal variation within each approach (Waever 2004). Whilst 
all critical approaches question the ontological essentialism, epistemological 
positivism and primacy of the state engendered within traditional studies, a 
range a divergent range of intellectual projects exist.  Indeed, a number of 
loosely defined ‘schools’ have emerged in recent years (Waever 2004; C.A.S.E 
2006). The ‘Welsh School,’ centred around Ken Booth and Richard Wyn-Jones, 
has linked the study of security to the goal of human emancipation (Booth 
1991). Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and their followers – the ‘Copenhagen 
School’- have focused on theorising securitisation, the process by which 
political issues become security threats (Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998). 
Scholars from the Paris School have developed a sociologically-inspired 
approach to the politics of everyday security practices (Huysmans 2006; Bigo 
1996). Finally, post-structuralist approaches linked security to power relations 
and the process by which citizens become political subjects (Dillon 1996; 
Ashley 1987). The division of critical security studies into schools is a heuristic 
device.48 In reality, such a categorisation “can be misleading if taken too 
seriously […] Aberystwyth, Copenhagen and Paris are dispersed locations 
associated with specific individuals and debates, much more than unitary 
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rejected this categorisation. 
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schools of thought” (C.A.S.E 2006: 444). In the following section, I introduce 
three of the facets of security that shape my approach to transnational security 
governance. First, security is a process through which elites frame issues in the 
language of security. Second, security is a set of practices through which elites 
aim to manage identified threats. Third, security is a process of subjectification 
by which those it seeks to protect, and those it seeks to neutralise, are rendered 
into political subjects. 
 
Security as Process  
 
Developed in the years following the Cold War, securitisation theorists focus on 
the process by which actors frame phenomena as security threats (Waever et al 
1993; Waever 1995; Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998; Balzacq 2011).49 This 
process of framing something as a security threat is performative rather than 
constative.  In the words of Barry Buzan and his colleagues, “security is thus a 
self-referential practice because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a 
security issue- not necessarily because a real existential threat exists” (Buzan, 
Waever and de Wilde 1998: 24).  Security threats exist in so far as they are 
labelled threats by social actors. For example, during the 1980s government 
agencies in Europe increasingly represented migration as a potential threat to 
security, emphasising its potential to destabilise public order and erode national 
culture (Huysmans 2000). Migration control is imbricated in the language of 
security; migration has become securitised. For the ‘Copenhagen School’ 
theorists, securitisation is based on a “speech act” (Austin 1962). As pioneering 
securitisation theorist Ole Waever argues, the word security “is the act […] by 
saying it something is done” (Waever 1995: 55). 
According to linguist J.L Austin, certain utterances, such as saying “I do” at 
a wedding, are performative; by saying something, we do something more than 
just speaking.  For Austin: 
Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain 
consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actions of the 
audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons: and it may be done 
with the design, intention, or purpose of producing them (Austin 
1962: 101).   
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Securitisation necessitates a certain response by the relevant actors to remove 
the threat (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998).  By labelling something a threat, 
it is lifted out of the sphere of criminality or politics and into the sphere of 
security, thereby allowing for extraordinary measures to be used against its 
perpetrators. Securitisation involves framing issues “ as a special kind of politics 
or as above politics’ (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998: 23).This process is 
neither objective nor subjective, but rather is inter-subjective. Securitisation is 
only possible when an actor frames an issue as an existential threat and the 
constituents of the referent object which as threat, in this case the citizens of the 
state, accept it as such.50  Whilst I agree with the Copenhagen theorists that 
objects become security threats when actors label them as such, a number of 
gaps exist in their theory.  
A number of scholars associated with the ‘second generation’ of 
securitization theory have criticised, modified and enhanced the ‘Copenhagen 
School’s’ approach (Stritzel 2005, 2014; Balzacq 2005; 2011; Donnelly 2013; 
McDonald 2008; Vuori 2008). First, the ‘Copenhagen School’s’ definition of 
security, which focuses on the Schmittian concept of the ‘politics of exception,’ 
is too restrictive (Huysmans 1998; Williams 2003).51 It neglects the importance 
of the social context in which the speech act takes place and the role of the 
audience in accepting or rejecting the securitisation move (Bigo 2002; Balzacq 
2005; Stritzel 2011; Meyer 2009; Eriksson 1999). Thierry Balzacq (2005) argues 
that the ‘Copenhagen School’s’ focus on the securitizing speech act itself (the 
illocutionary act) rather than its effects (the perlocutionary act). In doing so, they 
neglect the importance of the audience in accepting or contesting securitising. 
Building on Balzacq’s argument, Holger Stritzel has drawn attention to the ways 
in which securitisation theory suffers from a fixed, acontextual conceptualisation 
of the security speech act (Stritzel 2011). Rather, everyday security talk and 
everyday security practices are “an always (situated and iterative) process of 
generating meaning” (Stritzel 2007: 366, emphasis in original). Second, the 
‘Copenhagen School’ fails to fully appreciate the co-constitutive relationship 
between the speech act and the speaker’s power (Foucault 1994b). Not 
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 Thierry Balzacq argues that the Copenhagen School neglects the importance of the 
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 Carl Schmitt, a German political theorist, who wrote that politics is centred on the division 
between friends and enemies. As such, “the sovereign is he who decides on the exception” 
(Schmitt, 1985: 5). 
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everyone is in a position within the social structure to label something a security 
threat. Indeed, the ability to label something as a security threat has specific 
consequences - it is a “political technology in the hegemonic project of various 
agents” (Jackson 2007: 421).  Indeed, as I will argue later in this chapter, the 
process which actors seek to fix the meaning of concepts within a discourse is 
directly related to their hegemony; “discourse is meaning in the service of 
power” (Fairclough 1992: 4). Lastly, although securitisation theory usefully 
highlights the process by which actors label security threats and begins to link 
such labelling to security practices, as Shahar Hamieri and Lee Jones observe, 
“very little of this literature explores how security problems, once identified, are 
managed in practice or how the systems established to manage them actually 
operate. That is, they neglect security governance” (Hamieri and Jones 2015: 
3). Security does not end with the speech act (CASE 2006). Before turning to 
governance, I will first introduce security as a practice.  
 
Security as Practice 
Although securitisation incorporates practice through its use of speech-act 
theory and the idea that securitising something leads to measures being taken 
to counter the threat, practice does not form the centre of the ‘Copenhagen 
School’s’ approach. Studying discourses of security only provides insights into 
how objects, or subjects, come to be constructed as threats. It leads to a bias 
towards studying the elites who construct security discourses (Huysmans and 
Guillaume 2013; Walters and D’Aoust 2015). In doing so, it neglects the 
conditions of possibility from which security discourses emerge and the 
‘everyday’ practices of agents (Bigo 2002; Balzacq et al 2010). Instead of only 
studying the contingency, openness and instability of discourses, I am interested 
in the ways discourses shape the meaning of practices. Discourse and practice 
are inextricably linked to one another; “practice cannot be thought ‘outside of’ 
discourse” and vice versa (Neumann 2002: 628). Studying security practices 
allows us to understand what effects the process of securitisation has on the 
politics of security. In other words, studying practices and discourses allows us 
to understand how security operates.  
The turn to practice in security studies reflects a broader ‘practice’ turn 
social theory associated with thinkers such as Pierre Bourdieu, Ludwig 
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Wittgenstein and Erving Goffman (Schatzki et al 2000). Emmanuel Adler and 
Vincent Pouilot, who have applied a practice-centred approach to global politics, 
define practices as: 
Socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed 
more or less competently, simultaneously embody, act out, and 
possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the 
material world” (Adler and Pouilot 2011: 4). 
Practices, unlike actions, are repeated to the point that they become naturalised, 
playing themselves out in often mundane ways as part of everyday life. They 
exhibit regularities over time and space, allowing other actors to respond in 
appropriate ways. As such, practices are relational and integrative; they bring 
actors together in relations of enmity or amity. This relationality contributes to 
the durability of practice. As Ann Swidler argues, practices “remain stable not 
only because habit engrains standard ways of doing things, but the need to 
engage one another forces people to return to common structures” (Swidler 
2001: 85). Practices are imbued with symbolism; they are performances (Butler 
1990; Goffman 1959). Practice relies on background knowledge, which makes it 
socially intelligible to those involved. Without discourse, practice would be 
meaningless and unintelligible. For example, Russian police checking the 
documents of Central Asian migrants travelling on the Moscow metro constitutes 
a practice. It is formulaic, often repeated and embedded with meanings. 
Document checks constitute a display of government power and a performance 
of the control of migration. Whilst sending signals to passers-by indicating that 
migration is under control, this conceals the fact that the security officials are 
heavily invested in the continuation of illegal migration to Russia.  
 In recent years, scholars within security studies have started to take 
practices more seriously, placing them at the centre of the research agenda and 
arguing for “more sociologically sophisticated theories of security” (Williams 
2007: 1; Neumann 2002; Balzacq et al 2010). This involves taking emphasis on 
‘exceptional’ and ‘everyday’ practices of security. Security practices range from 
passport checks to urban planning to constructing cities that will be ‘resilient’ to 
terrorist attacks to using force against enemy combatants. Scholars associated 
with the ‘Paris School’ of security studies have led the way in theorising security 
practices (Bigo 1996; Bigo and Walker 2007; Guzzini 2000; Huysmans 2006; 
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Adler and Pouilot 2011; Leander 2005; Adler-Nissen 2008).52 For them, studying 
securitisation discourses is not sufficient. Instead, “representational practice has 
to be studied in terms of its imbrication within a range of practices that are not 
reducible to the linguistic model” (Walters 2010: 219). Academics who adopt 
sociological approaches to security have placed it within a wider array of 
practices of citizenship, violence and political agencies. For them, security is as 
much about the processes of profiling passengers in airports and filling in risk 
assessments at work, as it is about nuclear weapons control and the balance of 
power.  
The ‘Paris School’ is a loose coalition of critical scholars. Nonetheless, 
they all adhere to a number of commitments. They move beyond the purely 
discursive approaches of the ‘Copenhagen School,’ arguing that definitions of 
security are embedded within complex social relations (Huysmans 2006). 
Security is a technique of governing danger and as such a key domain of social 
practice. The key question for researchers becomes: “How does one 
conceptualize the politics of insecurity as a contested process of framing politics 
and social relations in security terms?” (Huysmans 2006: 145). According to Jef 
Huysmans, security and politics are both symbolic and technocratic. What is 
interesting is “not the threats that are defined in discourses of danger, but the 
processes through which fragmented practices are woven into domains of 
insecurity that are defined by the logics of security practice that traverse and 
connect events, institutional sites, skills, knowledge etc.” (Huysmans 2006: 
153). In approaching security, those associated with the ‘Paris School’ have 
called for an “international political sociology” (IPS) approach (Bigo and Walker 
2007).53 
Second, ‘Paris School’ theorists have focused on the role of security 
professionals in shaping what security is and who it is for.54 Utilising Pierre 
Bourdieu’s relational sociology, a range of scholars have attempted to map the 
security field. Didier Bigo traces the reconfiguration of the “security field” in the 
post-cold war period. Rather than focusing on culture, Bigo concentrates on the 
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ways in which uncertainty, danger and unease have proliferated in the 
discourses of western liberal security professionals. Unease - the inability to 
cope with everyday life – remains omnipresent. Where traditionally the military 
dealt with national security and the police protected internal security, this 
distinction is no longer tenable. Globalisation has led to the weakening of 
borders, proliferation of ‘common’ threats and, in response, the development of 
“a field of professionals of the management of unease” (Bigo 2008: 10). 
Security professionals, the police, military, non-governmental organisations and 
private security firms populate this field. More recently, Michael C. Williams has 
examined how this field developed after the end of the cold war. In his book 
Culture and Security, Williams argues that there has been a reconfiguration of 
the “field of security, where military and material power, while remaining 
significant, were repositioned within what might be called a cultural field of 
security that privileged cultural and symbolic forms of power” (Williams 2007: 2). 
According to these analyses, security is not an objective reality, but emerges 
from discursive struggles and cultural practices.  
Lastly, whereas the ‘Copenhagen School’ tends to overlook the role of 
power, it forms a central dynamic of the politics of security in the ‘Paris School’s’ 
approach (Stritzel 2007). Sociological theories of security not only incorporate 
ideas of security as the relational process through which agents produce and 
respond to dangers, but, following Foucault, excavate the power relations that 
underpin these processes.  Instead of being purely destructive, following 
Foucault, power is productive; “power resides in neither the actors alone, nor 
the structure itself, but in the relations between the two” (Williams 2007: 124). 
The language of security is used to “exclude in the name of protection and […] 
discriminate within society” (Bigo 2008: 105). Security professionals attempt to 
categorise risks, profile groups and evaluate dangers. In doing so, they divide 
the normal from the abnormal, the ordinary from the exceptional. Security 
remains a simulacrum of itself; it simultaneously frees and traps us (Bigo 2008).  
I will explore this central paradox of (in)security in the next section. 
Sociological approaches to the study of (in)security entail a number of 
benefits. Moving beyond the securitisation theory of the Copenhagen School, 
the Paris School offers a sociologically nuanced account of “who is doing the 
(in)securitization move, under what conditions, towards who and with what 
consequences” (Bigo 2008 128). Field analysis, as I outlined above, allows us 
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to overcome the boundary between state and non-state; this facilitates an 
approach that reflects the transnational topography of security (Bigo 2001). 
Field analysis also captures the struggles for power that exist in the ‘language 
games’ between security professionals, academics and other actors over what 
security is and who it is for, in other words “legitimate knowledge on what 
constitutes a legitimate unease, a real risk.” (Bigo 2008: 12). It reflects a reality 
in which no-one is omnipotent; “no actor can be the master of the game, but in 
which everyone’s knowledge and technological resources produce a hierarchy 
of threats” (Bigo 2002: 76). The ‘Paris School’ constitutes an interdisciplinary 
approach, which incorporates insights from sociology, surveillance studies, 
police studies amongst others (Bigo 2008).  In doing so, it overcomes many of 
the limitations of traditional approaches to security, which focus solely upon 
governments, armies and states.  It also overcomes some of the shortcomings 
of purely discursive approaches, which tend to treat discourses as determining 
and fail to theorise the interplay between discourse and practice. As Bigo notes, 
“naming is important, but language is part of reality, not all reality” (Bigo 2001: 
98). The ‘Paris School’ helps us to take discursive, visual and embodied 
security practices more seriously (Adler-Nissen 2012b). 
Nevertheless, a number of gaps in the research offered by the ‘Paris 
School’ and IPS approaches exist. First, their interrogations into balancing of 
security and liberty remain largely Eurocentric.  In 1997 Mohammed Ayoob 
observed that security studies remains dominated by Westerners and Western 
modes of thought (Ayoob 1997).  Most studies within the ‘Paris School’ have 
focused on the western liberal field of security (Bigo 2008; Huysmans 2006; 
Williams 2007; Berling 2012). Few academics have taken the Paris School 
approach beyond the West.55 Since Ayoob’s critique of the Eurocentric 
discourse on security from within academia, a number of scholars have begun 
writing from a “post-colonial” perspective on security (Acharya and Buzan 2007; 
Vasiliaki 2012; Barkawi and Laffey 2006).  Such analyses draw on non-western 
conceptions of security in theory and practice (Tsygankov and Tsygankov 
2010).  Second, the Paris School theorists are yet to fully examine the 
relationship between (in)security, secularism and religion. Although scholars 
have examined the management of unease related to migration, hooliganism 
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and EU enlargement, few scholars have investigated the ways in which 
religiosity and secularity can create fear (Tsoukala 2009). I intend to fill this gap. 
Lastly, the use of discourse analysis and elite interviews by researchers has led 
to a tendency for analysts to study security from the top-down, focusing almost 
exclusively on the government’s management of fear (Bigo 2006). What is 
missing is how political subjects respond to these security practices.  Here the 
‘Paris School’ would benefit from ethnographic approaches which take the 
political subject as the focus of enquiry into how government-produced fear 
shapes subject-positions and the ways in which subjects resist the politics of 
security.56 It is to this relationship between security, power and subjectification 
that I now turn.  
 
Security as Subjectification 
 
A number of post-structuralist scholars have examined the ways in which 
security discourses and practices configure the boundaries of subjectivity 
(Walker 1997; Dillon 1990, 1996; Agathangelou and Ling 2005; Epstein 2011; 
Shepherd 2007). Subjects are not fixed. Instead, they are produced through 
discourses and practices.57 Practising security involves subjectification, the 
process by which individuals become political subjects (Dillon 2004; Walker 
1997). Be they labelled a ‘patriot, a ‘terrorist’ or a ‘radical,’ individuals are ‘made 
up’ by the social categories that experts and administrators invent to label and 
organise them (Rose and Miller 1992: 174). This assignment of subjective 
positions is a process of becoming not being. People are not born as ‘terrorists’ 
or ‘Islamic extremists,’ they become them through processes of labelling and 
practice that are undercut by relations of power. As Rob Walker succinctly puts 
it, “modern accounts of security are precisely about subjectivity, subjection and 
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the conditions under which we have been constructed as subjects subject to 
subjection” (Walker 1997: 72).Defining subject positions involves privileging 
some forms of being over others; it is therefore inextricably interwoven with 
relations of power (Foucault 1982).  
This exercise of power through subjectification is related to both two 
processes that are essential to governance: the formation of social identity and 
the legitimisation of those who govern. Security is essentially about defining the 
poltical community against a dangerous, foreign Other (Stern 2006; Campbell 
1998; Hansen 2006; Lynn Doty 1998; Smith 2000; Zehfuss 2001). It is about 
demarcating between secure and insecure subjects. This division rests on the 
binary between a safe, sovereign inside and an outside characterised by 
indeterminacy, fear, and anarchy (Campbell 1998). These discourses of danger 
do not only help construct group identities. By uniting a community against a 
common enemy, discourses of danger also help to legitimate relations of power 
(Barker 2007). As Juha Vuori puts it, “security is a strong legitimator” (Vuori 
2008: 68). Maintaining order in the face of danger is a central justification for 
government. In Making Enemies, Rodney Barker argues that danger and 
political legitimacy are inextricably interlinked. As he argues, “without threats 
and the enemies who pose them, states and government would be 
unnecessary” (Barker 2007: 8). Providing security is a crucial means through 
which governments defend their powers. 
In theorising the relationship between security, power and subjectivity, I 
draw on the path-breaking work of Michel Foucault. As Foucault argued, 
delimiting subject positions is an exercise in power. Whether by executing a 
criminal for murder or promoting healthy lifestyles that will benefit public health, 
power is inherently linked to security. It is about securing the ruler, the individual 
or the entire population.  As Foucault argues, security practices aim to “achieve 
an overall equilibrium that protects the security of the whole from internal 
dangers” (Foucault 2003: 249). Exercising power involves securing the majority 
of the population against abnormalities in an attempt to prevent “all the possible 
forms of the irruption of danger” (Castel, 1991: 288). As Michael Dillon and 
Andrew Neal argue in the introduction to Foucault on Politics, Security and War, 
“sorting life requires waging war on behalf of life against life forces that are 
inimical to life.” (Dillon and Neal 2008: 8). This is the central paradox of security: 
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in attempting to achieve security, actors must use violence and thus make 
others insecure. 
 As Jan Selby identifies, scholars have applied Foucault to international 
relations and security studies in three ways (Selby 2007). First, drawing in 
particular on Foucault’s ‘archaeological’ writings, academics used Foucault to 
uncover the power relations that underly the disciplines dominant theory, 
neorealism (Ashley 1984; Walker 1993; Shapiro and Der Derian 1989).58 
Second, critical scholars have used Foucault to theorise the liberal world order 
(Larner and Walters 2004; Dillon and Reid 2001; 2009; Hardt and Negri 2000).  
For Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, this is a “globalized biopolitical machine” 
where life is regulated by transnational corporations (Hardt and Negri 2000). 
Third, less ambitiously, Foucault has been used to examine discreet political 
sites and technologies of control (Shapiro, Edkins and Pin-Fat 2004; Salter 
2007; Bigo 2002). It is this third, more circumspect, Foucauldian approach that I 
adopt in this thesis.  
Power and its relation to subjectification lies at the heart of Foucault’s 
intellectual project.59 In his analysis of prisons, schools and hospitals, Foucault 
demonstrated how relations of power saturate through all levels of human 
existence. Rather than being something that actors possess and wield, 
according to Foucault, power is a relation between agents. For him, power “is 
never localized here or there, never in anybody’s hands, never appropriated as 
a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a 
net-like organization” (Foucault 1994b: 98). To study power, according to 
Foucault, we need to examine the “interplay between the terms of the 
relationship” between different institutions, objects and subjects (Foucault 2003: 
168). Power, therefore, is decentred and polyvalent, rather than hierarchical. 
Power is not always destructive; it can be productive too. It produces political 
subjects. As Foucault argues, “rather than asking ourselves what the sovereign 
looks like from on high we should be trying to discover how multiple bodies, 
forces, energies, matters, desires, thoughts, and so on are gradually and 
materially constituted as subjects, or the subject” (Foucault 1980: 121). Through 
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power, subjects are “gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted 
through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, 
thoughts etc” (Foucault 1994b: 35).  
Foucault theorises three types of power. Sovereign power, focuses on 
maintaining the “safety of the Prince and his territory’ (Foucault 2004: 65). 
Disciplinary power attempts to render visible the spatial distribution of bodies in 
order to exert control over them. Finally, biopower takes life itself as its referent 
object and focuses on the management of populations (Dillon and Neal 2008: 
13). Having outlined these key components of the Foucauldian approach to 
power, in the next section I examine each of these three components of 
Foucault’s “triangle of power” in turn.60 
 
Sovereign Power 
 
Sovereign power constitutes the ability to take life or let live. It is the forbidding 
power of law, violence and control of territory. This repressive legal-sovereign 
power stops and limits certain behaviours. As Foucault notes, “power in this 
instance was effectively the right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and 
ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to 
supress it” (Foucault 1981: 136). Foucault presents the sovereign power as 
legislative, prohibitive and censoring; a power that primarily makes use of the 
law and law-like regulations. In other words, it is “police-like control, a power 
exercised in a top-down manner through various decrees and administrative 
measures emanating from the state” (Foucault 2007: 24). It enforces by agents 
of the state (the police, tax collectors, the army) who enforce the law by 
exacting penalties for violations. As Michael Dillon and Julian Reid (2000: 128) 
explain sovereign power seeks to “summon […] a form of life amenable to its 
sway” (2000: 128). But sovereign power is not the only form of power that exists 
in the modern world. 
 Security is not just about the sovereign question of survival, and the 
exceptional measures taken to ensure this, but also the management and well-
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being of the population. It is not just about the top-down provision of security 
aimed at protecting the sovereign. As Foucault famously quipped, “we need to 
cut off the king’s head; in political theory that has still to be done” (Foucault 
1991a). In Discipline and Punish, Foucault examines how in the late eighteenth 
century a new form of power emerged: 
 
“Deduction” has tended to be no longer the major form of power but 
merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce 
control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power 
bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, 
rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or 
destroying them (Foucault 1977: 136).  
Although sovereign power has not been replaced, Foucault also drew attention 
to the mechanisms of power through which institutions colonise space and 
influence behaviour. He called this new series of relationships disciplinary 
power. 
Disciplinary Power 
 
Unlike sovereign power which is based on the clearly-defined law, disciplinary 
power is based on the discursively-defined norm. As such, “the code they come 
to define is not that of law but that of normalization” (Foucault 1994b:  44). This 
“normalizing society” involves the calculated administration of life built on 
dividing practices that distinguish those who are normal, and those who are 
abnormal, and potentially risky (Foucault 1983: 208). To enforce the norm, 
disciplinary power uses an array of techniques including training, examination, 
the functional organisation of space, the use of timetables, drills, categorisation 
and detailed surveillance. The ‘abnormal’ is subject to corrective or therapeutic 
techniques that aim to reform, fix or rehabilitate him or her (Johnston 1991: 
149–169).  Rather than prohibiting certain behaviours like sovereign power, it 
aims to encourage individuals to monitor, train and discipline themselves. 
Instead of only repressing deviant subjects, governments become “managers of 
life” aiming to “ensure, sustain, and multiply life [and] put this life in order” 
(Foucault 1981: 138).  
Disciplinary power shapes and normalises subjects. According to 
Foucault, “discipline makes individuals; it is the specific technique of power that 
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regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise” (Foucault 
1991a: 170). This involves the management of populations and individual 
subjects through practices of self-regulation. Individuals make and are made by 
disciplinary power; they are the “objects and instruments of its exercise’ 
(Foucault 1977: 170). Unlike sovereign power, which operates through visible 
agents of the state, disciplinary power is diffuse in its operation. While sovereign 
power directly affects a small minority of criminals, disciplinary power affects 
virtually all aspects of living, subjecting everyone to regulation through 
institutions such as schools and hospitals. Foucault examined the ways in which 
institutions divided individuals into those who are deemed normal, and therefore 
responsible enough to be free to regulate themselves, and those who are 
deviated from the correct path and needed to be disciplined. Disciplinary power 
aims to harness the body for the good of society. It targets “the body as a 
machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its 
forces, the parallel increase in usefulness and its docility, its integration into 
systems of efficient and economic controls (Foucault 1984: 261). 
According to the Foucauldian notion of power relations, “power comes 
from below; that is, there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between 
rulers and ruled at the root of power relations, and serving as a general matrix” 
(Foucault 1981: 94). Whereas disciplinary power isolates, concentrates and is 
essentially protectionist, by contrast biopower is said to be centrifugally oriented 
in favour of expansion, circulation and movement. Instead of focusing on the 
safety of the sovereign or the disciplining of individual bodies, biopower focuses 
on the security of the population, granting the right to make live and let die. 
While disciplinary power is a micro-technology, working on individual bodies, 
biopower is a macro-technology, working on entire populations (Taylor 2013: 
45). Biopower is “part of a new type of governing for which life is a reservoir that 
must be tapped into rather than subjected to legal or disciplinary strictures” 
(Wallenstein 2013: 17). 
Biopower 
Biopower fosters life or disallows it to the point of death (Foucault 1990: 138). It 
exerts a positive influence on life, insisting on the right of the social body to 
ensure, maintain, or develop its life. What needs to be secured is no longer the 
juridical existence of sovereign but the biological survival of the population. 
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Characteristically, Foucault uses biopower inconsistently and its meaning shifts 
through his texts (Lemke 2011). When he first introduced biopower in History of 
Sexuality, Volume 1, he used it to describe the historical moment at which point 
species life began to emerge as a referent of politics and security. In later work, 
he used biopolitics to refer to the racial politics built on eugenics that led to the 
genocide of entire populations (Foucault 2003). And he also uses the term to 
denote the emergence of a form of individual self-governance.  
Biopower encompasses the health and ‘effectiveness’ of the population of 
a collectivity. Foucault highlights how biopower emerged in the eighteenth 
century when the authorities “brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of 
explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of 
human life” (Foucault 1981:143). During this period, governments began 
focusing on the optimisation of the population for economic growth and 
development through programs aimed to bolster longevity, birth rates, 
migration, improve public health, and housing.  
In the opening lecture of his 1977 to 1978 series at the College de France, 
Security, Population, Territory, Foucault defines biopower as:   
 
A number of phenomena that seem to me to be quite significant, 
namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological 
features of the human species became the object of a political 
strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, how, 
starting from the 18th century, modern Western societies took on 
board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a 
species (Foucault 2007: 1).  
 
Biopower has two main characteristics (Rabinow and Rose 2006). First, it 
involves discourses about the vital characteristics of being human (being 
healthy, productive etc). Biopower holds life itself as the governing imperative 
(Rose 2007). It “exerts a positive influence on life, endeavours to administer, 
optimize and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive 
regulations” (Foucault 1981: 137). Second, it involves specific interventions that 
manage the health and life of the population. Rather than dictating what people 
do, the government steers the population’s general behaviour, governing how 
life is reproduced, and how productive society is with the goal of advancing the 
well-being of the population. Biopower therefore focuses on shaping lifestyles 
(Dean 2010: 99). Foucault likens this exercise of power to a shepherd tending 
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his flock: “the shepherd’s power is exercised not so much over a fixed territory 
as over a multitude in movement towards a goal; it has the role of providing the 
flock with sustenance, watching over it on a daily basis, and ensuring its 
salvation” (Foucault 2007: 68). Efforts to curtail cigarette smoking, promote 
sexual health and healthy lifestyles all constitute forms of biopower. Third, like 
disciplinary power, biopower constitutes political subjects gradually, 
progressively and materially. As with disciplinary power, the exercise of 
biopower centres on defining what is normal and what is abnormal. But where 
disciplinary power targets individual bodies, biopower targets entire populations. 
In Foucault’s words, “such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise, and 
hierarchize, rather than display itself in its murderous splendor; it does not have 
to draw the line that separates the enemies of the sovereign from his obedient 
subjects; it effects distributions around the norm” (Foucault 1981: 144). 
In his lectures at the College de France between 1975 and 1976, Society 
Must be Defended, Foucault draws on the central paradox of security: in 
providing security for and improving the life of the majority, governments must 
encroach on the security of the minority. This ranking of social groups remains 
essential to the maintenance of relations of power. As such, “the death of the 
bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something 
that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer” (Foucault 2003: 
255).  
 
Foucault’s Triangle of Power 
This ‘triangle’ of power – sovereign, disciplinary and biopower – forms the 
centre of my analysis of transnational authoritarian security governance 
(Dean 2010: 122). Two interpretations of the relationship within this triangle of 
power exist. Foucault himself was never clear on the matter and made 
numerous contradictory statements regarding the relationship. On the one 
hand, in The History of Sexuality, Volume I, Foucault stated that “the ancient 
right to take life or let live was replaced by a power to foster life or disallow it to 
the point of death” (Foucault 1981: 138). In other words, archaic sovereign 
power was ‘replaced’ by the disciplinary and regulatory functions of biopower 
and disciplinary power in the early nineteenth century (Dean and Henman 2004: 
487).Yet in 1976, the same year that The History of Sexuality, Volume 1 was 
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first published, Foucault made a series of statements in his lecture series at the 
College de France that contradicted this idea of replacement. He argued that 
sovereign, disciplinary and biopower are simultaneously deployed: “the powers 
of modern society are exercised through, on the basis of, and by virtue of, this 
very heterogeneity between a public right of sovereignty and a polymorphous 
disciplinary mechanism” (1994b: 45). During a lecture in the 1977-8 lecture 
series, Security, Population, Territory, Foucault is even more explicit:  
So we should not see things as the replacement of a society of 
sovereignty by a society of discipline, and then of a society of 
discipline by a society, say, of government. In fact we have a triangle: 
sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management, which has 
the population as its main target and the apparatuses of security as 
its essential mechanism” (Foucault 2007: 107-8).61 
In Tajikistan, biopower and disciplinary power have not replaced sovereign 
power. From outlawing ‘extremist’ groups to regulating ‘deviant’ forms of piety 
and producing resilient secular subjects who will resist extremist messages, 
transnational authoritarian security governance relies on all three forms of 
power.  
Disciplinary, sovereign and biopower are not discreet forms of power. 
They can combine together in discourses and practices. For example, as I will 
discuss in Chapter Four, the Tajik parliament passed a Law on Parental 
Responsibility in 2011. It involves sovereign power in so far as it prohibits 
certain activities, such as studying Islam abroad without a license. It 
incorporates disciplinary power because it calls on parents to monitor and 
discipline their children. And it involves biopower in so far as it promotes 
lifestyles that fit with national, secular culture. 
A Foucauldian approach to security has a number of advantages. First, it 
allows us to place relations of power at the centre of the analysis of discourses 
and practices of security. Second, Foucault leads us to examine how by 
framing security threats and referent objects, individuals become subjects of 
security. Third, it allows us to study power from both the bottom-up and the 
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top-down, breaking down the dichotomy between ‘exceptional’ and ‘everyday’ 
security practices. As Foucault succinctly argues: 
We must eschew the model of the Leviathan in the study of power. 
We must escape from the limited field of juridical sovereignty and 
State institutions, and instead base our analysis of power on the 
study of power on the study of the techniques and tactics of 
domination (Foucault 1994b: 102). 
Fourth, Foucault examines how discourses and practices of security are 
context-dependent rather than timeless and universal. 
Thus far I have argued that security is a contested concept, and that 
security threats are constructed through discourse. This process of 
securitisation is not benign. Once an issue has been labelled a threat, elites and 
security professionals adopt a series of practices to counter the threat. These 
discursive and non-discursive elements of security governance are undercut by 
relations of power. Through these relations of power, both those labelled a 
threat and those who the measures seek to protect become security subjects. 
Having discussed security is relatively abstract terms, I will now turn to the 
specific questions which I attempt to answer through my research. I examine 
the links between security and governance, security and the transnational, and 
security and religion. 
Governing Security 
In this thesis, I am primarily concerned with how (in)security is governed 
through an array of discourses, practices and actors. By looking at security 
governance, I neither foreground discourse or practice, but look at how these 
combine in actor’s attempts to govern (in)security. With the end of the cold war 
and globalisation, the international system has shifted from an order 
characterised by bipolarity and concern over national security to one of 
transnational threats and multiple centres of power (Mabee 2009; Walters and 
Larner 2004; Hough 2008; Walker 2009). A qualitative distinction exists 
between ‘traditional’ state-based security threats and ‘non-traditional’ security 
threats (Hamieri and Jones 2015). Non-traditional threats, like terrorism, 
organized crime and climate change, defy state borders; they are transnational. 
This “globalisation of security” has led to sweeping changes in how security is 
imagined and how it is practiced (Mabee 2009). The emergence of this late 
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capitalist “liquid modernity” has led to the development of a “world risk society,” 
characterized by non-traditional, “borderless” security threats (Bauman 2000; 
Beck 1999). Governments and security professionals construct the idea that we 
live in “a complex world increasingly in need of management” (Dillon and Reid 
2001: 46). To effectively manage these threats, certain people have argued, 
actors need to develop a holistic, multilateral approach which brings together 
private and public actors. This approach has been termed “security governance” 
(Krahmann 2003). Emile Kirchner defines the concept as: 
An intentional system of rule that involves the co-ordination, 
management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate 
authorities, interventions by both public and private actors, formal and 
informal arrangements, and purposefully directed towards particular 
policy outcomes. (2007: 4). 
Kirchner’s definition combines the central tenets of security governance. It is 
polycentric. It involves public and private actors, formal and informal practices, 
which are all coordinated to manage security threats. Approaches to security 
governance emerged from a broader literature on governance. In the broadest 
sense, “governance refers to all processes of governing” that are aimed at “the 
creation of rule and order in social practices” (Bevir 2013: 1). More specifically, 
governance can be defined as the “processes and institutions, both formal and 
informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group” (Keohane 
2002: 202). Efficient governance, so the argument goes, is about identifying 
effective regimes to distribute public goods (Koechlin 2015). Governance can 
be seen as a more encompassing phenomenon than government because it 
embraces not only governmental organizations but also informal, non-
governmental mechanisms (Rhodes 1996). Whereas traditionally government 
was hierarchical, governance is decentralized and horizontal (Czempiel and 
Rosenau 1992). As such, the traditional distinctions between public/private and 
state/civil society are often blurred in a system of governance. 
 Governance regimes have also developed at the global level. For 
James Rosenau, “global governance is conceived to include systems of rule at 
all levels of human activity—from the family to the international organization—in 
which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational 
repercussions” (Rosenau 1995). Global governance, then, is concerned with the 
management of any issue which is transnational in nature (Finkelstein 1995). 
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This could be capital flows, border disputes, international law or migration. It 
refers to the development, since World War II, of international rule-making and 
political coordination, the greater role of non-state actors in global politics and 
an emergent ‘global civil society’ (Rosenau 1995; Czempiel and Rosenau 1992; 
Finkelstein 1995).62 
  Whilst security governance is part of the broader concept of global 
governance, it differs from it in a few ways. First, where global governance 
operates at the supra-state level, security governance can refer to activities at 
all levels ranging from responding to international terrorism through creating 
international agreements to policemen monitoring a terrorist cell. Second, the 
issues they address differ. Global governance deals with a range of economic, 
political and social issues with transnational dimensions. Security governance is 
more specific, addressing issues which have been labelled security threats. For 
Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams security governance is enacted by 
“global security assemblages” which are “new security structures and practices 
that are simultaneously public, private, global and local” (Abrahamsen and 
Williams 2011: 3). This process has been institutionalised in the transnational 
security architecture characterised by the growth of organisations such as the 
European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). These organisations 
attempt to address collective threats through coordinated responses. To 
address asymmetric and transnational threats, governments are increasingly 
relying not only on these inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) but also non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and private-military companies (PMCs) 
(Adams 1999). These PMCs have taken on a range of logistical and combat 
roles in conflicts across the globe. Blackwater, for example, was receiving $1 
billion in federal contracts for the protection of U.S. convoys, aid workers and 
diplomats by 2006.63 This proliferation of non-state security actors and lack of 
one central authority amounts to a “fragmentation of security policy making” 
(Krahmann 2005: 4). These actors, then, are both a cause and consequence of 
the weakening position of the state as a security actor.   
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 As a subject of inquiry, researchers have treated global governance, and 
security governance, in two distinct ways (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006). Some 
view it as a normative agenda, an ideal way of governing that creates the 
conditions for collective action, efficiently manages shared risks and creates 
peace and prosperity for all (Aydilini 2010; Kirchner 2007; Sperling 2014). 
Others view it as observable phenomenon describing the changing locus of 
political authority in the globalized post-cold war order (Krahmann 2003; 
Webber et al 2004).  
Whilst the literature on security governance draws attention to how 
security is managed by a range of state and non-state actors, it contains a 
number of gaps. First of all, most analysis remains functionalist; it responds to 
security problems and recommends policy solutions. Some scholars go even 
further, adopting a normative position that views governance as a natural 
solution to the complexities and insecurities of a globalized world. It operates on 
the assumption that “unregulated spaces lead to the growth of instability” 
(Aydilni 2010: 3). In much of the security governance literature, the European 
Union is reified as an ideal model to be emulated elsewhere (Sperling and 
Webber 2014). For these scholars the key question becomes: can western 
security governance be extended outwards? An assumption that Western states 
have the knowledge and power to fix ‘failed states,’ non-western states 
underpins this literature (Chandler 2016). Most of these accounts remain top-
down; they examine governance institutions and individuals working at them. 
While the majority of studies have focused on Europe and North American 
actors, a recent volume edited by James Gaskarth brought together a number 
of essays on the ways in which the “Rising Powers” of Brazil, Russia, India and 
China have engaged with global governance (Gaskarth 2015). But like earlier 
analyses it retains a top-down, system level focus (Kahler 2013). By treating 
governance as natural and scientific, analysts have neglected the roles of 
regimes of power in the emergence, consolidation and dissemination of security 
governance. 
Much of the literature remains blind to questions of ontology and 
epistemology. As Mark Bevir surmises, “debates about governance are 
impoverished by a lack of philosophical thought” (Bevir 2013: xi). Recently 
authors like Bevir, along with critical scholars governmentality studies and post-
structuralism, have started to problematize the contingent discourses and 
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practices of governance (Larner and Walters 2004; Cox 1981).64 Some scholars 
have argued that a form of “global governmentality” has developed in recent 
years (Larner and Walters 2004). They have started answering questions about 
how governance shapes political subjects. A handful of researchers have 
utilised a Foucauldian approach to examine how neo-liberal governance 
projects attempt to shape local populations in developing countries (Hönke 
2013; Li 2007). Others have examined how governments call on populations to 
be resilient in the face of ecological, security and economic challenges 
(Vaughan-Williams, Croft and Brassett 2013; Chandler 2014; Reid 2012; 
Joseph 2013; Zebrowski 2013). This literature on resilience is influenced by 
Foucault’s notion of biopower. As Chris Zebrowski summarises, the notion of 
resilience calls on people “to be encouraged, not directed; managed, not 
controlled” (Zebrowski 2013: 160). Yet much of this critical analysis has focused 
on the promotion of bottom-up population resilience in neo-liberal settings. Thus 
far, very little research has been carried out on authoritarian or illiberal 
governance.65 In the next section, I outline my argument and unpack the 
differences between liberal and authoritarian security governance. 
 
Authoritarian Security Governance 
A number of scholars have highlighted the Eurocentric bias within security 
studies and called for scholars to turn their attention to security-making in non-
western societies (Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Bilgin 2010; Acharya and Buzan 
2009). With the vast majority of the world’s population living outside of Europe 
and North America, often living under authoritarian regimes, this call is certainly 
timely. Security studies needs to take non-western approaches to and 
experiences of (in)security more seriously. The relationship between 
authoritarianism and security remains a lacuna within critical security studies. A 
number of authors associated with critical security studies have highlighted how 
so-called liberal governments use discourses of exceptionalism to use illiberal 
measures, such as torture, indefinite detention and racial profiling against 
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Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia are notable exceptions, 
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potentially threatening individuals (Neal 2009; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; 
Vaughan-Williams 2009; Reid and Dillon 2009; Hönke 2013; Butler 2004). But 
what about situations where those who are governing make no pretence to be 
liberal? How does authoritarian governance differ from its liberal cousin? Fewer 
academics have examined how authoritarian states manage and govern 
security threats.66 Although the boundary between (il)liberal and authoritarian 
security governance is not fixed, I maintain that there are qualitative differences 
in the way authoritarian governments manage security.  
  Authors have used a range of terms to describe non-democratic regimes 
including “illiberal democracy” (Zakaria 1997), “competitive authoritarian” 
(Levitsky and Way 2002), and “semi-authoritarian” (Ottaway 2003). In this thesis 
I use the term authoritarian to describe the government of Tajikistan and the 
way it governs security. I have chosen not to use the term illiberal or non-liberal, 
because these terms define the system as the absence of liberalism. Instead, I 
argue that authoritarianism involves practices that indicate that it is a presence 
in its own right. Tajikistan displays many of the “family resemblances” of an 
authoritarian regime, including a limited political pluralism, restrictions on 
freedom of speech and assembly, widespread use of torture and a president 
who has ruled for over twenty years (Linz 1964; Wittgenstein 1972). 
  In recent years, a number of scholars have started to dedicate attention 
to authoritarian conflict management and the illiberal peace, examing case 
studies from Sri Lanka, Rwanda, Tajikistan and Angola (Lewis 2010; Piccolino 
2015; Smith 2014; Heathershaw 2009). In his study of post-conflict Angola, 
Ricardo de Oliviera argues that the government of Jose dos Santos, who has 
been in power since 1979, ensures that there is not a revival of conflict by 
managing elections, co-opting civil society, controlling the media, implementing 
“high modernist” infrastructure projects and paying little attention to human 
rights (de Oliviera 2011). Indeed, authoritarian security governance is more 
about promoting hegemonic order and stability than about democracy and 
freedom (Heathershaw 2009). But most of these studies have examined how 
states achive stability after a period of civil war. Although Tajikistan did 
experience a civil war between 1992 and 1997, it is no longer a post-war 
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state.67 Rahmon’s regime incorporated warlords into the state at first, but has 
gradually removed them, in a process that Jesse Driscoll calls “coup-proofing” 
(Driscoll 2015). As such, my thesis concerns security governance rather than 
peacebuilding. Fewer authors have begun to theorise what authoritarian 
security governance looks like. In addition, none of the authors above adopt a 
Foucauldian approach to studying authoritarian governance.  
Some have argued that Foucault’s ideas are inherently linked to neo-
liberal modernity and therefore cannot be effectively used in authoritarian 
political systems (Joseph 2010; Selby 2007). Jonathan Joseph, for example, 
questions “whether governmentality, as a set of liberal techniques, really does 
apply to all parts of the globe” (Joseph 2010: 417). In my opinion, Foucault’s 
approach to power can be  applied to a range of liberal and authoritarian 
settings. Although Foucault developed his power with regards to liberal-
democratic modern Europe, others have argued that his ideas do have 
analytical purchase in authoritarian and non-Western settings as well (Dean 
2010; Philpott 2000; Death 2011; Jabri 2007; Vrasti 2008). While Foucault did 
discuss Nazism’s relationship to biopolitics, he did not comment on how his 
theories might be applied to authoritarian systems of rule (Foucault 1981). It is 
left to Foucauldians – those inspired by his work – to use his ideas to theorise 
authoritarian governance. I argue that, rather than being a synonym for 
neoliberalism, Foucault’s approach to power is most usefully conceptualised as 
an approach to the study of regimes of rule, and their relationship with power 
and subjectivity. If Foucault was interested in how power incites individuals to 
bind themselves to power spontaneously and voluntarily, then he can be 
applied to authoritarian systems of rule. As Stephen Collier argues Foucault 
mapped how different forms of power are combined in a “topology of power” 
(Collier 2009). He offers a way of making sense of how the world is 
represented, ordered and governed through relations of power, rather than a 
particular way of ordering politics. Both authoritarian and liberal systems of rule 
are built on a complex combination of sovereign, disciplinary and biopower. 
Both systems seek to govern through the dividing practices subjectification 
(Dean 2010). In his chapter on “authoritarian governmentality” Mitchell Dean 
identifies three forms of authoritarian governance: “those non-liberal forms of 
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thought and practice that are a component of liberal rationalities; those non-
liberal forms of thought and practice that gain a certain legitimacy within liberal 
democracies; and non-liberal forms of rule proper” (Dean 2010: 134). Tajikistan 
is a case of non-liberal, or authoritarian, rule proper. Qualitatively - both in terms 
of the discourses that legitimate it and the range of practices that it entails – 
authoritarian security governance diverges from its liberal alternative. I identify 
three areas in which they differ: discourse, space and practice.  
 
Discourse 
 
On the surface, similarities do exist between discourses of liberal and 
authoritarian governance.  Both liberal and authoritarian security governance 
portray security threats as ‘foreign,’ proceeding from a dangerous outside 
(Campbell 1998). Both use this external danger to legitimise power relations 
and form national identity (Barker 2007). In both systems, leaders call for 
exceptional measures to be taken to manage identified security threats (Neal 
2009; Vaughan-Williams 2009; Agamben 2005). Both emphasise the 
importance of stability. But whereas liberal security governance allows for the 
existence of counter-narratives from civil society and rival political parties, 
authoritarian governments attempt to maintain a monopoly on security 
discourses. Whereas the audience plays a role in accepting or contesting the 
securitisation process in democracies, in authoritarian states the audience plays 
a diminished role (Balzacq 2005). For example, whilst the media in the United 
Kingdom was able to criticise the government’s handling of the 2011 riots in 
London, when the independent media in Tajikistan criticised the government’s 
handling of political violence in Rasht in 2010, the government closed 
newspapers and blocked websites (Lemon 2014).  
 
Space 
 
Spatially, unlike liberal governments who view space as a source of economic, 
social and political competition, illiberal regimes see space as a securitized 
resource that the state must closely control (Cerny 1997; Lewis 2015: 143). This 
securitisation of space extends to diasporic and exile communities as well 
(Collyer and King 2015). Authoritarian states monitor and surveil their exile 
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communities to a degree generally not seen in liberal democracies. As David 
Lewis argues, “extraterritorial space poses genuine challenges to the domestic 
regime: it provides the opportunities for opponents to organize, to accumulate 
resources, to produce new discourses and to attract new members” (Lewis 
2015: 144). As Lewis identifies, the authoritarian regime’s discursive production 
of space is paradoxical. On the one hand, the regimes insist on the sanctity of 
national borders and the maintenance of stability within them. But on the other 
hand, their reliance on extraterritorial security practices undermines this 
sovereignty discourse. In securitising transnational space, authoritarian regimes 
attempt to legitimise their extraterritorial extension of domestic security policies.  
 
Practice 
 
Both liberal and authoritarian systems of rule combine elements of biopower, 
disciplinary power and sovereign power. Power is exercised with the view to 
moulding political subjects. But where liberal governance involves governing 
through freedom, thus allowing for the possibility of critique, authoritarian rule is 
based on the subject’s complete obedience to political authority (Dean 2010; 
Sigley 2006). In other words, authoritarian rulers “do not accept a conception of 
limited government characterised by the rule of law that would secure the rights 
of individual citizens” (Dean 2010: 147). Authoritarian governments rule through 
a complex range of state and civil society institutions. Authoritarian regimes 
combine a similar mix of formal and informal measures, public and private 
actors seen in neo-liberal governance. But authoritarian governance is 
characterised by a lower level of political decentralization; the state remains the 
most prominent governance provider. 
  Although authoritarian governance “seeks to operate through obedient 
rather than free subjects,” this does not prevent them from using all three forms 
of power identified by Foucault (Dean 2010: 155). At first glance, security 
governance in liberal and authoritarian states involves similar practices of 
sovereign power – torture, rendition, arrests. But the scale and scope of these 
practices differs. In terms of scale, the use of tactics such as torture remains 
more widespread in authoritarian regimes. Security services often use such 
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tactics against citizens and are rarely brought to account for this.68 The judicial 
system remains highly politicised. Charges of extremism take on a political 
nature and are used by the regime to remove opponents. Whilst UK Prime 
Minister David Cameron has called opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn a “terrorist 
sympathiser” and a “threat to national security,” he has not called for his arrest, 
as in the case of President Rahmon and his leading opponent Muhiddin 
Kabiri.69 Those who challenge the abuses of the security services can also see 
criminal charges brought against them.70  
Authoritarian regimes are not based on sovereign power, repression and 
coercion alone.  Like its liberal variant, authoritarian governance uses dividing 
practices based around distinguishing between normal and abnormal political 
subjects. In other words, it is based on disciplinary power. Surveillance remains 
widespread and citizens who publically display signs of resistance to the regime 
may be disciplined.  Authoritarian states also rely on biopower. Here 
Foucauldian studies of “colonial governmentality” are useful (Scott 1995). 
Colonisers rely on disciplinary and biopower to mould obedient, modern, 
civilised subjects. In their work on colonial Africa Jean Comaroff and John 
Comaroff’s refer to this process as the “colonization of consciousness” 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 1992). Through their analysis of Christian missionaries 
in the Southern Tswana region of South Africa, they show how “a particular way 
of being and seeing, colonized their consciousness with the signs and practices, 
the axioms and aesthetics, of an alien culture” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992: 
235). The missionaries sought to civilize the locals by replacing their backwards 
superstitions with scientific reason. Closer to my Tajik case study,  researchers 
have examined how Soviet attempts to construct a New Soviet Person 
constituted a civilising mission that aimed to positively transform everyday 
lifeworlds and social relations (Massell 1974; Rasanayagam 2011; Collier 2011; 
Prozorov 2014). Stephen Kotkin examines how the Soviet authorities shaped 
consciousness in the new town of Maginitogorsk, taking inspiration from 
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Foucault’s work on subjectification (Kotkin 1995).  Kotkin uses the personal 
diaries of workers to offer an account of the micro-physics of Stalinist power 
through practices of mutual surveillance and self-identification.  In another 
Foucauldian social history of the Soviet Union, Oleg Kharkohordin traces the 
development of the kollektiv during the Soviet Union (Kharkhordin 1999). Every 
group of workers in a factory, collective farm, school or office belonged to the 
same kollektiv. Kharkhordin argued that these groups united individuals around 
the common goal of building a socialist society and shared activities to bring this 
society about, enhancing group cohesion. Those whose comments or behaviour 
ran counter to the kollektiv’s interests could be denounced by members of the 
group, a process that Kharkhordin identifies as oblichenie (the condemnation of 
an individual’s actions). “Practices of mutual surveillance among peers, rather 
than the hierarchical surveillance of subordinates by superiors” characterised 
Soviet society (Kharkhordin 1999: 355). These practices were not restricted to 
the monitoring of others alone; individuals were expected to reflect on their own 
beliefs and practices. While much of this surveillance remained informal, 
volunteer-based druzhina militias also patrolled urban areas looking for signs of 
dissent. Kharkhordin traces the origin of these practices to the Orthodox church 
where the devoted were expected to do penance in public.  These acts of 
oblichenie forced individuals to conform to the state-defined norm. Kharkhordin 
claims that “the ultimate achievement of Soviet individualization [is] a modern 
subject who constantly readjusts his or her self-concept by staging mini-trials 
over his or her demonstrated deeds” (Kharkhordin 1999: 251). 
These Foucauldian studies of colonial and Soviet system of governance 
demonstrate how authoritarian governance is not reliant on sovereign power 
alone. Like liberal governance, authoritarian governance is characterised by 
bottom-up self-order rather than one solely imposed from the top-down. 
Authoritarian security governance involves a complex mix of sovereign, 
disciplinary and biopower which aim to create subjects who are loyal to the 
regime and therefore do not threaten regime security. Having outlined 
authoritarian security governance, in the final section of the chapter I turn to the 
two phenomena that the government of Tajikistan is seeking to govern: 
transnational space and religion. 
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Themes  
Transnational Security 
The ‘transnational’ refers to a phenomenon in which there are “multiple ties and 
interactions linking people and institutions across the borders of nation-states” 
(Vertovec 1999: 447). My study is transnational – examining activities that 
cross, overlook and intersect state boundaries - on at least two levels. First, it is 
transnational in so far as I examine how elites frame and respond to 
movements of people and ideas across borders as a question of security. 
Second, it is transnational because I study governance regimes that span state 
borders. In this section, I will examine these two facets in turn. My thesis 
profiles Tajik migrants living in Russia. Migrants are perhaps the most obvious 
example of transnational life. Indeed, much of the earliest literature on 
transnationalism focused on the “social process by which migrants establish 
social fields that cross geographic, cultural and political borders” (Glick-Schiller 
et al 1992: ix). A number of approaches to the security-migration nexus exist. 
Realist-inspired approaches to migration-security are generally state-centric; 
migration becomes a variable in the calculation of national security (Widgren 
1990; Heisburg 1991; Rudolph 2003; Weiner 1992; Koslowski 1998; Rudolph 
2006).71 Migrants, according to realist analysts, present a challenge and 
migration flows need to be managed by states (Adamson 2006; Rudolph 2003). 
Security is thus rendered a value to be achieved rather than problematised. 
Borders need to be secured so that undesirables cannot cross them. Migrants 
need to be categorised based on the risks that they pose to the security of the 
receiving state.  
Influenced by the ‘Copenhagen School,’ in the late 1990s, scholars 
began to challenge the prevalent realist-inspired approaches. Instead of looking 
at migration as an objective threat to national security, they examine “how 
international movement of people has been historically constructed as a 
security concern” (Bourbeau 2011: 6). Much of this analysis has focused on the 
ways in which migration threatens “societal security” (Buzan et al 1998; Waever 
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 Myron Weiner, for example, lists a number of different ways in which migrants become 
threats. First, some migrants are dissidents, criminals or terrorists and may seek to cause 
instability in their country of residence. Second, diasporas can be used by the host country 
against their state of origin or its rival. Third, migrants can be a cultural threat; they threaten the 
values, identity and traditions of the majority. Fourth, migrants are an economic threat; by taking 
jobs from nationals and using welfare they can degrade the state’s economy. 
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et al 1993). Societal security is “about collectivities and their identities” (Buzan 
et al 1998: 120). In other words, it involves the “security of large scale ‘we’ 
entities” (Waever et al 1993: 21). The migration of a culturally different group 
can threaten the identity and thus security of the other social groups. However, 
even the ‘constructivist’ Copenhagen School views society as homogenous and 
fixed (McSweeney 1996). It assumes that the boundaries between social 
groups are clearly demarcated and it is clear who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out.’  
Critical scholars associated with the poststructural approaches, the ‘Paris 
School’ and ‘Critical Migration Studies,’ have begun to examine “how individual 
movement is framed in different ways” and the policies this leads to (Guild 
2009:1; Huysmans 2006; Bigo 2002; Vaughan-Williams 2015; Ceyhan and 
Tsoukala 2002). Critical scholars have a number of common assumptions. First, 
the existence of migration as a security threat is not taken-for-granted. Instead, 
it is constructed through an array of representations and practices which have 
evolved over time. Governments have long deemed mobility to be both an 
opportunity and potential security threat. Unlike more traditional approaches, 
critical studies do not treat the relationship between security and migration as a 
timeless given. Instead, authors argue that actors transformed migration into a 
security threat over time through a series of material and representational 
practices (Huysmans 2006).  
Second, migration-security is central to a wider debate on politics, 
mobility and identity. Security remains a “political technique of framing” 
(Husymans 2006: xii). Indeed, migrants have come to be understood through a 
series of binary oppositions: legal/illegal, voluntary/forced, seasonal/permanent, 
and economic/political. If a migrant is considered in humanitarian terms they 
evoke compassion. However, if they are deemed a security threat, then 
exclusionary measures are required against them. Claudia Aradau, in her study 
of the representation of human trafficking in Europe, has analysed the ways in 
which policy-makers represent migration in such contradictory terms (Aradau 
2008). Human trafficking is simultaneously represented as a ‘security threat’ 
whilst the women are ‘victims.’ Whereas ‘victims’ are offered rehabilitation, 
‘illegal’ female migrants are detained and deported.  
Since 9/11, the focus of public debates on migration and security has 
shifted towards a focus on Muslim migrant groups (Croft 2012; Huysmans and 
Buofino 2008; Mavelli 2013; Birt 2006). Scholars have examined the ways in 
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which politicians (Huysmans and Buofino 2008) and the media (Croft 2010) 
have securitised Islam. Jonathan Birt examines the way in which the British 
government, through its counter-terrorism policies, created the boundary 
between ‘good’ tolerant, progressive imams and ‘bad’ divisive ones (Birt 2006). 
Luca Mavelli examines how European governments have implemented secular 
policies in order to govern religion. He focuses on the “practice of transnational 
governmentality that by distinguishing between ‘moderate’ and ‘radical’ Islam, 
contributes to create a category of threatening ‘others’ which calls for a more 
‘interventionist’ and disciplining state” (Mavelli 2013: 160). This securitisation of 
Islam, and the way actors tend to contrast religious violence against secular 
order, led scholars to become interested in the relationship between secularism 
and security, which I will discuss in the next section (Gutkowski 2012; Mavelli 
2013).  
 Most of the works cited above examine liberal migration regimes and 
focus on the ways in which elites in host countries securitise immigrants. 
Indeed, as Francessco Ragazzi argues a bias exists within security studies 
towards the study of immigration rather than emigration (Ragazzi 2009). In this 
thesis, I am interested in how a sending state (Tajikistan) presents Muslim 
emigrants as a threat to their homeland and takes actions beyond its borders to 
govern this threat. Although a number of academics have looked at this 
“transnationalization of state practices,” the ways in which states spilling over 
borders by reaching out to own people abroad, most of these focus on the 
‘positive’ dimensions of this (Ragazzi 2009; Ho 2011; Delano and Gamlen 
2014).72 This includes trying to channel remittance flows, extending voting rights 
to the diaspora and using it to influence policy in the host country (Baubock 
2009). A number of scholars have drawn attention to the darker side of these 
policies, to the export of the security apparatus to pursue exiles, emigrants and 
dissidents abroad (Shain 1989). Yossi Shain develops a typology of 
extraterritorial security practices, including the withdrawal of citizenship, 
employment of spies, incriminating exiles, exposing supporters at home, 
kidnapping and political assassination (Shain 1989). Studies have examined 
Turkish practices against Kurds in exile (Rigoni 2000), the disappearance of 
Moroccan opposition leader Ben Barka in Paris in 1965 (Gallissot and Kergoat 
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 The literature on sending state policies is vast. For a review of this literature, see Delano and 
Gamlen 2014. 
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1997), the assassination of dissident Bulgarian writer Georgy Markov in London 
in 1978 (Kostov 1988) and Yugoslav monitoring of guest-workers in West 
Germany (Bakovic 2014). All of these studies remain descriptive rather than 
analytical. They do not consider how these extraterritorial security practices 
shape our understanding of security and its relation to power.  
States have reached over their borders not only to respond to the 
imagined threat emanating from citizens residing abroad, but also to neutralise 
threats from foreign citizens. A more developed area of transnational security 
studies focuses on the development of this “global archipelago of 
exceptionalism” that at the height of the War on Terror in 2005 included 1,300 
detention centres or ‘black sites’ stretching from Guantanamo Bay in Cuba to 
Abu Ghraib in Iraq to Kandahar in Afghanistan and Diego Garcia in the Indian 
Ocean (Neal 2006: 44; Butler 2004; Agamben 2005). Fewer studies have 
studied the rendition of terrorist suspects. In general terms, rendition refers to 
the transfer of individuals from one country to another without reference to due 
juridical process. Unlike extradition, which is the formal process by which a 
person is surrendered to another country, rendition bypasses the need for 
treaties with the host country. In the US, ‘Rendition to Justice’ has been a policy 
since the Reagan administration.73 As part of this program, U.S. agents forcibly 
transferred an estimated 80 suspected terrorists to stand trial in America before 
9/11 (Satterthwaite 2006: 30). After the attacks of 9/11, the U.S. created an 
unprecedented network of detention centres and secret rendition flights. A 17 
September 2001 memo from President Bush to the Director of the CIA 
approved a system of “clandestine intelligence activity,” allowing the U.S. to 
detain non-US terror suspects anywhere in the world. Instead of rendering 
suspected terrorists to stand trial, intelligence gathering became the focus and 
many of the suspects were transferred to allied countries where torture remains 
widely used. As an official told the Washington Post shortly after 9/11, “We don’t 
kick the shit out of them. We send them to other countries so they can kick the 
shit out of them” (Khalili 2013: 124). Scholars refer to this new form of transfer 
as ‘extraordinary rendition.’ As Laleh Khalili argues, “the combination of 
invisibility and deniability make this kind of detention ideal when secret services 
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 A 1997 FBI report claims that it has “deep historical roots,” tracing it back to the abduction of 
John Surratt, accused of the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, in Alexandria in 1866.  
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wish to perform interrogations that under ordinary circumstances would be 
illegal” (Khalili 2013: 126).  
 Human rights organisations and international lawyers have thus far taken 
the most interest in the issue of rendition, rightly arguing that it is both illegal 
and immoral. Scholars within international law have examined the myriad of 
ways that rendition violates conventions and treaties on human rights (Parry 
2005; Sadat 2007; Satterthwaite and Fisher 2006; Amnesty International 2006; 
Open Society Foundation 2013).74 Analysts associated with ‘The Rendition 
Project’ which was formed in 2011, for example, have gathered data on over 
130 cases of rendition, thousands of suspicious flights and profiled the 
companies involved (Raphael et al 2016).75 In recent years, studies have shifted 
the focus away from the U.S. and towards the ways in which other actors, such 
as Russia and the Central Asian governments, have established their own 
rendition systems (Hug 2014; Lewis 2015; Amnesty International 2013). While 
these studies have certainly been useful in meticulously documenting rendition 
cases, often basing their reports on the testimony of those involved, they remain 
largely pre-theoretical. Scholars who have theorised rendition – such as Ruth 
Blakeley and Sam Raphael (both founders of The Rendition Project)- have 
focused on explaining why those security services involved in rendition have 
continued to deny this despite the evidence coming to light (Blakeley and 
Raphael 2014). In her other work, Ruth Blackley has adopted an overtly 
normative agenda, arguing that scholars working on security and human rights 
can help emancipate the oppressed through collective social action (Blakeley 
2013). While these are certainly interesting and pertinent questions, my interest 
here is slightly different. A number of other questions emerge from the 
proliferation of rendition across the globe: How do the creation of transnational 
networks of rendition impact upon our understanding of international relations? 
From where did the practice of rendition emerge? How is rendition related to 
other forms of security governance? What kinds of rationalities underpin it? 
Have the extraordinary rendition become so commonplace that it is everyday 
not exceptional? I will attempt to answer these questions through the case of 
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 For example, Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees 
that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his 
liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as established by law.” 
75
 See: http://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/. “Globalizing Torture,” a 2013 Open Society 
Foundation report, implicates 54 governments in the rendition network. The only country from 
Central Asia listed is Uzbekistan. The report lists 136 documented cases of rendition.  
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the Tajik government’s rendering of dissidents and terror suspects in Chapter 
Five. 
 In her book Time in the Shadows, Laleh Khalili has begun to answer 
some of these questions. Khalili examines the role of confinement in counter-
insurgency, tracing the history of detention camps, security walls, enclaves, 
rendition and offshore prisons.  Far from emerging in response to the War on 
Terror, Khalili traces the modern carceral practices of the U.S. and Israel to 
(post)colonial counter-insurgencies in places as diverse as Malaya, Kenya, 
Algeria and South Africa. Although occupying militaries may claim to use such 
practices to ‘protect’ the people, and counter-insurgency is increasingly imbued 
with the language of humanitarianism, it is really a form of power predicated on 
the control of territory, use of disciplinary power and population aggregation 
(Foucault 2004). Restrictions on movement for non-combatants signify the 
paradox at the heart of liberal population-centric counterinsurgency: despite 
claiming to bring freedom and liberty, in practice the opposite is often true. 
Many of those targeted by these security practices have been accused of 
‘Islamic extremism.’ Indeed, in this thesis I am interested in the ways in which 
religious emigrants have become the focus of security discourses and practices, 
in the ways that the government of Tajikistan seeks to maintain the secular 
order by governing religion. 
 
Governing Religion through Secular Security 
This thesis examines the ways in which the government of Tajikistan securitises 
Islam and governs pious Muslims. As I will argue in the empirical chapters, the 
governance of religion and security is based secularism. Put simply, secularism 
is a “public settlement of the relation between politics and religion” (Hurd 2008: 
12).  Secularism denotes discourses and policies which attempt to construct 
consensus on the ‘proper’ relations between state and religion. Often defined 
against religion, secularism involves a human-centred epistemology, emphasis 
on scientific reason, the prioritisation of the immanent over transcendent and a 
morality that lies outside of religion. Secularism is interlinked with modernity: “to 
be secular means to be modern, and therefore, to be religious means to be 
somehow not fully modern” (Casanova 2011: 59). When Charles Holyoake 
coined the term secularism in 1851, he described it as essential to “progress.” 
  
83 
 
Theorists of modernity such as Karl Marx, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim 
argued that modernization and secularization were mutually supportive 
processes.  As societies progress towards modernity, they argued, religion 
would gradually disappear from public life. Proponents of secularism, therefore, 
often place their values above those of religion. For them, “religion is 
simultaneously conceived as dangerously irrational and as a source of enduring 
social values” (Gutkowski 2014: 4).  
Within the social sciences a presumption prevails which posits that 
secularism has “no ideological significance of its own, other than as the taken 
for granted absence or obsolescence of religion” (Calhoun et al 2011: 1).  
According to this view secularism is an unquestioned and inherent part of 
modernity. Recently an approach which sees secularism as a legal, moral and 
ideological presence has emerged (Calhoun et al 2011’ Asad 2003). Scholars 
have demonstrated how the ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ are not fixed, clearly 
defined categories; the boundaries between the two fluctuate across space and 
through time. Maia Carter Hallward outlines a “boundary-focused approach” to 
secularism and religion which analyses the processes by which “categories of 
belonging emerge and are sustained” through actors attempt to fix the meaning 
of the ‘secular’ around certain signifiers (Hallward 2008: 8). As Elizabeth 
Shakman Hurd states, the key question becomes: 
 
How do processes, institutions, and states come to be understood as 
religious versus political, or religious versus secular and how might 
we ascertain the political effects of such as demarcation? (Hurd 2008: 
16).  
 
Indeed, following Foucault, by labelling individuals as ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ we 
subjectify them. Secularity forms a way “thinking about the world, but also ways 
of being in and relating to the world” (Gutkowski 2014: 12; Hirschkind 2011). It 
refers to “certain behaviours, knowledges and sensibilities in modern life” (Asad 
2003: 25). If secularism is not fixed, then it can take different forms in varying 
contexts. 
Multiple forms of secularism exist. Secularism may involve the absence, 
control over, equal treatment of or replacement of religions.  Through an 
examination of state-religion relations in Turkey, France and the United States, 
Ahmed Kuru outlines two forms of secularism: passive and assertive. Where the 
governments of France and Turkey pursue assertive secularism, attempting to 
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banish religion from the public sphere, the United States tolerates public 
religious expressions and therefore adopts passive secularism (Kuru 2007). 
Assertive secularism is used by a number of authoritarian governments in 
Central Asia and the Middle East to counter potential forms of religious-based 
resistance. Tajikistan’s government, as I will elaborate upon in later chapters, 
has pursued an extreme form of assertive secularism. Secularism in general – 
and assertive secularism in particular - is predicated on the exclusion of 
opposing religious worldviews (Connolly 1999). Instead of a space for tolerance 
of other opinions, the secularist “construction of ‘religious fanaticism’ can 
promote secular rationales for violence” (Cavanagh 2011: 227). The secular can 
become a site of isolation, violence and exclusion (Mavelli and Petito 2012; 
Connolly 1999). 
Like in other areas of social science, much of the literature within 
international relations has been informed by an underlying, but often unspoken, 
commitment to secularism (Hurd 2008). Ever since the wars of religion (1562-
98) and Peace of Westphalia (1648), religion, so the myth goes, had been 
confined to the private sphere (Cavanagh 2009).76 An assumption that religion 
is a potentially divisive and dangerous social force, where secularism is non-
violent and thus provides security underlies much of this literature (Asad, 2003). 
Over the past few years, however, scholars have started to ‘bring’ secularism 
and religion back in to international relations and security studies (Hurd 2008; 
Petito and Hatzopoulos 2003). The resurgence in academic interest in 
secularism in the fields of international relations and security studies is linked to 
two developments. First, the perceived religious revival, what Peter Berger calls 
the “de-secularisation of the world,” and its impact on global politics (Berger et 
al 1999). Second, the increased interest in Islamic extremism since 9/11 has led 
to a range of studies on how secularism informs responses to terrorism 
(Gutkowski 2014; Mavelli 2013). 
This relationship between security and secularity remains a “nascent 
area of enquiry” within academia (Gutkowski 2011: 348). Pinar Bilgin’s work on 
Turkey has opened the way for further theorisation in this direction (Bilgin 
2007).  Bilgin argues that secularism itself has become the referent object of 
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 The ideological forefathers of realism and idealism, Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant 
respectively, both advocated for the separation of religion and politics. William Cavanaugh calls 
this the “myth of religious violence” (2009).   
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security in modern Turkey. Utilising David Campbell’s ideas on the roles of 
“discourses of danger” in the production of security threats, Bilgin argues that 
secularism secures the state against domestic and international Islamic threats 
(Campbell 1998).  Bilgin’s genealogical approach unveiled “an intimate 
historical relationship between secularism and security” in which secularism in 
Kemalist Turkey emerged as a response to Europe’s indifferent attitude towards 
Turkey’s “difference” and the insecurities related to this. Stacey Gutkowski has 
taken Bilgin’s analysis further in her analysis of the interrelationships of 
secularism and risk within the British government’s ‘Prevent’ counter-
radicalisation agenda (Gutkowski 2011).  She argues that the UK government’s 
concerns over the risk of Islamic radicalisation are rooted in their secular 
ideology which leads them to frame Islam-inspired violence as “slippery, 
uncontrollable, mysterious and strange” (Gutkowski 2011: 346). Through his 
work on Islam in Europe, Luca Mavelli has shown how linking Islam to violence, 
terrorism and barbarism leads to a range of exceptional measures against 
Muslims. Mavelli concludes that “the securitization of religion is thus an 
exceptional measure that removes religion from ‘the realm of normal politics’ in 
order to preserve the latter’s secular character” (Mavelli 2012: 191). Such 
exceptional measures are justified because they, allegedly, secure the secular 
essence of the modern state.  
Nonetheless, a number of gaps in the literature on secularism and 
security exist. The literature remains Eurocentric, focusing on the relationship 
between western liberal modernity and secularism (Luermann 2011: 3).  In her 
analysis of secularism and international relations Elizabeth Shakman Hurd 
focuses on two approaches to secularism, both of which are western in origin: 
laicism and Judeo Christian (2008).  For western secularists, “Islam represents 
the “nonsecular,” a religion that is inherently political by its very nature (Hurd 
2008: 7).  Such exclusionary and exceptionalist discourses construct the image 
that the separation of religion and politics is a uniquely western phenomenon 
that stands in contrast with the intertwining of Islam and politics seen outside of 
the ‘West’ (Asad 2003). Studies of the non-European context have 
predominantly focused on India and Turkey (Bubandt and Van Beek 2012).  
Works focusing on secularity in the post-communist space are scarce (Thibault 
2014; Louw 2011; Luermann 2011).  One exception is Sonja Luermann’s 
ethnographic account of secularism in the Russian republic of Mari-El 
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(Luermann 2011). In her analysis of late Soviet secularism, she focuses on the 
role of what she terms the “didactic public,” professionals such as teachers who 
managed society and reproduced norms of secularity. Similarly, Helene Thibault 
examines how the Soviet secularisation project continues to inform discourses, 
institutions and individuals’ religious practices in Tajikistan (Thibault 2014). 
Although each of these analyses secularism as a presence that is negotiated 
and contested by individuals, neither of the authors addresses the relationship 
between secularism and security in post-Soviet discourses and practices.  
While authors have highlighted how “insecurity may also be an outcome 
of the process of secularization,” few people have used ethnography to map 
how attempts to create secular subjects create insecurity (Mavelli 2012: 170).  
Existing studies remain top-down, examining how elites, driven by a “secular 
habitus,” draw the boundary between the ‘sacred’ and the ‘secular.’ Important 
questions remain: how does secularity shape social interactions for non-elites? 
How do secular discourses and practices impact upon the lives of religious 
people? In Chapter Five and Chapter Six, I will answer these questions using 
evidence from Tajik Muslim migrants in Russia.   
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have offered an approach to studying security as a process, as 
a practice and as subjectification. I argued that the meaning of security is 
contingent and contestable. We therefore need to pay attention to the process 
by which threats are constructed in discourses. But paying attention to 
discourses of security alone is insufficient. We need to study how agents use a 
range of practices to manage threats; that is, we need to examine security 
governance. This process of governing threats is undercut by relations of 
power. In approaching TASG, I propose a Foucauldian approach which 
examines how governance regimes shape political subjects through sovereign, 
disciplinary and biopower.  
 Throughout the chapter, I have criticised studies that adopt an 
essentialist and reductionist approach to the study of security. Even those 
studies that have adopted an interpretivist approach to security have two key 
weaknesses. First, they remain Eurocentric, studying security in the liberal 
tradition. Second, they remain largely focused on top-down, hegemonic 
discourses created by those in power and the practices of security 
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professionals. My analysis thus far has been biased towards the top-down 
production of security discourses and practices. Through Foucault, I have 
started to explore how power pervades the system and affects people’s lives. I 
have focused on how individuals and phenomena come to be labelled security 
threats and how security is governed. Such an approach could give the 
impression that elites take priority over non-elites, reducing non-elites to the 
position of the passive subject. The focus thus far has been on the manifold 
ways that those in a dominant position control discourse, delineate space, 
create boundaries and exercise power. In Chapter Two, however, I examine the 
quotidian politics of (in)security, examining how discourses and practices of 
security governance shape everyday life. But, even in authoritarian contexts like 
the setting of this study, the strategic moves of those in power do not go 
uncontested. As Foucault argued, resistance exists wherever there is power 
(Foucault 1981). In the next chapter I will explore the tactics of contestation and 
resistance to security governance.  
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Chapter 2: The Quotidian Politics of (In)Security 
 
If there were no possibility of resistance – of violent resistance, of 
escape, of ruse, of strategies that reverse the situation, there would 
be no relations of power (Foucault 1994: 12). 
Power and resistance remain irrevocably intertwined. Each “embodies the trace 
of the other” (Balzacq 2014: 12). Our subject status is not fixed; it is always in 
flux and this provides opportunities to resist and destabilise subjectification.  
Resistance to subjectivity exists wherever there is subjectivity. Subjectification 
results in insecurities and resistance to those insecurities. As long as security 
practices create secure and insecure subjects, then we should expect those 
made insecure will reject and resist this subject status.  
In this chapter, I move beyond the elitist bias that characterises much of 
the critical security studies literature. If security is experienced and 
intersubjectively produced, we need to pay attention to citizens’ everyday 
perceptions, understandings and experiences of security. In this chapter, I 
examine how the regimes of power entangled in the discourses and practices of 
security governance shape everyday life. Thus far I have examined the politics 
of (in)security from the top-down; I have looked at the ways in which actors 
label objects, or subjects, as security threats, the practices associated with this, 
and the relationship between power and security governance. As such, the first 
chapter examined the strategies of domination used by the producers of 
security. In this chapter, I will introduce an approach to the study of the politics 
of (in)security from the bottom-up, from the perspective of the consumer. I will 
analyse how “securitisation works through everyday technologies, through the 
effects of power that are continuous rather than exceptional” (Bigo 2002: 63). 
Whilst in the first chapter I focused on the ways in which structures constrain 
agents, in this chapter I examine the potential for these agents to be 
autonomous and resistant. In the previous chapter I argued that security is 
ontologically unstable. In other words “security is conceptualized and politically 
practised differently in different places and at different times (Bubandt 2005: 
291). Lene Hansen drew attention to ‘the silent security dilemma,’ the notion 
that the potential subject of (in)security has no, or limited, possibility of speaking 
its security problems (Hansen 2000; Elbe 2006; Stern 2006; Wilkinson 2007). In 
foregrounding my analysis in the ‘everyday,’ I am responding to both ‘traditional’ 
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and ‘critical’ security studies neglect of the everyday lived experiences of 
(in)security. As Adam Crawford and Steven Hutchinson argue, “the ‘everyday’ 
acts as an important counter to a prevailing emphasis upon the ‘spectacular’ 
and the ‘exceptional’, which cast a long shadow over security research” 
(Crawford and Hutchinson 2015: 5).   
In this chapter, I examine the ways in which governance is made and 
remade by subjects. I examine how subjects of securitisation resist, oppose, 
disrupt, refuse or transform securitising processes. I argue that rather than 
being counter-hegemonic, unified and transformative, resistance to power 
relations is plural, decentralised and anti-hegemonic. Whilst I agree with 
Richard Wyn-Jones that post-structuralist approaches do not have “the 
necessary intellectual tools to conceptualize progress, development and 
emancipation,” in the Enlightenment sense of these words, this does not mean 
that they cannot theorise the politics of resistance (Wyn Jones 1999: 120).  
In this chapter I explore the following questions: What does it mean to 
feel secure? How do different people and groups experience, feel, interpret and 
respond to different (in)security projects and measures? Is it useful to examine 
(in)security in ‘everyday’ settings? What contextual factors affect these 
experiences of (in)security? How do security measures shape subjectivity? How 
are different security measures open to interpretation, transformation and 
resistance? What is the relationship between power and resistance? In outlining 
my approach to the ethnography of everyday (in)security, I draw on the work of 
Michel Foucault. Foucault explores how the everyday “micro-physics” of power 
shape political subjects Excavating power relations involves searching in both 
public and hidden places. As David Hoy argues, “a society without resistance 
would be either a harmless daydream or a terrifying nightmare” (Hoy 2004: 11). 
Hoy follows many post-structuralist thinkers in arguing that even utopian 
projects such as communism, when backed by force, can become tyrannical.  
The chapter unfolds as follows: I begin by outlining the ‘everyday’ and 
some of the literature relating to it. Second, I introduce ethnography as a 
methodology through which to examine the quotidian politics of (in)security. 
Next, I examine the relationship between security and everyday life. I then 
examine some of the existing research on the topic, arguing that ethnography 
provides a productive way to answer some of the questions that emerge from 
this body of literature. I argue that (in)security is a lived reality. Individuals are 
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involved in regulating their own security. In the next section, I discuss the how 
the concept of Ancient Greek concept of metis –practical, experiential and local 
knowledge- can help people negotiate the insecurities of everyday life (Scott 
1998; Vernant and Detienne 1974). Not all agents simply cope with the unease 
created by security governance, some people contest and resist it. In the final 
section, I examine the contribution of Michel Foucault studies of resistance. I 
argue that is constitutes an underused approach to the study of security. My 
overall argument running through the chapter, and indeed through the thesis, is 
that ethnography, with its focus on local understandings of hegemonic 
discourses and the micro-politics of contestation, provides a way the 
shortcomings of both the ‘linguistic’ and ‘practice’ turns in critical security 
studies identified in the previous chapter.  
 
 Everyday Security 
 
The everyday, Guy Debord writes, “is the measure of all things” (Debord 1962). 
At the most basic level, the everyday refers to all daily activities. Rita Felski 
defines the everyday as “the essential, taken-for-granted continuum of 
mundane activities that frames our forays into more esoteric or exotic worlds” 
(Felski 1999: 15). For Ian Burkitt, “it is in everyday life that the sum total of 
relations that make the human – and every human being – a whole takes its 
shape and form” (Burkitt 2004: 211). It is democratic in the sense that it 
encompasses the daily lives of all human beings; everyone regardless of who 
they are, eats, sleeps, drinks, coughs (Felski 1999). Ian Burkitt notes that 
everyday life is: 
 
rich, complex and multidimensional: it is an experience of diverse and 
differentially produced and articulated forms, each combining time 
and space in a unique way […] What binds these relations into a 
formation are not institutionalized spaces and codified sets of rules, 
but human emotions such as loyalty, mutual needs, and interests. 
(2004: 222). 
 
For Burkitt, far from being simple and unsophisticated, everyday life is 
multidimensional, involving an array of social fields. It is in the everyday that the 
‘unofficial practices’ and articulations of experience, and ‘official’ codified 
practices come together. Official norms and codes shape everyday life, and 
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normalised official practices emerge from everyday practices themselves. As 
Burkitt argues, “the unofficial realm is the living tissue of social life upon which 
official social life rests” (Burkitt 2004: 214). For Rita Felski, everyday life is 
centred around three dimensions: temporality, spatiality and modality. Everyday 
life is temporal in so far as it refers to repetition of similar actions over time. It is 
spatial because it is anchored in the home. According to Felski, “both repetition 
and home address an essential feature of everyday life: its familiarity” (Felski 
1999: 26). Indeed, everyday life is modal in so far as it is synonymous with 
routine and habit. Scholars from sociology and cultural studies have placed 
particular importance on the study of everyday life. From the 24-hour news 
media reporting on global conflicts to the planning of urban space, security 
saturates everyday life. It is to the everyday ‘turn’ in security studies that I now 
turn. 
Security has become “the political vernacular of our time” (Loader and 
Walker 2007: 9). From airport checks to risk assessments security saturates 
everyday life. Yet, relatively few scholars have analysed how security affects 
everyday life. Security studies and international relations – in both their 
‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ guises – tend to analyse events from the top-down, 
from the perspective of the dominant institutions and elites (McDonald 2008). In 
doing so, they ignore those at the “margins, silences and bottom rungs” (Enloe 
1996).77  Ken Booth writes that the study of security “should begin in the 
experiences, imaginings, analyses and fears of those living with insecurity” 
(Booth 2007: 152). Ignoring bottom-up perspectives on security runs counter to 
the ontological arguments made by critical scholars. If security is 
intersubjectively constructed, then individuals and the public should be a central 
concern. When RBJ Walker says that “the subject of security is the subject of 
security” (1997: 72, emphasis in original), he was referring to the way in which 
academics, by focusing on the construction and management of threats, have 
neglected the ways in which (in)security shapes political subjects (Vaughan-
Williams and Stevens 2015). Yet in making this call for a turn to the ‘everyday,’ 
most of the authors are talking in abstract terms; with the exception of a handful 
of scholars such as Nick Vaughan-Williams and Daniel Stevens, Marie Gillespie 
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 Much of the early literature advocating for international relations and security studies to listen 
to marginalised voices was written from the feminist perspective. See, for example, Lene 
Hansen’s article “The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in 
the Copenhagen School,” (2000). 
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and Ben O’Loughlin, Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister, they have not conducted 
empirical research on ‘everyday’ perceptions of security.  In this section, I argue 
that insights from anthropology and sociology can take us further in answering 
some of the questions at the centre of the study of (in)security.  
Even though scholars within security studies have only started critically 
engaging with the concept of security in recent years, sociologists and 
anthropologists have long been concerned with lived experiences of survival, 
uncertainty and violence (Pedersen and Holbraad 2013: 4). Indeed, 
anthropologists have long taken an interest in the “everydayness of violence” in 
the context of civil wars (Feldman 1991; Taussig 1987; Nordstrom and Robben 
1995; Nordstrom 1997). Contrary to approaches that take violence as a fixed 
concept and examine it with a broad lens, they have examined how violence is 
essentially contested and how it shapes individual subjectivities. 
Anthropologists and scholars using ethnographic methods but working in other 
disciplines have examined the emergence of “cultures of insecurity” in late 
modernity (Weldes et al 1999; Lakoff 2008; Lutz 2001; Low 2003).  In this 
thesis, I respond to Daniel Goldstein’s call for a “critical anthropology of 
security” (Goldstein 2010). This approach examines “the role that security – as 
a set of discourses and practices – plays in producing particular kinds of 
political and legal orders in societies around the world” (Goldstein 2015: 46). 
Sociologists have long examined how experiences of (in)security affect people’s 
lives. Anthony Giddens coined the term “ontological security” to refer to security 
derived from the certainty, order and continuity in people’s daily lives (Giddens 
1991). Ulrich Beck examined the development during modernity of a “risk 
society” which is increasingly focused on measuring and mitigating future 
hazards (Beck 1992). 
This turn to ‘security’ in anthropology and sociology has been mirrored by 
a turn to the ‘everyday’ in security studies. A number of scholars have called for 
greater attention to be paid to the ‘everyday’ politics of security (Weber 2008; 
Rowley and Weldes 2012; Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 2015; Aas et al 
2009; Bubandt 2005; Gillespie and O’Loughlin 2009; Jarvis and Lister 2013). 
Numerous edited volumes, special journal issues and monographs have now 
been dedicated to topic (Maguire, Frois and Zurawski 2014; Pedersen and 
Holbraad 2013). Scholars have examined securitised spaces such as airports 
(Salter 2011, Neyland 2009), mega-events (Coafee and Fussey 2012), cities 
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(Low 2003), borders (Reeves 2014, Staudt 2011) and checkpoints (Jones 
2008).  Anthropologists of security have examined topics ranging from public 
health and biosecurity (Lakoff 2008) to human rights (Goldstein 2012) and 
homeland security (De Genova 2007).  
In a recent article in the British Journal of Criminology, Adam Crawford 
and Steven Hutchinson call on scholars to pay greater attention to everyday 
security. Whilst studies of the ‘high politics’ securitisation and the practices this 
entails are certainly useful, they argue, greater attention needs to be paid to 
how this affects people ‘on the ground.’ For Hutchinson and Crawford, “the 
‘everyday’ enables rather than constrains new forms of political critique.” 
(Crawford and Hutchinson 2015: 3) They outline an approach to everyday 
security that takes into account the lived experiences of security processes and 
the practices of self-regulation that people engage in (Crawford and Hutchinson 
2015). They suggest the term “security experiences” to denote “the lived 
realities of practical security measures, including the diverse ways in which 
programmes, strategies and techniques for governing security are experienced, 
taken up, resisted, and even augmented by different individuals and groups 
within society” (Crawford and Hutchinson 2015: 2). Indeed, Nick Vaughan-
Williams and Daniel Stevens identify separate ‘vernacular’ and ‘everyday’ turns 
in security studies in recent years. Scholars focusing on the ‘vernacular’ have 
examined public opinion and threat perception with the view to giving voice to 
the voiceless (Bubandt 2005; Gillespie and O’Loughlin 2009, Jarvis and Lister 
2013). Such literature examines how particular individuals and groups articulate 
their attitudes and understandings of (in)security. Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister 
adopt such a normative agenda, explicitly stating that their goal is “to speak for, 
rather than to (or, perhaps better, with) ‘ordinary’ people and the conditions of 
(in)security they experience, encounter or construct in everyday life” (Jarvis and 
Lister 2013: 158). Those studying local understandings of security have relied 
on surveys (Meyer 2009) and focus groups (Vaughan-Williams and Stevens 
2015; Gillespie and O’Loughlin 2009; Jarvis and Lister 2013).  
Whilst these studies have drawn attention to individuals’ diverse 
understandings of the ‘international’ and security threats, neither of these data 
collection methods are appropriate for my study. First, in (semi)authoritarian 
country’s like Russia and Tajikistan public opinion data is notoriously unreliable. 
Suspicion towards researchers and the sensitivity of the topic meant that focus 
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groups lacked feasibility as well. Second, although focus groups offer a 
snapshot of an individual’s opinion of security issues, it is less useful in 
answering questions relating to how security discourses and practices impact 
on the routines and bodily practices of everyday life, as well as how people can 
resist security governance.  
Academics associated with the ‘everyday’ turn identified by Vaughan-
Williams and Stevens have are mostly associated with the ‘Paris School,’ but 
they have moved beyond the elite bias that characterises much of the work 
associated with this approach (Guillaume and Huysmans, 2013; Huysmans 
2014; Noxolo and Huysmans 2009).  They have challenged the way in which 
those interested in the ‘vernacular’ have created a dichotomy between the high 
politics of elites and the low politics of subalterns (Huysmans 2014). The 
everyday, as argued above, is ambiguous; it brings together the insecuritizing 
moves of elites with the practices of everyday life. Rather than focusing on 
perceptions alone, they have examined the everyday practices of security and 
how these shape citizen subjects. Thus far, the arguments put forward by those 
associated with the everyday turn have been theoretically, rather than 
analytically, driven (Gillespie and O’Loughlin 2009: 681).  
Although everyday approaches have drawn attention to the subjects of 
security, they have focused on the political subjects as the referent object of 
security (Stern 2006). In other words, most of the literature has focused on how 
security measures affect the lives of the people they claim to protect. Less has 
been written on how security practices impact on the lives of the subjects of 
securitisation, those people who have been deemed a threat (Ryan 2015; Ochs 
2011).78 The object of my study of everyday security - pious Tajik migrants – 
form such a group. My approach synthesises aspects of both turns. While I am 
interested in empirically sophisticated research on the lived realities of security, 
I reject the ‘vernacular’ approach’s bifurcation of ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics. 
Although I agree that the everyday is ambivalent and a potential space for 
resistance, I ground my analysis firmly within the empirical study of practice. To 
answer the questions about the everyday politics of (in)security, ethnography is 
the most appropriate approach.  Studying security from the bottom-up sheds 
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light on the three features of security governance that I outlined in Chapter One: 
security as process, practice and subjectification. Ethnographic approaches 
allow us to examine the ways in which global or transnational issues are 
negotiated and contested at the local level. Moving beyond analyses that reify 
formal institutions, a critical anthropology of security draws attention to the ways 
in which discourses and practices of security, such as the ‘War on Terror,’ are 
operative in everyday lives. Studying security from the bottom-up contains a 
number of advantages. 
As I outlined in Chapter 1, (in)security is ontologically unfixed and objects 
and subjects come to be labelled as a threat through discourses. Whereas top-
down approaches can trace the securitising moves of elites, bottom-up 
approaches examine how audiences receive these moves. They examine 
security as a situated concept; “notions and practices of security are ultimately 
cultural and embedded in deeply cherished and often unquestioned value 
systems” (Kent 2006: 344). Ethnographic approaches allow us to understand 
the social context of securitisation. Instead of treating security and insecurity as 
discrete categories, I adopt a dialectical approach to (in)security, arguing that 
security is reliant on the “constant manufacture of uncertainty,” in the absence 
of which security would become meaningless (Bubandt 2005: 280). As such, 
bottom-up approaches help us map security’s paradox: as societies strive for 
more security, they simultaneously create insecurity through these efforts (Aas 
et al 2009). 
Approaching security from the bottom-up reveals how security practices 
work ‘on the ground’ and how they impact on people’s daily lives. Uncertainty, 
risk, anxiety and danger form central challenges in people’s daily lives. Security 
is therefore a lived social experience revealed as much through the quotidian 
practice of filling out a visa application form as through the meetings of the 
United Nations Security Council. As Goldstein notes, a critical anthropology of 
security “helps to broaden our perspective on what security means, what it 
includes, and what it excludes in the ordinary and exceptional struggles of 
everyday life” (Goldstein 2010: 492). Ethnographies of the everyday practices of 
security have found them to be “far less rational and much more ‘messy’ than 
expected” (Aas et al 2009: 8). 
Research on everyday security can uncover how power and 
subjectification operate within security governance regimes. Indeed, 
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surveillance and other security measures create a tendency towards exclusion 
and social control (Lomell 2004). In other words, security governance is 
pervaded by the triangle of power. Approaching security from the everyday 
perspective, allows us to break down the boundary between the ‘exceptional’ 
and the ‘everyday,’ to examine how the seemingly extraordinary practices of 
sovereign power become normalised. Security is also dependent on dividing 
practices and the exercise of disciplinary power. As Lucia Zedner argues, 
“security is posited as a public good but in fact presumes social exclusion” 
(Zedner 2003: 166). Vida Bajc has delved further into the ways in which security 
practices foster social exclusion.  In her work, she examines how security has 
become a central value that orders everyday life, a “security meta-framing” in 
her words (Bajc 2011). This process is based on a “governmentality of 
possibilities,” a rationale of governing that uses surveillance, statistical 
probabilities and computer modelling to classify social groups, identify and 
manage risks to society (Bajc 2011). In terms of biopower, ethnographies of 
security reveal how subjects respond to efforts to foster and regulate life. 
Studying security from the bottom-up is in keeping with Foucault’s approach to 
the network of power relations and how these shape subjects.  
Crucially, approaching security from the bottom-up allows us to 
understand the relationship between security as process, practice and 
subjectification. Bottom-up approaches place emphasis on the interplay 
between discourses and practices in historicised settings. They study the way 
(in)security cultures are produced, disseminated and maintained in 
contemporary societies. According to Goldstein, “ethnography brings to life the 
often static representations of securitization and social life, putting into motion 
those processes that might otherwise have been understood as structures” 
(Goldstein 2015: 60).   
Rather than studying how governance regimes are produced, bottom-up 
perspectives examine how they operate and how they are received by the 
population. Ethnography therefore allows us to listen to the voices of the ‘silent’ 
majority, people who are only heard infrequently in the public debate on security 
(Williams and D’Aoust 2015). As argued in Chapter One, the literature on 
security, even the more critical studies of the Paris School, remains Eurocentric. 
But anthropologists tend to work in non-western settings, drawing attention to 
the cross-cultural and transnational dimensions of security (Goldstein 2015).  
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Bottom-up perspectives allow us to understand how the ‘international’ becomes 
the ‘local’ (Kent 2006). They take vernacular understandings of security 
seriously (Bubandt 2005 Lemanski 2012; Stern 2006; Ratelle 2013). It has 
become axiomatic to say that security is essentially contested. But ethnographic 
approaches to security have shown that it is just as contested by ‘ordinary’ 
people as by elites (Jarvis and Lister 2013). Indeed, studying security from the 
bottom-up reveals the complex ways in which security is interrelated with both 
power and resistance. It is to resistance that I now turn. 
 
Everyday Forms of Resistance 
What is resistance? Like the other concepts discussed in this thesis – ‘security,’ 
‘extremism,’ ‘secularism’- resistance is an essentially contested concept.79 
Resistance is often pitted in an oppositional relationship with domination (Thiele 
1990). Following this view, power is held by the elite and the masses can resist 
this domination. Many definitions link resistance to the Enlightenment idea of 
the emancipation of subaltern groups. Michael Keith and Steven Pile take such 
a normative approach when defining resistance in Geographies of Resistance 
(1997). They argue that “resistance is the people fighting back in defence of 
freedom, democracy and humanity” (Keith and Pile 1997: 1). But their definition 
is too narrow to be useful for at least two reasons. First, not all those resisting 
domination are fighting in the name of freedom and humanity. The Islamic State 
in Syria is resisting the Assad regime and other militant groups, but few people 
would associate them with ideas of humanity, freedom and democracy. The 
Confederate states went to war in 1861 to resist the North’s attempts to abolish 
slavery. Second, as a term, resistance does not necessarily distinguish between 
emancipation and domination (Hoy 2004: 2). Dominant groups can resist 
pressures placed upon it by the subordinate masses. A broader definition than 
that forwarded by Pile and Keith is required. 
Key definitional debates surround the importance of intent, the practices 
resistance entails and the goals it strives for. Does resistance have to be 
intentional? Does oppositional action have to be recognisable as such? Paul 
Routledge defines resistance as “any action imbued with intent that attempts to 
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challenge, change or retain particular circumstances relating to societal 
relations, processes and or/institutions, and cannot be separated from practices 
of domination” (Routledge 1996: 361). According to Routledge, resistance 
needs to be (1) intentional, (2) can refute or maintain power relations and (3) 
cannot be separated from domination. Routledge’s definition, however, is too 
narrow. Based on the literature, I argue that ‘resistance’ has five key features. 
First, as I will elaborate upon in the later section on Foucault, resistance is 
contingent. It cannot be disentangled from the relations of power from which it 
emerges. It is “contextually bound to the social and psychological structures that 
are being resisted” (Hoy 2004: 3). It varies in different social settings. Second, 
resistance can be both intentional and unintentional. Mona Lilja and Stellan 
Vinthagen argue that resistance does not require consciousness (Lilja and 
Vinthagen 2007). Instead, it is the consequence, undermining an attempt by 
another actor to influence behaviour, which matters.  Third, resistance is 
subjective in so far as it is open to interpretation by the actors involved. An actor 
can become ‘resistant’ when they are labelled as such. For example, in 
Tajikistan those watching the video of a banned cleric or joining a Facebook 
group to discuss politics may not consider themselves as resisting the system, 
but the authorities could, and often do, consider them as such. Fourth, rather 
than being destructive, resistance is productive. It is a form of agency that 
produces new power relations. Resistance is about escaping dominant 
representations and creating something new. Lastly, resistance involves a wide 
array of practices. People can resist domination in a range of different ways. 
Protests, rebellions and riots are some of the more exceptional forms of 
resistance. But they are in no means the only ones. Individuals also resist 
hegemonic power in more subtle, everyday ways. Everyday, or “tactical,” 
resistance is dispersed, sometimes disguised and seemingly invisible (De 
Certeau 1984). In this thesis, I focus on these everyday forms of resistance. 
Resistance and contestation are not synonymous with one another. 
Where contestation is counter-hegemonic, “tactical resistance” is anti-
hegemonic (de Certeau 1984). Counter-hegemonic politics aspires to build 
consensus around an emancipatory project and forge “political unity across 
cultural differences” (Sanbonmatsu 2004: 130). It is organised, openly negates 
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the hegemonic discourse and seeks a revolutionary change in the status quo.80 
Examples of counter-hegemonic movements include the Bolshevik party in 
Russia up to 1917, the Nazi party until 1933 and Indian nationalists up to 1950. 
In contrast, anti-hegemonic politics is characterised by individuals who “contest 
and deconstruct the status quo from diverse positionings without putting a 
single project in its place” (Cooper 1995: 137). Building on a Foucauldian 
analysis of power, feminist scholar Davinia Cooper argues that opportunities 
exist for “localized episodes” of progressive social change. Instead of making 
claims to universality, anti-hegemonic activists argue that knowledge is local. 
They do not seek to replace one system of domination with another.  
 
James Scott’s “Hidden Transcripts”  
In studies of resistance the work of James Scott is impossible to avoid. In his 
works on peasant resistance, Scott aims to explain “how we might more 
successfully read, interpret, and understand the often fugitive political conduct 
of subordinate groups” (Scott 1990: 17). Scott distinguishes between “public,” 
hegemonic transcripts and parallel “hidden” transcripts. The public transcript is 
“the self-portrait of dominant elites as they would have themselves seen” (Scott 
1990: 18). The public transcript calls for the quiescence of the subjugated 
masses. Although not always based on lies, it is unlikely to give a full picture of 
power relations. Public displays of deference mask clandestinely avowed 
feelings of injustice. Scott captures this form of resistance through the concept 
of the “hidden transcript.” This refers to the “discourse that takes place 
“offstage,” beyond direct observation by powerholders” (Scott 1990: 4). In this 
transcript, actors inflect, confirm and contradict the public transcript. This 
involves both speech acts and practices such as tax evasion, poaching and 
negligent work. Through the tactics of hidden transcripts, which remain 
inaccessible to the powerful, subordinates disguise their forms of avoidance of 
domination. This does not mean that the hidden transcript is always privately 
enunciated; it is made through veiled public expressions too. Rather, 
subordinates attempt to hide the underlying meaning of their transcript from 
elites. Scott’s theory is not universal in its application. Transcripts differ from 
place to place and time to time. Hidden transcripts are socially contingent; they 
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emerge in different forms depending on the site and actors involved. As Scott 
argues, “the greater the disparity in power between dominant and subordinate 
and the more arbitrarily it is exercised, the more the public transcript of 
subordinates will take on a stereotyped, ritualistic cast” (Scott 1990: 3). This is 
visible in the mass spectacles of public deference at festivals and parades in 
the authoritarian states of Central Asia (Adams and Rustemova 2009). 
Scott’s work has received a mixed reception by academics (Gutmann 
1993). For Charles Tilly, Scott’s insistence that there is a unitary public 
transcript and a unitary hidden transcript is misplaced. In reality not all members 
of a social group conform to the same transcript. Tilly notes that “the procedure 
by which Scott arrives at the distinction of three or four discourses contains a 
trap: why not ten, twenty, a hundred, as many discourses as subordinates?” 
(Tilly 1991: 598). Indeed, Sherry Ortner criticises Scott for offering a “thin” 
theorisation of the politics of subaltern groups. In an article assessing 
anthropological literature on resistance, she concludes that “the lack of an 
adequate sense of prior and ongoing politics among subalterns must inevitably 
contribute to an inadequate analysis of resistance itself” (Ortner 1995: 179). He 
does not, she argues, take sufficient account of the varying positions taken by 
individuals and their motivations for doing so. 
Despite professing his sympathy towards post-structuralist thought, 
Scott’s analysis is based on a series of dichotomies: hidden/public, overt/covert, 
dominant/subordinate, popular/elite. Social reality is not so neatly 
compartmentalised. Although this is a heuristic device, in doing so he fails to 
take into account how fuzzy these boundaries can be (Bayat 1997). Scott never 
defines what public and hidden are. Are these confined to specific spaces or are 
they defined by who populate them? For example, would a dinner party hosted 
in a private home but including senior members of the government be hidden or 
public? Is the policeman manning a roadblock demanding bribes from drivers a 
subordinate or a member of the elite? Scott does not answer these questions. 
Instead of being opposites that exist in neatly defined and discrete spaces, 
public and hidden transcripts exist on a continuum.  Responding to Weapons of 
the Weak, Timothy Mitchell accuses Scott of confining his notion of hegemony 
to the physical realm of coercion and ideas (Mitchell 1990). In doing so, he 
follows a Cartesian logic, pitting the hegemonic power over the body against the 
liberating thoughts of the mind. In other words, Scott “relies on the distinction 
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between a public (and behavioral) acquiescence and a realm of private (and 
largely mental autonomy)” (Mitchell 1990: 551). People physically behave in a 
way that fits with the public transcript, while at the same time challenging it in 
their mind. For Mitchell, such a division between the conforming body and 
resistant mind is far too simplistic; all subjects operate within relations of 
hegemonic power. Hegemony operates through a range of dominant cultural 
institutions including schools, museums, the media and religious organisations.   
 Mona Lilja and Stellan Vinthagen challenge Scott’s argument that 
resistance needs to be conscious and intentional (Lilja and Vinthagen 2007). By 
restricting his analysis to self-aware forms of resistance, they argue, Scott 
ignores a range of unintentional forms of resistance. Resistance is also a matter 
of interpretation. Acts of resistance may not be conceived as such by those who 
produce them, but may be interpreted as resistance by those who they affect. 
For example, as I will elaborate upon in Chapter Six, Tajiks who wear beards do 
not always see themselves as rebelling against an assertively secular system. 
Many see the wearing of a beard as a personal, spiritual preference rather than 
a political act. However, the government of Tajikistan has securitised the 
wearing of beards, linking them to extremism and resistance. These beard 
wearers would not be included in Scott’s analysis, but, in my opinion, they do 
come under the mantel of resistance. In studying how political subjects resist 
security governance, then, Scott’s theories remain limited. Instead, I turn to 
Michel Foucault’s work on resistance. Many have misread Foucault’s analytics 
of power and some of his more provocative statements about the inescapbiltiy 
of power relations, taking this to mean that subjects are incapable of resisting. 
As I will show through a careful reading of Foucault and the Foucauldian 
literature on resistance, this is not the case. Foucault’s thinking provides us with 
ample tools to approach resistance to security governance.  
  
Foucault on the Subject, Power and Resistance 
 
A plurality of resistances, each of them a special case: resistances 
that are possible, necessary improbable; others that are 
spontaneous, savage, solitary, concerted, rampant or violent; still 
others that are quick to compromise, interested or sacrificial; by 
definition they can only exist in the strategic field of power relations. 
But this does not mean that they are only a reaction or a rebound, 
  
103 
 
forming with respect to the domination an underside that is in the end 
always passive, doomed to perpetual defeat (Foucault 1981: 95). 
 
Foucault is a leading thinker of everyday life and power. But he is also a theorist 
of resistance. In his analysis of prisons, schools, hospitals, he demonstrated 
how relations of power saturate through all levels of human existence. As 
Patrick Ffrench summarises, “life, insofar as it is normal, everyday, in one sense 
of that word, is produced, managed and organized by, in and through power” 
(Ffrench 2004: 297). Foucault examined the politics of power at the level of 
everyday life. For him, power “is never localized here or there, never in 
anybody’s hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power 
is employed and exercised through a net-like organization” (Foucault 1994b: 
98). As I outlined in the previous chapter, Foucault examines the emergence of 
three separate, but not discrete, forms of power: sovereign, disciplinary and 
biopower. Each of these forms of power shape political subjects. Through 
power, subjects “gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted 
through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, 
thoughts etc” (Foucault 1994: 35).  
 Numerous questions emerge from Foucault’s paradigmatic analysis of 
power. Can subjects ever escape the constraints of subjectification? What kinds 
of resistance spring from what kinds of power? His critics have accused him of 
presenting such a bleak picture of disciplinary society that he paralyses all 
opportunities for resistance (Habermas 1987; Fraser 1981; Trombadori 1991). 
In his introduction to the English translation of Remarks on Marx, Duccio 
Trombadori concludes that “Foucault, far from providing a new stimulus to 
demands for liberation, limits himself to describing a mechanism of pure 
imprisonment” (Trombadori 1991: 20). According to the orthodox approach to 
Foucault’s analytics of power, “power is repression; agency is a myth; 
subjectification is enslavement; resistance to power is futile; freedom is 
impossible” (Heller 1996: 105).  State theorist Nicos Poulantzas argues that 
power and resistance exist at opposing poles in Foucault’s work. And power 
ends up being the dominant pole: “power is in the end essentialized and 
absolutized” (Poulantzas 1978: 150). For Marxist theorist David Harvey, 
Foucault’s disdain towards counter-hegemonic ideologies such as traditional 
Marxism leads him to be become a nihilistic relativist. According to Harvey’s 
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reading of Foucault, “no Utopian scheme can ever hope to escape the power-
knowledge relation in non-repressive ways” (Harvey 1990: 292). 
In the early 1990s, a number of scholars began challenging this reading 
of Foucault (Pickett 1996; Heller 1996). Foucault’s account of modern power as 
diffuse, circulating and polycentric certainly makes resistance difficult, but it 
does not make it impossible. His thinking, they argued, leaves a great deal of 
space for resistance.81 Rather than existing as a dialectical relationship, as 
many have argued, resistance and power exist in an agonal relationship of 
mutual definition.  Power and resistance only become meaningful when they 
interact with one another. As Foucault declares in his essay ‘The Subject and 
Power,’ “without the possibility of recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a 
physical determination” (Foucault 1982: 221). Foucauldian power is not 
totalising in the way that Harvey and Poulantzas seem to think. Foucault does 
not believe that all power relations involve domination. Instead, he 
conceptualises power as a “transformative capacity,” the ability to modify the 
actions of others (Heller 1996). 
Far from being something that is marginalised to the point of non-
existence by power, in ‘The Subject and Power’ Foucault argues that any 
analysis of power relations should take resistance to those relations as a 
starting point: 
I would like to suggest another way to go further towards a new 
economy of power relations, a way which is more empirical, more 
directly related to our present situation, and which implies more 
relations between theory and practice. It consists of taking the forms 
of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point. To 
use another metaphor, it consists of using this resistance as a 
chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their 
position, find out their point of application and the methods used. 
Rather than analyzing power from the point of view of its internal 
rationality, it consists of analyzing power relations through the 
antagonism of strategies (Foucault 1982: 210-11). 
 
Without resistance, power would be meaningless. But what does Foucauldian 
resistance look like? Power relations and resistance are mutually constitutive. It 
follows then that as power is spread throughout society and not localised in any 
                                                          
81
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particular place, “the struggle against power must also be diffuse” (Pickett 1996: 
458). Like power, resistance is not destructive, it is “productive, affirmative and 
[can] use the techniques of power” (Pickett 1996: 459). Resistance can turn 
power against itself.  
Change is certainly possible in Foucault’s analysis of power. But, for 
Foucault, social change starts at the local level. The fact that power is 
everywhere, “means that there are multiple opportunities for resistance” (Pickett 
1996: 461). In the History of Sexuality, Volume I, he writes that “the swarm of 
points of resistance traverses social stratifications and individual unities. And it 
is doubtless strategic codification of these points of resistance which makes a 
revolution possible” (Foucault 1981: 96). Foucault argues that “power is 
exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free” (Foucault 
1982: 221). And this potential to escape the relations of power and become truly 
free subjects never disappears. Small instances of resistance pervade society. 
Foucault is not interested in replacing one system of knowledge-power with 
another. Instead, he is interested in a politics where difference not conformity is 
the ordering principle. Resistance emerges from political subjects themselves. 
As he notes, “maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to 
refuse what we are” (Foucault 1982: 216). “The conclusion would be that the 
political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to liberate the 
individual from the state, and the state’s institutions, but to liberate us both from 
the state and from the type of individualization that is linked to the state,” 
Foucault continues (1982: 216). He is interested in the ways in which resistance 
can be a process of “self-creation” or “becoming what one is” in the Nietzschean 
sense.82 Subjectivity, the “structure of feelings,” can form the basis of resistance 
(Williams 1954). Subjectivity is a person’s consciousness, agency, beliefs and 
experiences. Whereas subjects are physical beings, subjectivity denotes the 
sense of the self that subjects have. For Sherry Ortner, “subjectivity is the basis 
of “agency,” a necessary part of understanding how people (try to) act on the 
world even as they are acted upon. Agency is not some natural originary will; it 
takes shape as specific desires and intensions within a matrix of subjectivity- of 
(culturally constituted) feelings, thoughts or meanings” (Ortner 2005: 34). 
Through practical engagement it is possible to work upon the self in isolation 
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from the politics of power. This can involve creating your own ethics and your 
own subjectivity through bodily practices and relationships. Foucault was 
motivated by a desire to ask if we can think differently about life. He wanted to 
“free thought from what it silently thinks” (Foucault 1984: 9).  
 
Resisting Security 
 
Early research on resistance in international relations examined the counter-
hegemonic goals and strategies of social movements (cf Lynch 1999; Keck and 
Sikkink 1998; Amoore 2005; Bleiker 2000). These studies set a binary 
opposition between rulers and ruled, those who dominate and those who resist 
(Balzacq 2014). But, as I outlined above, a Foucauldian understanding of power 
and resistance does not set them in opposition to one another. Instead, power 
and resistance exist in an agonal, mutually-constitutive relationship. Taking this 
more critical stance on resistance and power, a handful of academics have 
started to investigate the ways in which people can resist the oppressive politics 
and policies of security (Salter 2011; Marx 2003; Gilliom 2001; Guillaume and 
Huysmans 2012; Guillaume 2011; Balzacq 2014; Ochs 2011; Ryan 2015; 
Donnelly 2016; Stritzel and Chang 2015; Amicelle et al 2015). This literature 
has close links to the literature on ‘everyday’ security, examining how security 
subjects can resist securitisation and security practices. A number of these 
studies have also focused on authoritarian contexts, using ethnography to 
examine how Palestinians resist the Israeli occupation (Ochs 2011; Ryan 2015). 
These studies have raised important questions about agency, resistance and 
transformation in securitised sites. Yet the study of resistance to security 
remains in its infancy, and a range of theoretical and empirical questions 
remain.   
How can subjects resist security as process, practice and 
subjectification? Resisting security as process, or securitisation, involves 
counter-securitisation, which involves the subject of securitisation rejecting the 
label that they are a security threat. Although a number of scholars have 
mentioned this as a possibility, they have not discussed it at length (Buzan et al. 
1998; Vuori 2011; Hansen 2011; Charrett 2009). Holger Stritzel and Sean 
Chang have developed a more detailed theory of counter-securitisation (Stritzel 
and Chang 2015). In keeping with the idea that audience matters, Stritzel and 
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Chang argue that securitisation not be approached so much a “single act of 
transformation than as a prolonged and fragile political game constituted by 
moves and counter-moves in a continuous struggle for authority and legitimacy 
‘on the ground’” (Stritzel and Chang 2015). Those who are securitised do have 
the opportunity to reject the label. Nonetheless, counter-securitisation only 
examines how actors can resist security governance using discourse. This is 
not the only tactic through which resistance is possible.  
Resisting security practices can involve a range of practices including 
humour and practices of citizenship (Huysmans and Guillaume 2013; Salter 
2011; Wedeen 1999; Balzacq 2014). Subjects of securitisation can resist 
subjectification and the three forms of power which undercut TASG in a range 
of ways. Indeed, Vinthagen and Lilja (2014) argue that resistance differs 
depending on the type of power being exercised. Sovereign power limits and 
prevents certain behaviours, claiming a monopoly on violence. It involves 
arrests, torture and rendition. More overt forms of resistance to sovereign power 
involve breaking the law, civic disobedience, protests, rebellions and strikes. 
More subtle resistance to the practices of sovereign power involves using 
human rights law to counter-act the states excessive security practices. This 
could involve taking the perpetrator to court or seeking asylum in another state. 
As I will show in Chapter Six, a number of Tajik citizens who have been 
detained in Russia at the request of the government of Tajikistan have used the 
European Court of Human Rights to resist being rendered home.  
Elites use disciplinary power to define and police the norm; those 
deviating from the norm or seen to be at-risk of doing so – the terrorist, the 
extremist, the insurgent- are subject to corrective treatment. Disciplinary power 
shapes and normalises subjects. According to Foucault, “discipline makes 
individuals; it is the specific technique of power that regards individuals both as 
objects and as instruments of its exercise” (Foucault 1991a: 170). Faced with 
the dividing practices of disciplinary power subjects of securitisation can resist 
in at least two ways. First, they can change the way they present themselves so 
as to appear less ‘threatening.’ For Muslims whose outward signs of piety lead 
the authorities to deem them a potential risk, this could involve de-veiling or 
trimming their beard. But in doing so, disciplinary power is successful; subjects 
conform to the norm. As such, this form of resistance is more about self-
preservation and does not directly take on the legimitacy of the exercise of 
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disciplinary power itself.  A more confrontationary form of resistance to 
disciplinary power involves maintaining ‘abnormal’ and ‘risky’ behaviour despite 
securitisation. Contrary to the hiding their religiosity, as in the previous example, 
this would involve wearing a beard or hijab in spite of state campaigns to 
securitise religious dress.  A degree of overlap exists between resistance to 
biopower and disciplinary power. Both involve maintaining a ‘risky’ subjectivity 
in spite of subjectification.   
The final, and most recent, form of power that Foucault examines is 
biopower. This involves the management of populations and individual subjects 
through practices of self-regulation. Biopower has two main characteristics 
(Rabinow and Rose 2006). First, it involves discourses about the vital 
characteristics of being human (being healthy, productive etc). Second, it 
involves specific interventions that manage the health and life of the population. 
Efforts to curtail morbidity, secure species life and efforts to securitise certain 
‘dangerous’ lifestyles all constitute forms of biopower. Biopower is “pastoral.” 
Institutions care for subjects as a shepherd tends his flock. How does one resist 
biopower? Vinthagen and Lilja argue that resistance involves rejecting the 
pastoral care of elites (2014). Resisting biopower involves rejecting hegemonic 
discourses on ‘healthy’ lifestyles and persevering with ‘risky’ practices. This 
involves remaining resilient in the face of security governance’s subjectification. 
In Chapter Six, I will explore how pious Tajiks resist the biopolitics of security 
governance by continuing to live their lives with dignity and morality. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Thus far, my discussion has been abstract and theoretical rather than empirical.  
In the first two chapters, I outlined and critiqued the current literature on the top-
down politics of security and the everyday, bottom-up politics of (in)security. 
Using the thinking of Michel Foucault, and some of the scholars inspired by his 
work, I developed an approach to transnational authoritarian security 
governance that incorporates elements from both bottom-up and top-down 
approaches. My approach is premised on the argument that security is 
ontologically unstable and actors engage in struggles to ‘fix’ the meaning of 
security, its referent object and what is threatening. My approach to security 
governance involves three steps. First, I examine security as process, the ways 
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in which actors securitise objects and subjects through discourse, and how the 
audience of these security discourses respond to this. The securitisation of 
Islam in Tajikistan did not spring forth from nowhere; it has a specific 
genealogy. Contemporary discourses on Tajik security developed during the 
Soviet Union and have been reformulated since Tajikistan gained independence 
in 1991. In Chapter Three, I trace the genealogy of discourses on Islam and 
(in)security and in Chapter Four I map the features of this discourse in 
independent Tajikistan. Second, I examine security as practice, how the 
government of Tajikistan has responded to the ‘threat’ of radical Islam posed by 
migrants living in Russia. In Chapter Five, I examine the range of practices that 
the Tajik government has deployed to police the diaspora. Third, security 
governance is a process of subjectification undercut by relations of power. 
Transnational authoritarian security governance involves the practice of 
sovereign, disciplinary and biopower, which combine to produce political 
subjects. In Chapter Five, I start to map the ways in which TASG impacts on the 
daily lives of pious Tajik migrants. As I demonstrated in this chapter, the 
existence of these power relations is dependent on there being resistance to 
them. In Chapter Six, I focus on how those Tajik migrants subjected to 
securitisation can resist TASG.  
My Foucauldian approach to TASG takes particular inspiration from 
Foucault’s genealogical writings. My approach to TASG takes the role of history 
in informing and shaping contemporary modes of governance seriously. Whilst 
the coming of independence in 1991 certainly shook Tajikistan, contributing to 
its slide into civil war in 1992, it did not lead to an overnight transformation in 
governance. Soviet ways of thinking and acting have proved durable. Tajik 
elites have not engaged in the denigration of the Soviet past that has been seen 
in other post-colonial states.83 Instead, the contemporary discourse on religion 
and security contains many of the assumptions of the Soviet discourse. In the 
next chapter, I begin my analysis of transnational authoritarian security 
governance in Tajikistan by outlining the Soviet origins of the discourse linking 
Islam to the potential for violence. 
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 A debate exists as to whether post-Soviet Central Asia is post-colonial. See Kandiyoti 2002; 
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Chapter 3: Emergence: Genealogy of Discourses on Religion and 
(in)Security in Soviet Tajikistan 
Inspired by the genealogical approach outlined by Michel Foucault, in this 
chapter I write a “history of the present” relations between politics and religion in 
Tajikistan (Foucault 1977: 31). The study of history, for Foucault, constitutes a 
means through which we can critically engage with and understand the present. 
Foucault told an interviewer in 1984, ‘‘I set out from a problem expressed in the 
terms current today and I try to work out its genealogy. Genealogy means that I 
begin my analysis from a question posed in the present’’ (Kritzman 1988: 262). 
Genealogy involves delving into the past in order to examine how hegemonic 
discourses and practices emerge. It involves “working back from our present to 
the contingencies that have come together to give us our certainties” (Asad 
2003: 16). Influenced by Foucault, theorists have examined the genealogy of 
the foundational concepts of international relations such as “security” 
(Neocleous 2008), “sovereignty” (Bartelson 1995; Weber 1995) and “the 
international” (Walker 1993). Examining the genesis of discourses on religion 
and security fits in with the four stage methodological approach outlined by 
linguist and leading proponent of Critical Discourse Analysis Norman 
Fairclough.  Influenced by Foucault, Fairclough surmised that “researching the 
emergence and constitution of […] discourses requires a genealogical approach 
which locates these discourses within the field of prior discourses and entails 
collection of historical series of texts (2006: 54).” Rather than providing a 
comprehensive genealogy of the emergence of these relationships by tracing 
them back to their pre-Tsarist and Tsarist antecedents, which would constitute a 
mammoth task, I will restrict my analysis to the Soviet past.  
Tajikistan continues to be post-Soviet. Historian Adeeb Khalid argues 
that “the way in which Central Asians relate to Islam, what Islam means to 
them; can only be understood by taking into account seventy years of Soviet 
rule” (Khalid 2007: 2). During the Soviet period the ways in which Tajiks 
conceived of and related to Islam fundamentally changed. Soviet rule rendered 
Islam a key part of identity (Khalid 2003).  Islam became a “cultural marker;” 
religious identity did not entail a set of fixed beliefs (orthodoxy) or practices 
(orthopraxy). In contemporary Tajikistan, Islamic practice - as well as state 
religious policy - remains post-Soviet.  
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In this chapter I make a series of arguments. I argue that both the 
association of religion with violence, and security with secularism, originated 
during the Soviet Union.  Whilst I offer an overview of Soviet religious policy in 
Central Asia, I focus on the late-Soviet period in particular.84 My reasoning is 
twofold. Many of politicians, academics and journalists who are currently active 
in producing discourses on religion and security in Tajikistan received their 
education during the late-Soviet period. Additionally, as I elaborate below, it was 
during the late Soviet period that both Sovietologists and Soviet thinkers took a 
greater interest in political Islam. I draw on both primary and secondary sources 
in my analysis. In terms of primary sources, I have identified over fifty English 
and Russian language articles from the late Soviet period using BBC 
Monitoring.  During a trip to Dushanbe in July 2013, I had the opportunity to 
read some of the original Russian-language articles in the Tajik National 
Library. On a subsequent trip to Moscow in 2015, I located the rest of the 
articles at the Russian State Newspaper Library in Khimki. As well as using this 
archival material, I also draw on a range of academic accounts by Soviet 
thinkers and western Sovietologists. 
Many similarities exist between the way the two dominant approaches to 
religion in the Soviet Union - the Soviet and the Sovietological – treat the 
relationship between religion, politics and security (Kristeva 1986). I trace this 
manifest intertextuality back to the origins of these discourses.  Although a 
number of excellent studies of Islam in Soviet Tajikistan exist, most of the 
literature - both that produced in western institutions and by the Soviets 
themselves - remains conceptually, analytically and methodologically flawed (cf. 
Tett 1994; Khalid 2007; Saroyan 1997; Atkin 1989). Michael Kemper argued 
that all Sovietological accounts “should be dismissed completely unless their 
findings can be supported by the testimonies of the Muslim’s themselves” 
(Kemper 2009: 21). Whilst I agree that the idea that we should not draw 
conclusions about lived realities of Islam in the Soviet Union from these 
accounts, they remain interesting in so much as they illustrate the emergence of 
a western discourse on religion and politics in the former Soviet Union.  During 
the Soviet period, a number of assumptions about the relations between 
religion, politics and security emerged. These assumptions continue to pervade 
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policy-making and analysis of the region. In this chapter, I identify three such 
assumptions. These include the idea that Islam is monolithic and opposed to 
modernity, the rigid dichotomy between official and ‘parallel’ Islam, and the 
conclusion that Islam constituted an inevitable threat to the Soviet Union.  I am 
interested in the ways both western and Soviet actors produced and sustained 
these assumptions about Soviet Central Asia. These ways of thinking, as I will 
demonstrate in later chapters, continue to form the foremost way through which 
actors interpret political realties in post-Soviet Central Asia. 
The chapter unfolds as follows. First, I offer a brief overview on Soviet 
religious policies and local reactions to these policies. After this, I trace the 
emergence of a number of dominant assumptions about the relationship 
between politics and religion. I argue that these assumptions were often shared 
by both the Soviet regime and western academics. Having outlined these 
assumptions, I argue that these discourses and practice remain undercut by 
relations of power, including elements of biopower, sovereign and disciplinary 
power. In the final section, I illustrate how these discourses shaped the framing 
of an important political event during the late Soviet period: the Dushanbe riots 
of 1990.  
Islam in the Soviet Union 
Between 1917 and 1991 the process of Soviet, state-led modernisation 
profoundly transformed Tajikistan’s economic, societal, cultural and political 
structures.  As part of the Soviet project the economy was industrialised, the 
education system revolutionised, factories built and healthcare transformed. 
Religion had played a key part in the regulation of social life in the pre-Soviet 
Emirate of Bukhara and Kokand Khanate.85 The authorities viewed Muslims, 
who constituted the vast majority of the Central Asian population in 1917, as a 
feudal society in need of rapid modernisation (Malashenko & Polanskaya 1994).   
It is impossible to talk of one Soviet policy on religion; in reality policies 
diverged during different periods. An ad hoc and accommodating policy towards 
Islam characterised the years between the October 1917 revolution and the 
razmezhevaniye, or national delimitation, of 1924 (Yemelianova 2002). Under 
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Josef Stalin, who assumed leadership of the USSR following a power struggle 
after Lenin’s death in 1924, the government attempted to enforce it atheistic 
worldview on the Tajik population and expunge Islam from the public sphere. 
This assault included the banning of the hajj (1928), the hujum (Uzb: Lit. 
storming or assault) against the veiling of women, the confiscation of waqf (land 
owned by mosques), closure of mosques and persecution of the ulema 
(religious establishment).86  The change in alphabet from Arabic to Latin (1928) 
and then to Cyrillic (1937-40), cut Central Asian Muslims off from the rest of the 
umma (community of believers). During World War II the party temporarily 
halted the onslaught and a period of rapprochement followed. In 1943, the 
government established SADUM (Rus.: Dukhovnoye Upravleniye Musul’man 
Sredney Azii I Kazakhstana) which managed Muslim affairs in Central Asia.  
SADUM was headed by a dynasty of Muslim clerics; the Babakhans.87 In 
addition to this, the government reopened the Mir-i-Arab madrasa in Bukhara in 
1946 and legalised the hajj in 1944.88  Although these institutions continued to 
function, Nikita Khrushchev launched a renewed propaganda campaign against 
the idea of Islam between 1954 and 1958.   
During the Brezhnev era of “mature socialism” (Rus.: zrely sotsializm) the 
government reduced its repressive policies and framed Islam as an integral part 
of the Central Asian republics’ identities.89  After Mikhail Gorbachev came to 
power in 1985, new religious freedoms resulting from perestroika 
(Rus:.restructuring) and glasnost (Rus.: openness), led to the re-emergence of 
Islam in the public sphere.  By 1988 even the Communist Party itself was 
admitting that religious believers constituted around 20 per cent of the Soviet 
Union’s population.90 As John Anderson states: “by 1990 a de-facto and de-jure 
freedom of consciousness had emerged in the USSR” (1994: 216).  In 
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Asia. 
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Tajikistan this culminated in the opening of the first madrassas in Tajikistan and 
formation of the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan in 1990.91  
According to Marxist-Leninist thought, religion was an ideology in the 
negative sense, a false consciousness held by the masses which legitimised 
capitalist domination (Pospielovsky 1987). The entry for Islam in the Bol’shaya 
Soviyetskaya Entsiklopediya (Large Soviet Encyclopaedia) summarised the 
religion as follows: “Islam is an instrument for the spiritual oppression of the 
workers […] and the peoples of the east” (1954: 516). Soviet rule transformed 
the relations between religion, politics and identity. Local norms were Islamised 
and Islam was localised. This process of Sovietisation meant that “Islam was 
rendered synonymous with tradition” (Khalid 2003: 578).  During the era of 
“mature socialism” under Brezhnev (1964-1982), the media portrayed Islam as 
tantamount to national culture (Yemelianova 2002).  As such local to’y or 
festivals were viewed as Islamic, but accompanied by non-Islamic behaviour, 
such as drinking alcohol.  Islam became a crucial “identity marker” which 
offered a personal function of differentiation between local “self” and Slavic 
“other” (Khalid 2007). These social transformations generated interest from both 
Soviet and western scholars. Indeed, after the Second World War a plethora of 
studies on Islam in the Soviet Union were published in English, Russian and 
French (Bennigsen and Quelquejay 1967; Bennigsen and Broxup 1983; Rwykin 
1990).92 Such accounts continue to shape the ways in which the region is 
understood (DeWeese 2002).  
Sovietological Approaches to Islam in Central Asia 
Whilst a few excellent studies of Islam in Tajikistan dating back to the Soviet 
Union exist, most studies of Islam in the Soviet Union conducted by western 
Sovietologists contain a range of flaws (cf. Tett 1994; Atkin 1989; Rakowska-
Harmstone 1970).  In 2002, historian Devin DeWeese called for “a serious 
housecleaning” in the field of research on Islam in the Soviet Union (DeWeese 
2002: 300).   These words formed part of a review of Yacoov Ro’i’s dense book 
Islam in the Soviet Union, a book that DeWeese commends for uncovering 
archival material, but criticises for the author’s lack of critical engagement with 
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his sources. DeWeese views this 800-page work as the culmination of an 
approach to the study of Islam in the Soviet Union which he labels “Soviet 
Islamology.” The work of Russian-French émigré scholar Alexandre Bennigsen 
stands out in this sub-field of Sovietology. Other notable authors included Marie 
Broxup, Helen Carrere d’Encausse, Michael Rwykin, Martin Wheeler and 
Enders Wimbush.  The key early product of this literature was Bennigsen and 
Chantal Lemercier Quelquejay’s Islam in the Soviet Union (1967).  Despite 
being rife with methodological problems which render their truth claims 
incredulous, Bennigsen and his disciples have “exerted a stultifying and even 
pernicious influence on the study of Islam in the Soviet environment” to this day 
(DeWesse 2002: 299).  
Sovietological Islamology remains conceptually, analytically and 
methodologically flawed.  Scholars borrowed more from the theoretical and 
empirical traditions of Sovietology than from Islamic studies (DeWeese 2002).  
Political interests dominated and drove the field of Sovietology. Indeed one of 
the primary journals in which Sovietological literature appeared, Problems of 
Communism, was published by the United States Department of State, 
International Information Administration, a body charged with projecting U.S. 
soft power during the Cold War.  For Devin DeWeese this came at the expense 
of contextualising Soviet Islam within the broader Muslim world (2002). Such an 
analysis would examine how Central Asians themselves understand Islamic 
theology and practices. Nevertheless, dissenting voices about the shortcomings 
of this approach began to make themselves heard in the late 1980s (Brill-Olcott 
1985; Atkin 1989). Mark Saroyan critiqued the Sovietological discourse, arguing 
that it did not reflect what was happening so much as shape western 
perceptions of the region (Saroyan 1997). Saroyan contends that there is a 
great degree of intertextuality between what the Sovietologists and Soviets said 
about Islam in Central Asia. Julia Kristeva coined the term intertexuality in 1966. 
It refers to the influence that one text has upon another. Kristeva referred to 
texts in terms of two axes. First, a horizontal axis connects the author to the 
reader. Second, a vertical axis links the text with other texts. In an oft-quoted 
phrase, Kristeva argued that “every text is from the outset under the jurisdiction 
of other discourses which impose a universe on it” (cited in Culler 1981, 105; 
emphasis in original).Texts do not exist independently of one another; instead 
they are woven into complex discourses. Indeed, the language, conclusions and 
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assumptions contained within Soviet and Sovietological writings on Islam in the 
USSR bear a striking resemblance to one another.93 Saroyan argues that by 
“directly extrapolating” their arguments and assumptions from the Soviet 
sources themselves, the Sovietologists reproduced the Soviet discourse on 
Islam (Saroyan 1993).  
In explaining this intertextuality, following Saroyan, I argue that both 
Soviet and Sovietological authors often based their knowledge claims on similar 
sources. Given that it was impossible for western academics to access the 
region for extended fieldwork during the Soviet Union, the Sovietological 
literature on Islam in the Soviet Union is largely based upon official publications 
such as books produced by SADUM and journals like the English-language 
Muslims of the Soviet East and Nauka i Religiya (Science and Religion).  The 
publications aimed at a non-Soviet audience, such as head of SADUM 
Ziyauddin Babakhan’s Islam and Muslims in the Land of the Soviets portrayed 
the regime as tolerant of religion arguing that “the Soviet state vigilantly guards 
the rights of believers” (1980: 52).  Authors supplement this periodical literature 
with anti-religious propaganda from agitprop (Department for Agitation and 
Propaganda).   These publications, aimed at an internal audience, framed Islam 
as dying out in the face of Soviet modernisation and progress. 
Sovietologists relied on three main sources: state media, surveys and 
rare fieldtrips.  In their study of “everyday Islam” academics rely upon the 
survey data generated by Soviet ethnographers. They relied on statistics and 
indicators to represent the “reality” of Islam in the Soviet Union.  These systems 
of measurement were based on principles of scientific rationalism inherent to 
Soviet ethnography.  As such Central Asians were classified into categories 
ranging from “firm believer” to “committed atheist.”  In 1980, for example, a 
Soviet survey found that thirty per cent of Central Asians were “believers” (Ro’i 
1984).  Despite purporting to offer an emic perspective on Central Asian Islam 
though the self-categorisation of individuals, this approach contains a number of 
fundamental flaws.  First, by imposing categories on respondents and through 
the use of close-ended questions, the surveys did not allow locals to express 
how they attributed meaning to their beliefs and practices.  Second, the results 
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of these surveys are invalid due to the fact that most respondents would have 
been aware of the surveyors links with the government.  As such, most of them 
did not offer their actual opinions when questioned.  For example, after the 
introduction of a new and relatively liberal Law on Religion in 1990, the number 
of adherents to Islam skyrocketed from ten to fifty per cent of Central Asians.  
This indicates the spurious nature of the data generated by Soviet 
ethnographers.  
Occasionally academics bolstered their arguments with the accounts of 
émigrés from the Soviet Union. Indeed two of the most prominent experts on 
Islam in the Soviet Union residing in the West, Alexandre Bennigsen and 
Michael Rwykin, were both émigrés themselves.  Sovietologists also rely on the 
accounts of foreign Muslim delegations who frequently visited Central Asia to 
attend conferences organised by SADUM. State authorities closely supervised 
such visits. Some of the best work produced by western analysts emerged at 
the end of the Soviet Union when perestroika offered an opportunity for 
anthropologists like Gillian Tett and Muriel Atkin to spend long periods of time in 
the region (Atkin 1989; Tett 1994). 
Many Sovietologists recognised the problems associated with the 
reliability of their sources and thus the validity of their conclusions (Ro’i 2000).  
Nevertheless, for Bennigsen and Wimbush this problem could be overcome 
through “great familiarity with the subject, its lexicon (both Soviet and non-
Soviet variants) and the analytical spectra within which the sources become 
meaningful” (Bennigsen and Wimbush 1985: 158). Indeed, Sovietologists often 
equated quantity with accuracy.  Bennigsen and Wimbush argue that “Soviet 
sources, because of their abundance, can provide a more or less coherent 
picture of Islam in the Soviet Union” (1985: 162).  However as Yaacov Ro’i 
argues in his useful opening chapter on the use of Soviet archives, “the 
distortion of truth would seem to be the rule rather than the exception” even 
among internal communiques (Ro’i 2000: 8). All Soviet sources on Islam are 
mediated through ideological considerations and can be considered highly 
subjective in nature.  Despite making reference to the overtly ideological nature 
of these sources, most analysts still relied on them to make their inferences 
about Soviet Islam.  Rather than representing any reality of Islam, these 
sources simulated an image in which Soviet modernisation had largely removed 
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Islam as a force within society.  The lack of critical reflexivity about the reliability 
of sources constitutes a key weakness in the Sovietological literature. 
In making their truth claims about the Soviet Union the Sovietologists 
relied heavily upon Soviet sources. This intertextual process, however, was not 
purely one-way. Numerous Soviet academics demonstrated their awareness of 
the work on Islam in the USSR being produced by western Sovietologists. One 
academic from the Turkmen Academy of Sciences dismissed the alarmist work 
of Sovietologists as “bourgeois propaganda.”94 Some academics transcended 
ideological divides by arguing that their warnings needed to be taken seriously. 
Igor Belyayev addressed Alexandre Bennigsen’s concerns directly in an 
editorial published in Literaturnaya Gazeta in May 1987, “But both he 
[Bennigsen] and other Western experts have much to say, too much, even, that 
is alarming, and that inclines us to study Islam attentively here at home.”95 
Soviet and Sovietological discourses on religion in Central Asia, then, remain 
intertwined. As a result of these linkages, both parties perpetuated flawed 
assumptions about the nature of religion in Tajikistan. It is to these assumptions 
that I shall now turn.  
 
Underlying Assumptions about Religion and Security 
 
Assumption I: Religion Constitutes a Threat to Security in Central Asia 
Both Soviet and Sovietolgical accounts framed Islam as a threat to national 
security. For the Soviets, it constituted tool in the hands of enemies (Rus.: vragi) 
of the state- imperialists and capitalists- which could be used to manipulate 
local populations into threatening the state (Ashirov 1979). Sovietologists 
separated the Soviet state from Muslim society, pitting the two in opposition to 
one another.  The dominant view held by the Sovietologists contended that “the 
Muslim community is prepared for the inevitable showdown with its Russian 
rulers” (Bennigsen and Broxup 1983: 87).  Sovietolotists viewed Muslims as 
resistant en-masse to the Soviet efforts at integration, sbylizheniye (Rus.: 
“getting nearer”) and sliyaniye (Rus.: merging), which formed the cornerstone of 
the Soviet nationalities policy (Bennigsen and Wimbush 1985).  As such Islam, 
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by its very nature as an alternative identity which separated Russian from non-
Russian, formed a threat to the unitary Soviet state (Khalid 2007).   
Authors visually captured this “clash of world views” with the image of 
“red Communists” fighting “green Islamists.”96 This was evidenced by the titles 
of the works themselves, for example Bennigsen’s The Islamic Threat to the 
Soviet State (1983; With Marie Broxup) or Michael Rwykin’s Moscow’s Muslim 
Challenge (1990).  For many Sovietologists, “the primary threat to the Soviet 
state was an Islamically-inspired, Sufi-led led revolt” (Myer 2002: 162).  They 
dedicated entire books, most notably Bennigsen and Wimbush’s Mystics and 
Commissars, to measuring the number of Sufis in the Soviet Union and 
analysing the nature of the anti-Russian, fanatical Sufi threat (1985).97 Many 
western journalists also bought into the idea that the Sufis formed a clandestine 
and fundamentalist “parallel” Islamic force.98 With hindsight, however, we can 
see that Salafi rather than Sufi Islam has played the greater role in shaping the 
politics of the region (Naumkin 2005). 
Given that Tajikistan was the poorest republic in the USSR with a largely 
rural population, for some officials within the party a stand-off between “Islamic 
forces” and the secular state seemed inevitable. Outwardly, a contradictory 
discourse on the “Islamic threat” developed. On the one hand, official religious 
leaders downplayed any potential conflict between Islamic norms and 
communist values. In an interview with Hungarian radio, Abdul Abdullayev, the 
deputy leader of Central Asian Muslims, stated that in the Soviet Union 
“conditions are favourable for religion […] No-one interferes in matters 
of religion.”99  In contrast, other commentators stirred up popular fears about the 
threat posed by religion. An article entitled “Green Tea in a Red Tea House” 
published in  Komsomolskaya Pravda stated that "given all this, the danger is 
that Tajikistan may end up as a poor and aggressive Islamic republic, 
periodically wracked by civil strife and palace revolutions."100 Many western 
analysts agreed with this conclusion. One journalist wrote that in 1987 that 
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“battle lines are being drawn over a force that threatens the moral fabric of the 
Soviet atheistic domain - the religion of Islam.”101 
Indeed, many Soviet analysts and Sovietologists assumed that a causal 
link existed between adherence to Islam and resistance to the regime; Islam by 
its very nature is inherently political and opposed to secularism (Heathershaw 
and Montgomery 2014). This interpretation pitted Homo Islamicus, “united by 
the bonds of history, culture and tradition,” against Homo Sovieticus (Carrere 
d’Encause 1979).  Indeed, the communist party supported this view and 
frequently referred to the Islamic threat. In January 1986, for example, First 
Secretary of the Tajik SSR Qahhor Mahkamov referred to the threat as 
“politically acute.”102 Many accounts inferred that the persistence of Islam at the 
local level was indicative of a resistance to Soviet rule amongst Central Asians 
in general. For Soviet ethnographer Sergei Poliakov “traditionalism has grown 
too much to be considered a ‘survival,’ for it now behaves like a system 
opposed to our order” (Poliakov 1992: 173).   
Most analysts assumed that any violence in Central Asia must ipso facto 
be religious in nature. Amir Taheri, for example, framed the 1986 protests in 
Alma-Ata, in which residents protested against the removal of Kazakh 
Communist Party leader Dinmukhamed Kunayev and his replacement by 
ethnic-Russian Gennady Kolbin, as being religious in nature (1989).  Here his 
analysis is based on the assumption that political resistance in a majority 
Muslim republic must be Islamic in nature.  More recently scholars have argued 
that these protests were more about ethno-nationalism than religion (Cummings 
2005; Akiner 1995).   In addition to forging a natural link between Islam and 
resistance, Sovietologists tended to associate the volume of material produced 
on an issue with the extent of the threat itself.  For example, the increase in 
volume of published material on “radical Islam” and Sufism which emerged in 
the Soviet Union after 1980, was seen as proof that such a threat existed 
(Bennigsen 1982).   Myer argues that “the concept of an Islamic threat to 
Central Asia is in itself a largely Western construct, serving Western interests” 
(Myer 2002: 3).  According to him, with the CIA supporting the Afghan 
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mujahedeen in their struggle with the Soviet Union, the U.S. was interested in 
analysing the extent to which the jihad could be exported to the USSR itself.   
As well as posing a physical threat to the region’s security, Islam also 
constituted a demographic threat according to some analysts. With falling birth 
rates in the European Russia and rapid population growth in ‘Muslim’ republics, 
the notion of an inevitable showdown between Slav and Muslim existed.103  
Michael Rwykin dedicates a large section of his Moscow’s Muslim Challenge to 
demographic trends. Life expectancy in Central Asia was low; the population 
surge created a “youth bulge” (Roche 2010). For the authorities, the burgeoning 
young population constituted a potential security threat. According to one 
journalist at Kommunist Tadzhikistana:  
Some of the clerics illegally teach the dogma of Islam to children 
and young people. Having absorbed the opium of religion, young 
men refuse to join the Young Pioneers and Komsomol and do not 
take part in social life, and some of them to not wish to take the oath 
[for military service]. It follows that the above mentioned individuals 
are not harmless.104 
 
As the case of the 1990 Dushanbe riots, which I discuss at length in the next 
section, shows, the framing of young people as a potentially subversive force in 
need of discipline, helped the government to legitimise a crackdown on potential 
opposition. 
With hindsight, these conclusions appear misguided. Islam did not force 
the end of the Soviet Union. Despite the prevailing view that “it was in the 
Muslim republics that most clouds appear on the Soviet horizon,” the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 was not driven by factors within Central Asia (Taheri 
1989: 272).  In fact the Central Asian republics had independence thrust upon 
them. For most people, Islam and communism did not represent mutually 
exclusive modes of being. A March 1991 Komsomolskaya Pravda article stated 
that if the people of Tajikistan were asked if they would like to live in an "Islamic 
Republic" - without specifying exactly what that entailed - the overwhelming 
majority responded favourably.105 That same month 97 per cent of population 
voted in favour of staying in the Soviet Union. Although the ballot was clearly 
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rigged, it remains clear that most Tajiks were in favour of maintaining the Union. 
Indeed, while Islam remained localised in Tajikistan, the regime framed it as 
non state-controlled Islamic practices as “foreign,” influenced by external actors. 
 
Assumption II: The Foreign Hand 
Soviet officials framed Islam as “foreign,” something that proceeded from the 
Middle East.  Tajikistan’s proximity to Afghanistan and linguistic ties with Iran 
made it more vulnerable to extremist influences after the Iranian revolution and 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (Akcali 1998; Myer 2002). The official 
media- a key source for the Sovietologists - circulated reports of the nefarious 
influence these “foreign” agents had upon vulnerable Central Asians. Although 
leader of the Islamic Renaissance Party, Said Abdullah Nuri, founded his first 
underground youth movement - Nahzati Islomi (Revival of Islam) - in southern 
Tajikistan in 1974, he came to the attention of many Sovietologists only in 1987, 
when he organised a protest against the war in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, 
some analysts argued that an “Islamic revolution” was inevitable. Within this 
discourse of Islamic danger numerous authors argued that the Muslim threat 
was exogenous, imported to the region after the 1979 revolution in Iran and the 
USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan.  Bennigsen and Wimbush summarise this 
argument as follows: “We can assume that they [Muslims in the Soviet Army] 
returned [from Afghanistan] to their native Soviet republics with tales of Muslims 
who were prepared to resist the Russians with arms” (Bennigsen and Wimbush, 
1985: 37).  American journalist Keven Klose, for example, after travelling 
through the region in 1979, concluded that “the subdued, carefully controlled 
face of Islam betrays barely a flicker of interest in the explosive Moslem revival 
storming through the nations to the south.”106  
Indeed, a “religious revival” seemed to be gripping Soviet Tajikistan and 
this constituted a serious threat to social stability. The authorities repeatedly 
linked it to foreign events: the situations in Afghanistan and Iran. Anti-Soviet 
propaganda, some of which originated in neighbouring Afghanistan, particularly 
concerned the authorities.107 Reading through Soviet newspapers from 1985 
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onwards, reports of religious leaders being arrested frequently crop-up. 
Nematullo Inayatov from Kulob was arrested in 1986 on charges of spreading 
religious propaganda.108 Kalandar Sadurdinov, a mullo from Kommunistichesky 
region, was also reported to be preaching among the local population. 
Eventually he was arrested and accused of “deliberately spreading fabrications 
defaming the Soviet state.”109 On 6 March 1989 Dushanbe resident, Gafur 
Zaidullayev, was charged with “distributing ideologically detrimental materials 
[…] with pan-Islamic ideas alien to Soviet reality.”110  
 Although the population was taking a greater interest in religion, this did 
not directly translate into political radicalisation (Heathershaw and Montgomery 
2014). The late 1980s was a time when Islam and its role in national identity 
was widely debated by the intelligentsia and rural poor alike. The solutions were 
not always “radical” or transformative, the actions of religious leaders not 
always political.111 Most of those shaping these debates were Tajiks 
themselves, not foreigners, and much of the discussion focused on the 
particularities of Islam in Tajikistan. Nonetheless, through the actions of the 
Soviet authorities their practices could become securitised, they could be 
labelled “Wahabbi” and be disciplined by the regime (Atkin 1989; Bleuer and 
Nourzhanov 2013).  Thus far I have discussed the ways in which the Soviet 
authorities framed those whose practices fell outside of the confines of official 
Islam as “dangerous” and “foreign.” Now I turn to the representation of Islam as 
backwards and opposed to socialist modernity.  
Assumption III: “Backwards” Central Asia 
 
Analysts of Islam in the Soviet Union often treat Islam as a homogenous and 
essential phenomenon.  Despite being a-theoretical and largely narrative in 
content, Sovietological Islamologists make a number of unwritten assumptions 
about the nature of Islam (Khalid 2007). In doing so, they borrow from the 
conceptual understandings of Islam which developed from the traditions of 
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nineteenth century Russian Orientalism and informed Soviet thinking on Islam 
(Kemper and Connerman 2011). Indeed, although both camps came to different 
conclusions about the extent of Islamic observance in Central Asia, both Soviet 
and Western studies largely agreed on its nature (Saroyan 1993).  Influenced 
by the ideas of Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, both Soviet and 
Sovietological writers argued that modernity and religion oppose one another.  
This argument is more overtly present in Soviet analyses than in the often a-
theoretical Sovietological literature, but the similarities outweigh the differences 
in their conceptual approaches.   
An assumption that modernisation would lead to secularisation informed 
both the Soviet and Sovietological discourses on religion (Saroyan 1993). The 
Soviet authorities portrayed Islam as intolerant and as running counter to the 
doctrine of inter-cultural harmony or druzhba narodov (Rus.: Friendship 
Amongst the Peoples). Islam, according to Marxist-Leninists, would be 
eliminated by the progress achieved under communism.  This ambitious project 
ultimately failed to eliminate Islam, but it did succeed in transforming it in 
numerous ways. Soviet ideologues framed Islam as part of the historical identity 
of the region, as a perezhitok (Rus.: remnant), a vestige of a feudal society 
common to all “eastern people” (Rus.: vostochny narod) (Smirnov 1954).  
According to one Soviet thinker, religion “shrouded the whole region [Central 
Asia] in a dense fog of superstition.”112 Whereas the Soviet authors argue that 
Central Asian society was modernised, leaving certain vestiges, the 
Sovietologist saw the persistence of Islam as a result of the failure of the Soviet 
modernisation project, in particular their failure to mould forms of 
consciousness. Most Sovietologists argued that religion retained its, often 
nefarious, grip on society. For Bennigsen “Islam has in no way been 
contaminated either by Marxism or secularism […] Islam in the USSR is the 
same unadulterated religion it had been before 1917” (1980: 39). A monolithic 
“community spirit” united Muslims in Central Asia according to Rwykin (1990: 
115). Bennigsen argued that all Muslims had an “inborn” sense of umma 
(community), which dictated the way they behaved (1978: 258).  Such 
essentialist arguments reduced explanations of Central Asian politics and 
society to questions of religion. 
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Such Orientalist analyses portrayed Islam as backwards and in opposition 
to progress (Myer 2002).  A quote that typifies such an Orientalist 
representation comes from Rywkin: 
Central Asian Muslims value everyday joys, need no vodka to forget 
their troubles, are not interested in theoretical problems and remain 
indifferent to ‘isms’ of any shape as long as their family lives and daily 
pleasures remain unaffected (Rywkin 1984:  4). 
Here Rywkin’s patronising tone indicates that the region’s inhabitants are 
backwards and all united in one, Islamic, mode of thought.  Evidence would 
suggest that this is not the case; multiple subjectivities existed in Soviet 
Tajikistan. Nonetheless there is a tendency for analysts to make such sweeping 
generalisations. Much western media coverage took on an Orientalist tone. The 
opening line to an article on the Armenian riots published in The Economist in 
1990 stated that “conventional wisdom used to hold that Soviet Central Asia 
was a bastion of "Asiatic despotism": a corrupt elite, run on clan lines, ruled 
over primitive masses.”113  Another journalist stated that in 1991, “the Islamic 
flavour of this relatively backward republic some 3,000 km (1,860 miles) to the 
southeast is striking and exotic. Bearded Moslem men wearing turbans or dark 
green "tubiteika" skullcaps hawk fruits and meat at Dushanbe's busy central 
market. Many are dressed in bright striped coats called chapans that reach 
down to their knees.”114 Such orientalist discourses render Central Asia as 
obscure, exotic and backwards. These myths still pervade western discourses 
on the region to this day (Heathershaw and Megoran 2011). Another 
assumption that emerged during the Soviet Union, and persists to this day is the 
division between ‘good,’ state-sanctioned Islam and ‘bad,’ parallel, unofficial 
Islam. 
 
Assumption IV: The Parallel/Official Dichotomy 
Both discourses tend to dichotomise parallel, dangerous Islam with benign, 
state-controlled Islam. The Soviet policy on religion had not successfully 
eradicated Islam from society. Instead, according to analysts, Islam had been 
pushed “underground” where it was represented by Islamic teachers, Sufi 
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ishans and “Wahhabi” fanatics (Malashenko and Polonskaya 1994).115  A story 
relayed in the national newspaper Kommunist Tadzhikistana in 1983 typifies the 
way in which party members often turned a blind eye to religious practices. The 
author states how he saw a religious poster on a bus with the message 
''Tavakaal ba khudo'' (There is no hope, salvation lies with God). He wonders 
why no-one reported this blatant violation of party ideology, “Do they think that 
the socialist rules of behaviour can peacefully coexist in public places with 
antediluvian posters containing reactionary slogans?”116 This parallel Islam 
appeared everywhere in Central Asia. One party official, writing in Pravda 
Vostoka, commented that: 
  
Some people now show two faces, as it were: a public and political 
face, when they stand up for our ideals, and an everyday face, when 
they observe religious ceremonies. They skilfully use the first face 
on the job, and the other one in the family and at their place of 
residence.117 
 
Unofficial religious leaders - according to the Communist Party - posed a 
particular threat to the region’s security. In the 1970s a number of self-styled 
imams emerged in Tajikistan (Mullojanov 2001). Soviet reports framed these 
men as uneducated and dangerous.118 According to Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 
all a man had to do to become a mullo was “to grow a beard, tie a turban 
around their heads, hold prayer beads in their hands, and, to start off, memorize 
a few verses from the Koran.”119  Future leader of the Hizbi Nahzati Islomi 
Tojikiston (Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan), Said Abdullo Nuri, was one 
of the most prominent of these emergent leaders. Nuri (nee Abdullo 
Nuriddinovich Saidov) was born in Sangvor, Tavildara in 1947. His father and 
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teacher was Nuriddin Saidov was, a former state farm director. His family was 
forcibly resettled in the cotton growing region of Vakhsh in southern Tajikistan in 
1953.  Born into an observant family, he studied under Deobandi scholar 
Mahmudjon Hindustoni (1892-1989) at his unofficial madrassa in Dushanbe. A 
driver by occupation, he worked in the Kurgan-Tyube Equipment Inventory-
Taking Bureau.  
In 1974 he founded Nahzati Islomi (Revival of Islam); the organisation 
aimed to re-educate young people in the ways of Islam. His religious interests 
swiftly brought him into conflict with the regime. After he petitioned the 27th 
Party Congress in 1986, calling for the establishment of an Islamic state, the 
local authorities labelled him “Wahhabi”.120 Thus, as one journalist concluded 
“step by step Saidov slipped into antisocial positions and became socially 
dangerous.”121 His home town, the Turkmenistan State Farm in Vakhsh District, 
was reported to be infested with his ideas. People ignored “secular holidays” 
and did not watch television. According to Kommunist Tadzhikistana: 
Like metastases, religious sentiments are creeping through the 
kishlak (village), affecting more and more people, poisoning their 
minds and fencing them off from reality behind a curtain of false 
ideals.122 
In the aftermath of the incident, KGB chief, Vladimir V. Petkel, stated that 
Tajikistan was a ''fertile ground'' for Islamic ideas and groups opposing the 
Soviet system.123 
Sovietologists appropriated the language used by their Soviet 
counterparts. Bennigsen borrowed the term “parallel,” which he first used in 
1980, from Soviet scholar Lusitsian Klimovich who first used the term in 1966 to 
describe “extra-mosque” activities. By doing so, Sovietologists mistakenly 
simplified Islam and religious policy by examining them through binaries such 
                                                          
120
 The label Wahabbi was, and still is, used in Central Asia as a catachall term for Islamic 
fundamentalists whether they claim to adhere to the teachings of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab or not. 
Johan Rasanayagam illustrates how the term has become a tool for non-elites to denounce and 
discredit rivals and opponents (Rasanayagam 2011). 
121
 Rabiyev, V, “Posle Suda: Nikuda” [After the Trial: Going Nowhere], Kommunist 
Tadzhikistana, 12 February 1986, p. 3. 
122
 Rabiyev, V. “Posle Suda: Nikuda” [After the Trial: Going Nowhere], Kommunist 
Tadzhikistana, 12 February 1987, p. 3. 
123
 Taubman, P. “Gorbachev Is Feeling the Heat from the South,” The New York Times, 6 March 
1988, p.3. 
  
129 
 
as official/parallel, internal/external, religious/secular. In expressing the division 
between parallel and official Islam Bennigsen states that Central Asia was: 
 
Torn between two contradictory trends: a modest, cautious 
modernism represented mainly by the ‘official,’ religious 
establishment and an aggressive, militant conservatism advocated by 
the non-official, Sufi sects (Bennigsen 1977: 274). 
 
For Sovietologists, this parallel Islam was more appealing than the official 
Islamic institutions (Bennigsen and Broxup 1983). This obscuritanist discourse 
divides Islam into two mutually exclusive trends.  All of the nuances which 
differentiate believer’s individual relations with Islam are lost. Following such a 
dyadic mode of thinking, Wimbush argues that Central Asians were faced with a 
zero-sums decision: Islam or Communism (Wimbush 1985).   
Upon closer inspection, however, Islam in the Soviet Union appears to 
be more complex than such reductionist analyses contended.  In this view the 
official/unofficial dichotomy is more of a continuum, upon which actors move 
with relative fluidity (Kemper et al 2009).  Many Soviet citizens did not see Islam 
and Communism in such mutually exclusive terms.  Instead many identified 
themselves as both Soviet and Muslim (Tett 1994; Khalid 2003). During the 
Soviet Union governmental policy transformed Islam into a marker of national 
identity.  Therefore “in the Soviet Union it is possible to be an atheist and a 
‘Muslim,’ because to claim to be a Muslim merely means being proud of having 
a Muslim heritage” (Brill Olcott 1982: 490).  The Babakhans, despite being 
members of the “official” Islamic clergy, interacted with and were influenced by 
many trends within “parallel” Islam (Naumkin 2005).  Analysts of Islam in the 
Soviet Union, then, need to deconstruct these binary categories in order to 
arrive at a better understanding of Islam. 
To summarise, both Soviet and Sovietological discourses on Islam, 
politics and security in the USSR contained a number of flawed assumptions. 
They created a dichotomy between loyal, official Islam, and resistant, ‘parallel’ 
Islam. This parallel Islam was backwards, dangerous to the stability of the 
secular republics of Central Asia, and imposed on the region by actors outside 
of the region, in the West and the Middle East. This securitisation of Islam 
pervaded western Sovietological accounts of the region and, as I will 
demonstrate in the next chapter, continues to shape the discourse on Islam and 
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security in Tajikistan today. Having outlined these assumptions, I will now 
explore the ways in which Soviet governance of religion and security displayed 
elements of the ‘triangle of power:’ sovereign, disciplinary and biopower. I will 
demonstrate this through an event that brought the themes of religion, politics 
and (in)security to the fore: the 1990 Dushanbe riots. Driven by local political 
grievances, the government framed the riots as the result of irrational 
hooliganism and Islamic fanaticism perpetrated primarily by young men.  
Case Study: Governing the 1990 Riots in Dushanbe 
It was then that a call rang out in the tea-houses which had been 
turned into prayer-houses ''Wake up, Muslims! The people are rising 
up!'' Speeches by Islamic fundamentalist leaders were distributed on 
audio and video tape ''It is time to establish an Islamic state!''124 
The riots that took place in Dushanbe between 12 and 19 February 1990 
constitute an interesting case study of the ways in which the Soviet government 
linked political violence with Islam, as well as the process by which this 
discourse was reproduced by western journalists. Rumours of a mass influx of 
Armenian refugees following the pogroms in Sumgait, Azerbaijan in 1988 
sparked the violence. As many as 5,000 Armenians would be resettled in 
Dushanbe according to the rumourmongers (Horowitz 2002; Atkin 1997). Three 
hundred angry Tajiks marched on the Communist Party Central Committee 
building in Dushanbe demanding an explanation from the government. The 
crowd quickly swelled and protestors began to demand the resignation of the 
First Secretary, Qahhor Mahkamov, himself.125 On 12 February protestors 
started to attack the party offices. Reacting swiftly, the regime declared martial 
law. After a day of looting, protests and unrest 22 people were left dead and 565 
injured. The Dushanbe riots constituted the most serious outbreak of social 
unrest in the Tajik SSR’s 60 year history. 
To map the framing of the riots, I analysed 23 articles from state 
newspapers Komsomolskaya Pravda, Izvestiya, Pravda and Kommunist 
Tadzhikistana. The official framing of the riots blamed events on three groups: 
Tajik nationalists inspired by the Rastokhez movement, hooligans bent on 
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causing destruction and radical Islamists.126 The discourse linking the riots to 
religion conformed to the assumptions highlighted above. According to the 
hegemonic narrative, the riots demonstrated the danger that religion could 
cause, pitting Muslims fanatics against ethnic Russians. In blaming the events, 
at least in part, on “radical Islam,” the government set a precedent that 
continues to this day; any political violence in Tajikistan must be at least partly 
religious in nature (Lemon 2014). During the Soviet Union a tendency existed for 
the authorities to blame any disturbance on “radical Islam” or “Wahabbists” 
(Atkin 1995). President Mahkamov stated in an interview in Moskovskiye 
Novosti that religion inspired the rioters. Speaking in public for the first time in 
many years in May 2014, First Secretary Mahkamov, maintained that the riots 
were organised by religious leaders. He told a conference in Dushanbe, “every 
evening in mosques mullos told worshippers: ‘Tomorrow you must go to the 
rally. Those who do not will be given the three taloq (divorce) by their wives.’”127 
He stated that the role of regionalism (Rus.: mestnichestvo) had been 
overplayed:  
When I became First Secretary [of the Communist Party], the first 
deputy that I selected was Chairman of the Council of Ministers 
Council of Ministers Izatullo Hayev from Kulob.128 Nobody raised the 
issue of regionalism at that time.129 
Writing in Pravda, Viktor Ponomarev condemned the riots in Dushanbe as 
stemming from “Islamic fundamentalists” and “anti-perestroika” forces.130 He 
castigated the local authorities for “pussyfooting” around. According to the 
author, “when dialogue unilaterally turns into dictatorial behaviour, blackmail 
and terrorism, the time for words is past.” Some western commentators bought 
into this discourse. Any sign of religiosity was taken as evidence that the riots 
were religious. David Aikman from Time magazine reported that he saw one 
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mullo take a microphone and sing out the Arabic call to prayer to over 10,000 
men.131 For the author, this proved that the riots had an “Islamic character,” with 
protestors calling for an Islamic state.132 According to the official coverage, 
events were driven by self-interest rather than grievances. For one journalist the 
events were an example of power-hungry extremists exploiting “the political 
awakening (Rus.: probuzhendiya) of the masses for selfish reasons 
(nebeskorytnikh tseliakh).”133 A number of articles propagated conspiracy 
theories about the “hidden hand” driving events.134 This framing, however, runs 
counter to the available evidence on the 1990 riots. What was missed from 
these accounts, however, was that religious leaders called on the crowds to 
disperse, thus avoiding further bloodshed.135  
Indeed, those involved have recently accused the KGB of spreading the 
rumours that caused the unrest.136 Aziz Niyazi, who has written the most 
comprehensive account of the violence, apportions blame to both sides (Niyazi 
1993). A number of scholars have also argued that local economic grievances, 
rather than religion motivated the violence (Atkin 1997; Collins 2006; 
Scarborough 2016). It is interesting to note that the protestors demands 
included the resignation of the government, closure of the aluminium smelter 
near Dushanbe (TadAz), the release of twenty five prisoners and the equal 
distribution of the revenues from cotton sales (Bleuer and Nourzhanov 2013). 
None of these demands was religious in nature. As Christian Bleuer and Kirill 
Nourzhanov argue, “the conflict did not have anti-Russian and/or pro-Islamic 
roots. A closer examination reveals that it was a struggle for power” (2013: 
185). Indeed, Niyazi still maintains that the events were not inspired by religion:  
 
There were a number of causes, some random (sluchaniye) and 
some not. Islamists were not involved. Events were driven by 
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nationalism. The government blamed the events on radical Islam. It 
was convenient (udobny) to do so.137 
Indeed, the framing of the events as religious did prove useful to the Soviet 
government; it legitimated a crackdown on unofficial Islamic leaders. The riots 
provide an example of the ways in which the Soviet government governed 
through security. The way the state framed and governed the riots contains the 
three forms of power identified by Foucault.  
 
Sovereign Power 
 
By blaming the riots on Islam, the government created conditions to exercise 
sovereign power by cracking down on those deemed to adhere to “radical” 
Islam and “Wahabbism.” In August 1990 the authorities brought 102 criminal 
cases against those accused of planning the February riots (Horowitz 2002: 
364). Those arrested included members of the religious and secular opposition. 
Following the riots, the communist government struck back by arresting six 
Muslim clerics, including prominent Dushanbe mullo Sokijon Bedimogov. 
Allegedly, extremists started planning a week before the clashes at the opening 
of a new mosque in Arbobkhotun in Lenin district (near Dushanbe). According 
to the authorities, a number of calls for the establishment of an Islamic state 
could be heard at the meeting.138  The riots, then, formed an opportunity for the 
Soviet regime to further securitise Islam, linking it to violence and legitimating 
the arrest of religious figures. But the Soviet authorities did not stop at simply 
arresting those it blamed for inciting the events. In a similar fashion to the 
practices of the current Tajik government, the authorities paraded the arrestees 
on national television, where they confessed their wrongdoings.139 This 
symbolic act was a deterrent aimed at encouraging others to regulate their own 
‘abnomal’ behaviour and conform to the Soviet-defined norm. In other words, it 
is an example of disciplinary power. 
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Disciplinary Power 
 
The Soviet authorities did not solely rely on repression and violence to govern 
Tajikistan. Communism as an ideology is transformative; the government in the 
USSR aimed to promote “not life as it was but life as it must become” (Prozorov 
2014: 15, emphasis in original). The Communist Party aimed to mould political 
subjects, the Novy Sovietskii Chelovek (New Soviet Person), through the 
relations of power which enmeshed material technologies with discursive 
practices within various institutions (schools, political clubs, collective farms). 
This ideal citizen would follow the principles of communism and scientific 
atheism, including a commitment to the collective over the individual 
(Kharkhordin 1999; Gerovitch 2007).  A number of scholars have drawn on 
Foucault to demonstrate the ways in which the Communist party used 
disciplinary and biopower in their attempts to construct this positive 
transformation of lives, this New Soviet Person (Prozorov 2014; Collier 2011; 
Hoffmann 2011; Kharkhordin 1999; Kotkin 1995). It is within this attempt to 
mould forms of being and modes of consciousness that the Soviet campaign 
against Islam was located (Shahrani 1993).   
The hegemonic narrative framed those participating in the riots as 
running counter to the principles of Soviet collective ideology. In the pages of 
Kommunist Tadzhikistana, which unlike the other publications was aimed at a 
Tajik audience specifically, the young men involved were framed as “extremists” 
who betrayed the nation. Numerous articles used the word “disgrace” (Rus.: 
pozorom) to describe their behaviour.”140 Another article written by an official 
imam is entitled “I am Ashamed and Upset” (Rus.: Mnye Stidno I Bolno).141 
Violent extremists are contrasted with the “kindness” (Rus.: dobrozhelatel’nost) 
and “hospitality” (gosteprimnost’) of the Tajik people.142 As one author states, 
“we know the Tajik people as human (gumanii), friendly (druzheskii) and hard-
working (trudolubivii).”143  
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The hegemonic narrative frames the events as running counter to the 
principle of “friendship of the peoples” (Rus.: druzhba narodov) which all 
citizens should embody. According to this ideology, ethnic groups in the USSR 
should live in harmony with one another.144 The implementation of the policy, 
according to sociologist Igor Savin, was not always successful: 
As an idea it was good; it was about building a new society based on 
friendship. We had one big country with many peoples (Rus.: 
narodov). But in practice, divisions remained. It was ideological of 
course, but it was also real (real’nyy). Between most people there 
were good relations, there was tolerance (terpimost’). But when 
ethnic relations became political, then there were problems. It 
[friendship of the peoples], existed and did not exist (bylo i ne 
bylo).145 
As Savin indicates, druzhba narodov was not purely epiphenomenal; it shaped 
the way Soviet subjects related to one another. The state media framed the 
rioters as selfish people who had forgotten the Soviet principle of collectivism. 
Whereas ‘real’ Tajiks are tolerant of other nationalities, the rioters were not.146 
Authors called on citizens to reject violence and maintain good relations with 
their neighbours.147 As such, the discourse was not just about denigrating the 
rioters but praising those who remained committed to Soviet life. In other words, 
it contained elements of the productive form of biopower. 
Biopower 
Not only did the framing criticise the ‘abnormal’ behaviour of the rioters, it 
praised those whose resilience symbolised the durability of Soviet modes of 
subjectivity. Many of the articles contain the notion that the Soviet way of life is 
the only way of life to be lived. The alternative being offered by the rioters was 
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not going to be better that life in the Soviet Union. As political scientist Vladimir 
Dolganov concludes:  
Is this democratisation? No. This unanimity (Rus.: edinomysiliye) will 
be replaced by another, an intolerance (neterpimost’), a new 
intolerance.148 
The pages of Soviet newspapers were filled with the ‘positive’ stories of ordinary 
citizens going on with their lives, with headlines like “We will Live!” (Rus.:Budem 
Zhit’), and “No to Extremism!” (Ekstremizmu Nyet!).149 These articles called on 
people to remain “united” (Rus.: edini) and committed to the principles of that 
organised Soviet life: the kollektiv and druzhba narodov. As I have shown, the 
1990 riots form an example of how the late Soviet governance of religion and 
security worked. To manage radical Islam, the Soviet authorities relied on 
repressive sovereign power, arresting those accused of extremism. But it did 
not rely on violence alone. The Soviet government ruled through 
subjectification, creating subjects that adhered to the principles of druzhba 
narodov and the kollektiv, and therefore remained loyal to the regime. Those 
who refrained from violence and remained committed to the Soviet way of life 
were praised, whilst those who engaged in it needed to be disciplined. These 
ways of framing Islam, violence and its relations to subjectivity evolved, yet 
persisted, in the post-Soviet period. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I offered a genealogy of the securitisation of Islam during the 
Soviet Union. I traced the origins of the association of religion and violence back 
to Soviet and Sovietological discourses. Assumptions about religion and 
(in)security that persist to this day have their roots during the Soviet period. This 
includes the ideas that religion by its very nature constitutes a security threat, 
the notion that Central Asia is backwards, the argument that a “foreign hand” 
lies behind violence in the region and the idea that reactionary religion is 
opposed to secular modernity. A form of assertive secularism developed; the 
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state could regulate religion, but religion could play no role in the state. By 
portraying religion as backwards and dangerous, the Communist Party 
legitimised a crackdown on religious practices that fell outside of state control. 
This discourse contained elements of sovereign power, taking life from those 
deemed to be ‘extremists,’ disciplinary power, dividing between normal, Soviet 
citizens and anti-Soviet, radical Islamists, and biopower, promoting loyal, 
secular Soviet modes of subjectivity. The 1990 Dushanbe riots form an example 
of the way in which the Soviet government took advantage of a locally-driven 
conflict, framing it as inspired by religion and using this to legitimate a 
crackdown on religious leaders. This is a pattern that continues in post-
independence Tajikistan (Lemon 2014). 
Indeed, these assumptions about security and religion continue to shape 
the ways in which security is governed in Tajikistan. Whereas in this chapter I 
focused on the emergence of an official discourse on religion and security in the 
Soviet context, in the next chapter I examine how this discourse has been 
reformulated since Tajikistan gained independence in 1991. Although the 
content of this discourse has changed in numerous ways, the form and 
underlying assumptions remain distinctly post-Soviet. This discourse sets the 
conditions for the emergence of transnational authoritarian security governance, 
combining elements of the triangle of power that had already been seen during 
the Soviet Union. 
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Chapter 4: Consolidation: The Official Discourse on Radical Islam in 
Tajikistan 
In this chapter, I discuss the ways in which the government of Tajikistan frames 
the radical Islamic threat, using the case of Tajik citizens fighting for the Islamic 
State (ISIS) to illustrate the main features of the discourse. I argue that the 
government discourse rests on the division between ‘good,’ official, moderate 
Islam and ‘bad,’ unofficial extremist Islam. The state media argues that religion 
has the potential to be socially regressive and politically dangerous. The 
situation in the Middle East serves as a warning of what can happen if religion 
and politics mix. Secularism, the government argues, is the best means to 
secure the state and society against this threat.  
Not only is radical Islam bad, it is foreign (begona). This alterity exists on 
three levels. Spatially, radical Islamists learn their ideas abroad, whilst labour 
migrants in Russia or at madrassas in Pakistan, and clandestinely in spaces 
away from the official gaze. Radical Islam itself is a tool for foreign powers to 
manipulate the politics of Central Asia and the Middle East for their own selfish, 
geopolitical aims. Morally, those who join radical groups betray their nation and 
bring shame on their families. No patriotic, strong Tajik man would ever join an 
extremist group. Those who display signs of piety – such as wearing a hijab or 
beard - are accused of foreigner-worshipping (begonaparasti).150 The 
government opposes civilised, national, secular, yet Muslim, values against 
backwards, alien, Islamic ideas. Temporally, the Tajik government argues that 
the Tajik people are inherently peace-loving. Memories of the country’s civil war 
serve as a potent reminder of what happens if “alien” religious ideas are allowed 
to influence politic (Roche 2013). 
The framing of the Islamic State threat to Tajikistan is not benign. It sets 
the conditions for transnational authoritarian security governance, which I will 
describe in the next chapter.  Indeed, official discourses on terrorism are 
undercut by relations of power. The Tajik state narrative contains all three forms 
of power identified by Michel Foucault. It is sovereign as it aims to protect the 
government and Tajikistan’s territory. But Tajik counter-terrorism is not based on 
repression and destruction alone. It is productive in so far as it aims, through 
discourses and practices, to create loyal secular subjects. Ultimately, the Tajik 
                                                          
150
 Instead, the government promotes the rumol as befitting of national culture. The rumol is a 
headscarf that covers the hair but not the sides of the face. 
  
140 
 
government believes that efforts to shape consciousness (shuur) are more 
important than repressive measures. Indeed, the Tajik government’s response 
to radical Islam is disciplinary as it calls for the punishment of those who are 
accused of “extremism,” offering a warning to others who may take this path. 
And it is biopolitical because it involves discourses about the vital characteristics 
of being human, as well as the management of populations and individual 
subjects through practices of self-regulation. Indeed, the responsibility to govern 
extremism does not solely fall on the government; it falls on citizens as well. 
Citizens are encouraged to work on themselves and monitor others for 
suspicious behaviour.  
In both its form and its content, the contemporary state discourse on 
radical Islam in Tajikistan contains a number of similarities with the Soviet 
discourses outlined in the previous chapter. With regards to content, the 
narrative contains elements of all of the four assumptions about religion and 
politics found in the Soviet discourse. Officials still view religion as backwards, 
potentially dangerous and in need of discipline. They still create a dichotomy 
between good, official Islam and bad, parallel Islam. And they still argue that 
religious extremists are controlled by foreign powers. Perhaps more 
interestingly, the form that the discourse takes remains remarkably similar. 
Soviet newspapers were filled with reports from local officials celebrating their 
achievements spreading atheist propaganda and denouncing religious 
individuals in their communities. Similarly, many of the texts that I analyse below 
are written by academics, teachers, members of local government and 
prosecutors. Like the Soviet examples, these writers praise the government, 
extol the benefits of a patriotic education and criticise Islamic groups. Citizens 
have been co-opted in Soviet and post-Soviet Tajikistan to affirm and reproduce 
the hegemonic narrative. 
The state discourse on radical Islam also contains homologies with the 
liberal approaches to radicalisation. Although they differ in the way they 
conceptualise the causes of and solutions to extremism, I argue that liberal 
approaches to extremism overlap with authoritarian ones at a basic level; both 
aim to create subjects who will be resilient to extremist messaging. Both 
combine sovereign, disciplinary and biopower. But where liberal approaches 
aim to create subjects that are free to defend their rights against both the 
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repressive government and extremists, TASG aims to create citizens that are 
loyal to the regime.  
The chapter unfolds as follows: in the first section, I outline and critique 
the literature on ‘radical’ Islam in Tajikistan. I outline two approaches that 
authors have taken, one descriptive and one evaluative. Much of the descriptive 
literature produced by think tanks and academics is alarmist and based on 
limited evidence, often reproducing rather than challenging the Tajik state 
discourse. I argue that evaluative approaches that utilise ethnography and 
discourse analysis, taking discourses on religion and security to be productive, 
rather than reflective, of reality, offer the most promise. In the next section, I 
examine the homologies between TASG and transnational liberal security 
governance (TLSG). After this, I use a critical discourse analysis to outline the 
main features of official discourses on Tajiks in ISIS. Having mapped the 
discourse, I link the discourse to relations of power and introducing the 
narrative’s connections with transnational authoritarian security governance. 
These discourses produce their objects as having a certain religious-political 
character. But inconsistencies exist between how the issue is represented and 
the evidence available publically. I conclude the chapter by discussing the 
available evidence about Tajik citizens travelling to take part in hostilities in Iraq 
and Syria. I outline what little is known about who these people are and their 
pathways to the Islamic State. This evidence points to a more complex picture 
than the Tajik state discourse and descriptive western accounts construct. 
 
Literature on Radical Islam in Tajikistan 
As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, during the Soviet Union western 
Sovietologists considered Central Asia to be at risk of an Islamic revolution. 
Following independence in 1991, governments, academics and organizations 
have continued to frame Tajikistan as a potential haven for Islamic extremists 
(Rashid, 2001; Brzezinski, 1997; Naumkin 1994; Lubin and Rubin, 1999; Slim 
2002; cf. Heathershaw & Megoran, 2011). For these actors, radical Islam 
constitutes an existential threat to the security of the state and society; the state 
in Tajikistan could collapse and be replaced by Islamist chaos. In 2010, in the 
wake of the prison break and conflict in the Rasht valley, journalist Ahmed 
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Rashid asked if Tajikistan was becoming the “next jihadi stronghold?”151  Rashid 
concluded that:  
Nevertheless both Tajiks and foreigners concede that it would make 
perfect sense for al-Qaeda and the Taliban to expand their operations 
and bases into the weak southern hinterland of Central Asia, which 
includes southern Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. These 
countries are beset with poverty, unrest, growing devotion to Islamic 
causes, and anger at their governments’ ineptitude. 
For Rashid, the growing piety of the population directly translates into a 
heightened extremist threat. Undeterred by the fact that his dire predictions did 
not materialise, in June 2015, Rashid declared Tajikistan to be “jihad’s new 
frontier” following the defection of paramilitary police (OMON) commander 
Gulmurod Halimov to the Islamic State.152 Although Rashid admits that “the 
extent of radicalization of Tajik youth, however, is in fact still small,” he argues 
that “their loyalty may be fragile because the country remains the poorest 
former Soviet republic and has been ruled since 1992 by an authoritarian 
president, Mr. Rakhmon.” For Brussels-based think tank International Crisis 
Group, Tajikistan has been on the “road to failure” for a long time (ICG 2009). In 
their latest report they note that the government’s crackdown on opposition 
parties raises “the risks of state failure and the potential for Islamist extremists 
to capitalise” (ICG 2016: 1). Echoing these concerns, Sanderson et al argue 
that “all three nations [Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan] suffer from a 
combustible combination of poor governance and potential militancy” 
(Sanderson et al 2010: 1). Having argued that Central Asian militants may move 
north following the Pakistani army’s operations in Waziristan in 2009, the 
authors conclude that this spill-over could “pose a potentially grave threat to 
regional stability and international security” (Sanderson et al 2010: 2). 
According to the narrative developed by Rashid, Sanderson et al and 
International Crisis Group, poverty, the “porous” 1,400 kilometre Afghan-Tajik 
border, the religious revival, corruption and authoritarianism create the 
conditions for radicalisation and potential state collapse. A number of 
academics have challenged this view, arguing that the Tajik state and society 
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have proved more resilient than many have given them credit for (Heathershaw 
and Megoran 2011; Heathershaw 2013; Heathershaw and Montgomery 2014).  
According to Didier Chaudet, “there is only one thing that we are certain 
about in studies of political Islam in Central Asia; we do not know much” (2006: 
119). Before 1991, the region remained closed to academics. Much of the 
popular literature on radical Islam in Central Asia is sensationalist, journalistic 
and alarmist.153 Much of the academic literature is more nuanced. The literature 
on radical Islam in Tajikistan has discussed the individuals involved in shaping 
political Islam in the country (Mullojanov 2001; Epkenhans 2013; Dudoignon 
2011; Naumkin 2005; Khalid 2007), the causes of radicalisation (Naumkin 2005; 
Karagiannis 2010) and attempted to measure the threat posed by radical 
Islamic groups (Zelkina 1999; Cohen 2003; Chaudet 2006). Like the ICG, 
academics have argued that poverty, authoritarianism and social inequality 
push people on the path towards radical groups (Karagiannis 2006; Chaudet 
2006; Naumkin 2005; Petros 2004). But they have also argued that ideology of 
these groups – centred on overcoming social inequality and cleansing local 
politics – plays a key role in mobilisation (Karagiannis 2006; Chaudet 2006). 
Others have profiled individual groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir (Mihalka 2006; 
Karagiannis 2006; Baran 2004),154 the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
(Chaudet 2008; Pories 2013)155 and Jamaat Ansurallah (ICG 2011).156  
Whilst the literature that traces the development of political Islam and 
profiles the biographies of those involved remains essential to an understanding 
of the shape of political Islam in post-independence Tajikistan, the literature 
which seeks to measure the threat posed by radical Islam and make inferences 
about its causes contains a number of conceptual, methodological and 
empirical weaknesses. Conceptually, scholars often take the definition of radical 
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Islam as a given; few authors theorise it as a politically-loaded label. For Nick 
Megoran, the idea of radical Islam “perpetuates political repression in the region 
and informs the misguided foreign policies of external powers” (Megoran 2007: 
141). Like the literature on Islam in the Soviet Union, much of the research on 
radical Islam in post-independence Tajikistan ignores the specificities of religion 
in the post-Soviet context. Authors readily generalise about the threat posed by 
radical Islamic groups without taking into account how 70 years of Soviet rule 
has shaped local understandings of Islam (Megoran 2007). 
Methodologically, analyses of radical Islam in Tajikistan have been 
based on desk research, elite interviews and social surveys. Each of these 
methods has its shortcomings. Although surveys on radicalisation in Tajikistan 
have been conducted, they are severely limited in their explanatory power 
(Taarnby 2012; Mullajanov 2010). The Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) survey conducted in 2011, for example, had a 
sample size of 3,502, supplementing this with six focus groups (Taarnby 2012). 
The survey asked respondents about which country’s religious policy they 
would like to see emulated in Tajikistan, whether they saw radical Islam as a 
threat and the role religion plays in their daily life. Nonetheless, the survey 
contains a number of flaws. First, Islam is both a socially constructed and 
subjectively lived phenomenon. This complexity makes it difficult to quantify its 
constituent components as part of a statistical study.  Questions about whether 
someone identifies themselves as ‘Muslim’ remain interesting, but only scratch 
the surface of what this means for individual and social life. Second, on the 
practical level, questionnaire layout, wording and lack of clarity can negatively 
impact the validity of results. The OSCE questionnaire remains dependent on 
the background knowledge of the respondents. Fifty one per cent of those 
surveyed, for example, believed that Tajikistan should emulate the government-
religion relations of Iran; in other words, that Tajikistan should become a 
theocracy (Taarnby 2012). Yet in another question, respondents 
overwhelmingly expressed support for the secular state. Such contradictory 
viewpoints are the product of a survey that asks people to express opinions on 
topics that they may have limited knowledge about. Third, a tendency exists to 
impose academic concepts, such as radicalisation, on local populations. 
Surveys usually focus on the latent, rather than the manifest meanings that 
actors ascribe to concepts.  Indeed, the closed-ended nature of many of the 
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survey questions leaves little room for the respondents to discuss their own 
interpretations of these complex terms.  
The other dominant methodology in studying radicalisation, desk studies, 
is in many ways even less satisfactory. These types of publications usually base 
their analysis on both open-source government documents and media reports 
(Cohen 2003; Chaudet 2006; Yemelianova 2010; Petros 2004; Tazmini 2001; 
Cornell and Spector 2002; Falkenberg 2013). Most of these articles offer a 
descriptive overview of state-religion relations and Islamic movements, making 
analytical claims based on limited evidence. Although some authors have 
exercised critical judgement when dealing with official sources (Bleuer 2012), 
others have tended to reproduce government narratives. Didier Chaudet, for 
instance, concludes that “there is, in the long term, an impending Islamist threat 
in Central Asia (Chaudet 2006: 268). He does not explain how he has reached 
this conclusion which seems to be based on his reading of local media reports. 
Similarly, Anna Zelkina offers an overview of Islamic movements in Central Asia 
concluding that Islam poses a “genuine threat” without backing up this claim 
with evidence (Zelkina 1999). Some researchers have used elite interviews to 
complement secondary sources. Most studies tend to rely on elite interviews 
with religious leaders, officials, NGO workers, journalists and diplomats (ICG 
2015; Sanderson et al 2010; Karagiannis 2006; Naumkin 2005). Vitaly 
Naumkin, for example, bases his study on twenty years of interview data from 
“top and rank-and-file radical Islamists” (Naumkin 2005). Nonetheless, the 
accounts of the rank-and-file remain largely absent from his book. In his 
discussion of Hib-ut-Tahrir in Tajikstan, Emmanuel Karagiannis formulates his 
argument that ideology is the principal driver of recruitment based on interviews 
with local experts, using just one conversation with members of the movement 
itself (Karagiannis 2006). By uncritically repeating the views of western and 
local experts, these accounts have usually served to re-inforce rather than 
challenge the hegemonic narrative on radical Islam in Tajikistan (Heathershaw 
and Montgomery 2014).  Rather than simply reproducing the assumptions of the 
government of Tajikistan, my approach critiques the way in which radical Islam 
is represented and governed. Two approaches can help researchers overcome 
this tendency to uncritically reproduce elite discourses of Islamic danger and to 
better ground their analysis in local politics: ethnography and critical discourse 
analysis. 
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Approaching the Governance of ‘Radical’ Islam in Tajikistan 
 
Indeed, only a limited number of academics have actually gone and spoken with 
individuals who the government has labelled as “radical” (Heathershaw and 
Roche 2011; Roche 2010; Thibault 2013; Abashin 2006). Ethnographic 
accounts of Islam and security in Tajikistan highlight the ways in which the 
discourse on radicalisation obscures struggles that are usually shaped by local 
politics rather than transnational Islamism (Lemon 2014). In his analysis of a 
civil war conflict in an ethnic Uzbek village, Sergei Abashin uses Bourdieu’s 
theories of symbolic capital to argue that the conflict was “not only about 
theological or ideological differences, but was intimately bound up in local 
politics, with competition over control over symbolic and material resources, and 
with the re-distribution of financial resources in a period of crisis and state 
reconstruction” (Abashin 2006: 268). In her study of “born again” Muslims in 
northern Tajikistan, Helene Thibault examines how state secular policies shape 
the religious experiences of pious Muslims. Her study “does not depict the rise 
of extremism but rather a fragile co-existence of conflicting moralities in tough 
times” (Thibault 2013: 162). Johan Rasanayagam’s work in neighbouring 
Uzbekistan shows how Muslims negotiate the state’s division between “good” 
and “bad” religion, sometimes appropriating the “Wahabbi” label to discredit 
rivals (Rasanayagam 2011). All these accounts place the human experiences of 
discourses and practices of state secularism at the centre of their projects. 
Instead of examining the causes and threat posed by radical Islam, they 
examine how everyday Muslims in Central Asia experience the discourse of 
Islamic danger. While they have approached the issue from a bottom-up, actor-
centric perspective, other critical scholars have examined the issue from the 
top-down. 
Another fruitful approach to studying radical Islam in Tajikistan examines 
the ways officials and the media frame, script and spin the threat posed by 
radical Islam. Scholars associated with this approach examine the discourses of 
danger surrounding radical Islam and the effects these discourses have on 
politics (Lemon 2014; Megoran 2008; Heathershaw and Thompson 2005; 
Heathershaw and Megoran 2011). In an informative essay, Stuart Horsman 
draws out a number of features of state discourses on terrorism which are 
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relevant in Tajikistan (Horsman 2005). This included an amorphous definition, 
speculative assessment of the threat posed, image of a well-co-ordinated 
terrorist menace, the terrorist as the non-political criminal and the idea that 
terrorism is extra-regional. Nick Megoran’s work on the framing of the 2005 
Andijan massacre also influences my analysis of radical Islam in Tajikistan 
(Megoran 2008). Megoran argues that Karimov’s government framed the 
protestors at Andijan as criminals intent on undermining constitutional order and 
subverting the government’s gradualist approach to reform. In a book dedicated 
to the massacre, President Islam Karimov framed it as a “law and order 
operation in reaction to a plot perpetrated by criminals and terrorists of deviant 
masculinity, religiosity and inauthentic nationality, opposed to the constitutional 
order and at odds with the scientific laws of states” (Megoran 2008: 28). 
Responding to the publication of annual alarmist reports on security in Tajikistan 
by the International Crisis Group, David Montgomery and John Heathershaw 
challenge many of the assumptions contained in western reports on the security 
of the region. They outline eight myths of post-Soviet Muslim radicalisation: the 
idea of a post-Soviet Islamic revival; that to Islamise is to radicalise; that Muslim 
radicalisation is always anti-state; that authoritarianism and poverty are the 
main causes of radicalisation; that ‘underground’ religious groups are radical; 
that ‘underground’ groups are networked; that political Islam opposes the state; 
and that Islam is anti-secular (Heathershaw and Montgomery 2014). Where 
they focused on western perceptions of religion in Central Asia, I examine how 
Islam and security are framed by domestic actors. Although many of these 
myths are shared by western and domestic actors, they do differ in some 
aspects. For example, the government of Tajikistan does not blame 
authoritarianism for radicalisation. In addition, as I demonstrate below, the 
domestic discourse of Islamic danger contains a strong element of nationalism; 
those who are labelled extremists are “foreign” and anti-Tajik. I will now explore 
this hegemonic domestic discourse through the example of Tajik citizens 
fighting with the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. 
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State Discourses and the Islamic State 
The first reports of Tajik citizens participating in hostilities in Syria emerged in 
late 2013. While the first reported fighters were linked to Jabhat al-Nusra, 
subsequently the vast majority of Tajiks who have reportedly travelled to Syria 
and Iraq have joined the Islamic State.157 Given that most Tajiks travel to Syria 
and Iraq via Russia and Turkey, crossing multiple borders, no one can say 
precisely how many have joined the Islamic State. Whereas one militant has 
boasted that 2,000 Tajiks are currently based in Iraq and Syria, the interior 
ministry has given a more circumspect figure of 1,000 for the number of Tajik 
foreign fighters, including those in Afghanistan, with 156 having been killed and 
61 returning home.158 Taking the government statistic at face value, this means 
only one in every 8,000 Tajik is fighting with the group. While significant, this is 
a smaller proportion of the country’s Muslim population than in many European 
and Middle Eastern countries.159 
In recent years, the threat posed by Central Asian citizens who have 
joined the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq has captured the attention of internal 
and external analysts. ISIS is now the most frequently invoked radical Islamic 
group in the region. A number of academics and policy analysts have examined 
the case of Tajik citizens fighting for the Islamic State (Lemon 2015; Rotar 
2015; ICG 2015; Dyner et al 2015; Tucker 2016). Reports have focused on 
measuring the threat and what is driving recruitment, highlighting poverty, 
authoritarianism and state repression of religion as potential drivers of 
radicalization (ICG 2015; Dyner et al 2015). Brussels-based think tank the 
International Crisis Group paints a particularly bleak picture of the threat:  
 
Should a significant portion of these radicalised migrants return, 
they risk challenging security and stability throughout Central Asia. 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
form a brittle region, sandwiched between Russia and Afghanistan, 
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Iran and China. Each suffers from poor governance, corruption and 
crime (ICG 2015: 1). 
 
John Heathershaw and David Montgomery have criticised the International 
Crisis Group report for its “suggestive impressions masquerading as solid 
insights.”160 They question the report’s uncritical use of elite interviews and for 
“overgeneralizing the threat and making spurious associations between 
Islamization and radicalization.” Given the paucity of reliable evidence, studies 
measuring the threat posed by the Islamic State and the causes of militant 
recruitment remain little more than guess-work. A more feasible and 
academically-rigorous line of enquiry has focused on state discourses on the 
Islamic State and how these have shaped the government’s response. 
Journalist Igor Rotar has examined how the Tajik government’s response to the 
Islamic State has been part of a broader campaign to de-legitimise the Islamic 
Renaissance Party (Rotar 2015). Finally, Noah Tucker has analysed the online 
messaging from Tajik ISIS fighters and how the state frames the issue of 
foreign fighters (Tucker 2016). In this chapter, I build on Tucker and Rotar’s 
work, examining how the government frames the foreign fighter problem and 
how it has responded to it. To illustrate the main features of the official 
discourse on radical Islam in Tajikistan, in this section I examine the hegemonic 
narrative on Tajik citizens joining the Islamic State. Although the participation of 
Tajik citizens in the civil wars in Syria and Iraq, and the state’s response to this, 
has generated a dynamic discussion in the unofficial and social media, in this 
section I limit my analysis to how radical Islam is presented in the state media 
(Tucker 2016).  
Rather than examining why Tajiks join the Islamic State or whether they 
pose a threat to Tajikistan’s security, I am interested in how the regime frames 
the causes of, nature and solutions to the Islamic extremist threat. Since he 
began mentioning the Islamic State in his speeches in the summer of 2014, 
Emomali Rahmon has frequently referred to ISIS as an existential threat to 
Tajikistan, a “modern plague.” Rahmon has argued that "these young people, 
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when they return home, bring instability to society."161  Tajikistan’s response to 
ISIS is based on legislation that gives the government a great deal of flexibility 
in labelling groups and individuals as threats, and adopting measures against 
them. 
 
Amorphous States Definitions of Terrorism and Extremism 
Official discourses on security remain state-centric; the state remains the main 
guarantor of security for its subjects. Terms such as national security (amniyati 
milli), state security (amniyati davlati) and societal security (amniyati jam’iyati) 
are used interchangeably. All of them refer to the security of the state, its 
government, territory and population. Despite this appeal to national security, 
many of the practices adopted by the government are aimed primarily at 
securing the position of the regime. As such, it is logical to start my analysis of 
transnational security governance with a focus on state discourses. Similar to 
other states in Central Asia, the government of Tajikistan defines terrorism and 
extremism in broad terms in its legislation.162  Adopted in 1999, the “Law on the 
Fight against Terrorism,” defines terrorism as: 
 
violence (zirrovari) or the threat of violence against individuals or 
legal entities, and also the destruction (damaging) of or threat to 
destroy  or damage property and the destruction, or threat to 
destroy, property […] actions which have socially dangerous 
(jam’iyat khavfnok) consequences and are implemented with a 
view to violating public security (amniyat jam’iyati).163 
Legislators do not elaborate on what “socially dangerous” or “public security” 
mean. Similarly, the “Law on the Fight against Extremism,” adopted in 2003, 
lists eleven activities that constitute extremism.164 These include “forcibly 
(majburi) changing constitutional order,” “usurping (ghasb) power,” “insulting 
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national dignity (sha’ni milli)” and unsanctioned rallies. With such a fluid 
definition of extremism, the government can label all manner of forms of 
resistance and oppositional politics ‘extremism.’ This loose definition of 
terrorism and extremism sets the conditions for Tajik counter-terrorism. 
Good versus Bad Islam 
Continuing the practice of the Soviet government, the government of Tajikistan 
has created a discursive dichotomy between ‘good’ state-regulated, moderate, 
local Islam and ‘bad’ unregulated, fundamentalist foreign Islam. Whereas ‘good’ 
Islam is tolerant and peaceful, ‘bad’ Islam is divisive and prone to violence. 
Rahmon repeatedly claims that the Islamic State “does not have any connection 
to religion,”165 and that “terrorism does not have a country, a people or a 
religion.”166 But even if the Islamic State does not meet the Tajik government’s 
definition of ‘good’ Islam, this does not mean it is not religious per se. For the 
Tajik government, radical Islamic groups like ISIS represent the danger of 
religion being used as a tool to mobilise young people against the state. Like 
their Soviet predecessors, the Tajik regime sees unregulated religion as 
backwards and potentially dangerous.  
Religion is only safe, according to the Tajik government, if it is closely 
monitored and regulated by the state. Whilst the regime accepts officially-
sanctioned religious practices, it cautions against any attempt to mix religion 
with politics. Islam “as a political ideology is against the state and the 
constitutional order (muqobili davlati milli va sokhti konstitutsioni),” the 
underlying assumption claims.167 First, when it is politicised Islam has the 
tendency to cause chaos and instability.168  According to one author, “in 
countries where Islamic groups operate, conflict and adversarial relations 
(adovatu dushmani) dominate”.169 Conflicts in the Middle East form a symbol of 
what happens when Islamic parties attempt to take power. Rahmon repeatedly 
references the conflicts in Afghanistan, Libya, Egypt, Syria and Iraq in his 
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speeches, framing them as conflicts that are primarily religious in nature. The 
Arab Spring serves a second purpose: it forms a warning of what can happen 
when people revolt against their leaders. According to one journalist, “in order to 
achieve revolutions, thousands have been killed […] we are against protest 
(e’tiroz)!”170 Another journalist concludes that, “instead of building a new society, 
they are killing each other.”171  
Second, once combined with politics, religion becomes a tool used for the 
pursuit of power. For one analyst, “the word Islam in the name [of the Islamic 
State] is used solely to attract (jalbi) people.”172 Radical Islamists are framed as 
puppets in the hands of elusive “great powers.” Referring to the Arab Spring, 
journalist Samariddin Kiyom asks “but is democracy (demokrati) the ultimate 
goal? Of course not. The goal is to render them totally dependent (dastnigiri) on 
outside powers.”173 This conspiracy theory making contains stark similarities 
with the late Soviet discourse, which claimed that the CIA was supporting 
Islamists in Central Asia (Heathershaw 2012). 
Third, the official discourse conflates Islamisation with radicalisation. 
Islamic parties – most notably the Islamic Renaissance Party – directly 
contribute to Islamic State recruitment by making people challenge the natural, 
secular order.174 “As the events in Syria and Iraq have shown, the first to join 
the ranks of the Islamic State were people with connections to Islamic 
movements (harakoti Islomi),” one journalist argues.175 Half of the Tajiks who 
have joined the Islamic State were members of the IRPT, another claims.176 By 
blurring the boundary between moderate parties like the IRPT and terrorist 
movements like the Islamic State, the regime de-legitimises all forms of faith-
based opposition to its rule. As political scientist, Abdulqodir Kalomov argues: 
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People saw a vote for the IRPT as contributing to the influence of the 
party in society, thus indicating a possible tendency for young people 
to join the ranks of more terrorist movements.177 
By consistently linking the IRPT to groups like the Islamic State, the government 
self-legitimised its campaign against the party. On the eve of the March 2015 
parliamentary elections, imams read a prepared text during their Friday sermon. 
It stated that: 
Today, there are some people who blacken the name of the 
[president’s ruling PDP] party, who blacken the name of Islam. These 
statements are nothing more than exaggeration. These words are 
spoken by those who have usurped Islam for their own selfish 
purposes and scare people with religion. […] In neighbouring 
countries, parties and groups who act in the name of Islam exist, but 
today on their territory blood has been spilt. These parties are foreign 
to us, they blow up mosques, destroy people’s tranquillity and make 
children orphans.178 
The party lost its two seats in the Supreme Assembly (Majilis Oli) at the 
elections. When the government blamed the party for planning armed attacks in 
Dushanbe and Vahdat on 5 September 2015, the pre-existing narrative 
accusing the group of being linked to terrorism made the government’s account 
of events plausible in the eyes of many Tajiks. Party leader Muhiddin Kabiri 
stated that the government had been looking for evidence against the party for 
many years and “tried to provoke (Rus: provotsirovat’) us into radical action 
(Rus: radikal’niye deistviya).” The September attacks provided an excuse to 
complete this long-term ambition to liquidate the party, according to Kabiri.179 
His views were shared by IRPT activist Farrukh:  
 
People accept that we are terrorists because of everything they have 
heard. The government consistently highlights our apparent links to 
groups like the Islamic State.180  
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The linking of the IRPT to ISIS helped create the conditions by which the 
government could erode the party’s legimitacy to the extent that labelling it a 
terrorist organisation seemed credible. It thus forms an example of how the 
transnational discourse on terrorism was used by the government to pursue its 
own domestic policy. 
Fourth, officials argue that religious beliefs restrict an individual’s ability to 
think and act freely. As sociologist Yormuhammad Niyozi states, “compared to 
the Soviet era (shirravi shoroitero), in Tajikistan there are more mosques and 
religion is practiced freely. But when there is political Islam (din siyosi), ideas 
are not free.”181 Behind this framing, lies the Soviet-era belief that religion is 
backwards and opposed to modernity. For one journalist, while “knowledgeable 
(donishmand) and well-educated people are making progress (peshrafthoi) in 
the fields of nanotechnology and astrophysics, mullos are talking about the 
length of beards, and the space between people’s feet whilst they pray.”182 This 
contrast between secular progress and religious regression is a central trope of 
state discourses on Islam. As political scientist Qiyomiddin Hikmatullo 
summarises:  
Despite the fact that humanity has reached new peaks of science 
(ilmro), human life (zindagi) becomes better and better with the 
modern achievements of science and technology, sadly medieval 
(asrimiyonagi) religious conflict still causes the death of innocent 
(begunoh) Muslims in various countries the world.183 
Not only does the state media argue that religion is backwards, they imply that it 
is uncivilised. In their discussions of political Islam, state media and officials 
frequently declare that ‘civilised’ (mutamaddin) countries do not have religious 
parties.184 An important aspect of this claim is that secularism is more civilised 
and modern. 
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Defence of the Secular State 
Faced with the threat of backwards, irrational, inherently violent religion, the 
Tajik government advocates the creation of a secular system. Through 
secularism, it argues, peace, stability and security can be guaranteed. Islamic 
extremism, according to Rahmon, threatens “national independence (istiqloliyati 
davlati), the democratic, constitutional and secular state (davlati demokrativu 
huquqbunyod va dunyavi), the security of a peaceful life (hayayoti osoishta), 
and the values of civilised (tamaddunsozi) people.”185 Indeed, in 51 speeches 
between 2008 and 2015 Rahmon repeats the mantra of “democratic, secular, 
constitutional” (davlati demokrativu huquqbunyod va dunyavi) 55 times. 
Whereas religion is backwards and potentially dangerous, secularism is a 
progressive ideology. Tajik officials use the term ideology (mafkurai) in the 
positive, unifying Soviet sense.186 Secularism forms the cornerstone of 
Tajikistan’s post-independence national ideology. Secularism is required to 
secure the state against religion and guarantee peace. 187As such, “in 
communities where religion is separated from the state (islomi judoni din az 
davlat) an atmosphere of security (amnu) and tranquillity (oromish) prevails.”188 
The secular system is legitimated through a discourse of exceptionalism. In an 
article entitled “The Root of Secularism in People’s Minds,” philosopher 
Kamurattuloh Abdulhaev outlines a position on secularism, religion and security 
that fits with the government’s policy. Faced with the danger of religious 
extremism, “secularism is a necessary (zururri) policy” to maintain order.189 In 
other words, “secularism protects religion (diniyat) against foreign 
(begonashavii) influences.” 190 Whereas “some people claim that secularism is 
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the product of the West (gharb) and has nothing to do with Islam,”191 Abdulhaev 
argues, secularism is universal (jahoni) and modern (muosir). Instead of 
denoting the separation of religion and state, the state takes a position above 
religion; the state can regulate religion, but religion cannot influence the state. 
As Abdullo Rahnamo argues, “the secular state in post-Soviet space not only 
acquired the form of a state without religious foundation, but, more likely a state 
limiting religious activities and completely controlling the religious sphere 
(Rahnamo 2004: 3). For philosopher Karamatullo Abduhalil, although under 
normal conditions religion is a private affair, “the state has the right to intervene 
(dakholat) when the rights and freedoms (ozodihoi) of citizens are under threat, 
in order to create a situation of security (aminyat).”192 Not only is radical Islam 
bad, it is also foreign to the Tajik nation and culture.  
Outside Threat 
In Tajikistan, the discourse on the “foreign threat” posed by the Islamic State 
operates on three levels. First, spatially, the terrorist menace is said to come 
from overseas; radicalisation occurs in Russia and terrorist groups are 
sponsored by foreign powers. Second, temporally, the government juxtaposes 
the terrorists’ call for violence with the population’s desire for peace, which it 
links to the fear of a return to the violence seen during the civil war. Third, 
morally, the government contrasts the ideal Tajik citizen- masculine, honourable 
and peaceful- with the terrorist ‘other’- feminine, dishonourable and violent 
(Lemon 2014). 
 
Moral  
Have you come across a person who had a secular (dunyavi) lifestyle 
and served his people (khalku vatan sofdilona khizmat mekard), but 
then came under the influence of another person?193 
The question, posed by two representatives of the Attorney General’s office, 
denotes the binary at the centre of state discourses on extremism in Tajikistan. 
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On the one hand the ideal Tajik person is good, patriotic and embodies secular 
values. On the other hand the terrorist ‘other’ is bad, treacherous and a religious 
fanatic. Indeed, the regime frames Tajiks who have joined the Islamic State as 
traitors and the enemies of the Tajik nation. Rahmon states that: 
We must work together to prevent young people from being tricked 
(gumrohro) into joining extremist movements and allow them to 
blacken (doghdor sozand) the name of the holy and glorious 
motherland (muqaddas va pursharafi vatan), and have brought 
shame (badom) and grief (ghamu) to their parents.194 
Tajiks who have joined the Islamic State “blacken” the name of the nation and 
bring shame on their family.195 In another article, a journalist describes a visit to 
the family of a man from Panjikent who has gone to Syria. He frames the 
situation as a tragedy; his son asks for his father, his parents weep. As one 
religious scholar concludes, “Tajiks in ISIS should be ashamed (nang), what 
would their mothers think?”196  
 Those who join the Islamic State are portrayed by the regime as weak 
individuals, whose lack of morality made them vulnerable to the false messages 
of recruiters. According to Dodojon Ruziyev, “emissaries from extremist groups 
attract young people to its ranks who are gullible (zudbovar), and weak both 
morally and ideologically (usulhoi zaifi ahloqi va aqidavi).”197 Such an argument 
performs two functions. It denies that those who join the Islamic State are 
agents with the ability to dictate their actions and freely choose to go to Syria 
and Iraq. And it distances those who join the Islamic State from national values, 
rendering them “traitors” to the Tajik nation. But Tajiks who adhere to forms of 
Islam outside of the government’s control are not merely bringing shame on 
their families, they have also fallen under the influence of “alien” ideas.  
Officials repeatedly call on citizens to beware of “alien” (begona) cultures 
and refrain from “foreigner-worshipping” (begonaparasti). Begonaparasti is 
potentially derived from the Iranian concept of gharbzadegi, which roughly 
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translates as “westoxification.”198 Unlike its Iranian counterpart, however, 
begonaparasti refers to two forms of cultural practice that are alien to Tajik 
national culture (farhangi milli): Western and Islamic. The term appears in 13 of 
the sampled texts, including four of Emomali Rahmon’s speeches. Officials not 
only portray begonaparasti as a sign of social decay, but also as a danger to 
national security. In a speech at Kulob in September 2015, Rahmon explicitly 
links ‘alien’ ideas with national security: 
Kulob is an ancient city whose people have pride and great respect 
for national values. Women should set an example by fighting against 
the negative impact of alien phenomena and foreigner-worshipping 
(begonaparasti) […] I would like to warn you that vanity, externalism, 
foreigner-worshipping and superstition (zohirparasti, begonaparasti 
va khurofot) have terrible consequences for the society and state of 
the ancient Tajik nation, as these threaten security and stability 
(amniyatu suboti), hinder development (peshi rohi rushdi) and cause 
trouble (boisi badvahti).199 
For Rahmon, begonaparasti is dangerous, backwards and anti-Tajik. Rector of 
the Information College, Rahmonali Sharifzoda, takes Rahmon’s words a step 
further. For Sharifzoda, begonaparasti not only runs counter to Tajik culture, it 
runs counter to Tajik history and tradition. While Rahmon implies that he is 
speaking about Islamic dress, Sharifzoda explicitly links begonaparasti to 
religion: 
Today, alienation (begonashavi) and foreigner-worshipping 
(begonaparasti) has emerged in society, particularly among young people, 
causing them to turn away from national culture (farhangi milli), from their 
ancestors and origins (az ta’rikhi niyogon va asli khesh megardad). One of 
the causes of this is the emergence of youth groups with Islamic names 
(garavidani javonon ba raviyahoi gunoguni bo nom Islomi).200 
The use of begonaparasti to denounce any practices that do not fall into the 
state’s definition of what ‘good’ Islam is part of a broader effort to conflate 
Islamisation with radicalisation (Montgomery and Heathershaw 2014).  
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According to the hegemonic narrative, young people who join terrorist 
groups are ignorant (bekhabari) and lack education (nadonistan).201 For 
religious scholar, Hoji Rajabzoda, “people who join extremist groups not only 
lack awareness of secular knowledge (donish dunyavi), but also correct Muslim 
practice (adabi musalmoni).”202 This lack of knowledge makes them vulnerable 
to being tricked (gumroh) and deceived (fireb) into joining terrorist groups.203 
Indeed, Rahmon argues that deception due to ignorance constitutes the main 
reason Tajik citizens travel to Syria and Iraq in five of the sampled speeches. It 
is the most oft-mentioned explanation, appearing in 28 of the sampled opinion 
pieces. Rather than being agents who actively choose to join extremist groups, 
these people are “robots” (robothoi) and “puppets” in the hands of foreign 
powers.204 Terrorists are not only morally repugnant individuals who betray the 
nation, they are spatially foreign; recruitment takes place outside of the 
country’s borders. 
Spatial 
Spatially, the Tajiks fighting for the Islamic State are foreign on at least two 
levels. First, they are recruited abroad, primarily in Russia. Second, they are 
directed by undefined “foreign powers.” Indeed, according to publically available 
sources the majority of Tajiks fighting with the Islamic State are recruited in 
Russia (Lemon 2015). Tajik officials have highlighted that migrant labourers are 
most at risk of radicalisation. Far from the support networks and cultural 
influences of their homeland, they become vulnerable to the messages of 
outsiders. According to one journalist, “the road (rohhoi) to extremism lies 
abroad, in labour migration, in foreign educational institutions and on the 
internet.”205 In November 2014, the Deputy Chairman of the Tajik GKNB stated 
that “in Moscow, on Prospekt Mira, there is a mosque where our young people 
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are recruited for Syria.”206 Recruitment does not only take place outside of 
Tajikistan, it is also supported by outside groups.  
 The state media repeatedly claims that Islamic groups – such as the 
Islamic State, IRPT and Salafi movement – are funded by “foreign powers” 
(hojagoni).207 The state discourse on radical Islam forms part of a broader 
narrative on the nature of security and international relations. Tajik officials 
ascribe to many of the central tenets of a realist worldview. According to the 
hegemonic narrative, the international system is anarchic and filled with 
instability (noustuvor).208 States compete with one another to secure their 
geopolitical interests (manfiathoi geopolitiki).209 The world is characterised by 
disparities of power and developing regions such as Central Asia form a 
chessboard upon which great powers compete for their material interests. 
Central Asia is experiencing a new “Great Game” (bozi bozurg), in which China, 
Russia and the United States vie for power in the region.210 This dangerous 
externality is rife with modern threats that are transnational (transmilli, faromilli) 
and global (globali).211 In his speeches, Rahmon frequently mentions the fight 
against organized crime, drug trafficking and extremism.212 Such transnational 
threats, he argues, require a collective response.213  
In a paper on Tajik state discourses on ISIS, Noah Tucker argues that “the 
state’s overall message in response is that Tajiks are lured into joining ISIS as 
part of a grand conspiracy to undermine Tajikistan” (Tucker 2016: 1). Radical 
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Islam, for Tajik officials, emerges from this anarchical system. Conspiracy 
theories remain central to the way many Tajiks view domestic and world politics 
(Heathershaw 2012). Mysterious powers lie behind most events and secretly 
dictate what happens. In keeping with the primacy of geopolitical conspiracy 
theories within their worldview, extremists are pawns in the hands of oft-
mentioned, but never explicitly defined, external powers. These foreign powers 
have been active in the republic ever since it achieved independence in 1991. 
According to political scientist Kormon Aslov, “after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, instability (nooromiu besuboti) broke out in the republics, some world 
and regional powers tried in this country to secure their own geopolitical 
interests (manfiathoi geopolitiki).”214 Radical Islamic ideology becomes a tool to 
mobilise support against the status quo and create chaos in regions like the 
Middle East. Extremists seek to divide (tafrika andozand) the Muslim world and 
denigrate the name of Islam. But ultimately they are power-seeking, self-
interested groups who use terrorism to secure their geopolitical goals (ahdofi 
geopolitiki).215 Farrukh remains convinced that the Islamic State was created by 
the USA and their Israeli allies: 
When the USA invaded Iraq in 2003, they aimed to create instability 
(noorom sozand) in the whole region. Why? Because they wanted to 
render Middle Eastern countries dependent (dastnigiri) on the United 
States and to extract the region’s resources. The United States 
released Baghdadi and other terrorists from prison, knowing that they 
would cause chaos. They gave them money and Mossad trained 
them. They wanted to use IS to overthrow Asad.216 
Most state media reports argue that “foreign powers” lie behind ISIS. But rarely 
do they name any countries. A number of articles do name America as a country 
that purposefully stirs trouble in the Middle East.217 Isomiddin Sharifov from the 
Academy of Sciences argues that the United States, influenced by Samuel 
Huntingdon’s theory of the “clash of civilisations,” politicises Islam in order to 
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cause conflicts between Muslims.218 To summarise, the hegemonic narrative 
frames Tajik citizens who fight for the Islamic State as spatial Others; they are 
recruited abroad and supported by foreign powers. But the discourse of alterity 
also has a temporal dimension; those fighting fro the Islamic State want to drag 
Tajikistan back into civil war. 
Temporal 
For Tajikistan, which has experienced Islamic political war 
(islomi siyosi jangovarro), people have seen with their eyes how 
the nation state passed through a river of blood (daryo khunu) 
and the flames of a civil war (alangai otashi jangi shahrvandi 
guzashtaast), this phenomenon [Tajiks fighting in IS] is very 
alarming (khatar meboshad).219 
During the civil war, the government tended to refer to the opposition coalition 
as simply “Islamic.” This framing “blurred the distinctions among the constituent 
parts and facilitated the stigmatization of the opposition’s main members as 
dangerous Islamic extremists” (Atkin 1995: 255). According to this narrative the 
war broke out in 1992 when Islamic extremists, camped out on the Shahidon 
(Martyr’s) Square in Dushanbe, attempted to overthrow the legitimate, secular 
order (Atkin 1994: 211). 
The regime argues that young people (javonon), who have no memory of 
the civil war, are most likely to fall victim to the lure of the Islamic State. Indeed, 
the vast majority of recorded Tajik fighters in Syria and Iraq are under 30 years 
old (Lemon 2015). In Tajik culture, youth – defined as the period before a man 
turns 35 years old– is a time of immaturity and vulnerability (Roche 2010; 
Stephan 2007). To prevent young people from forgetting the war, state-
controlled media and educational institutions frequently remind them about its 
horrors. Since the signing of the 1997 peace accord, the regime has invested 
“in rewriting history, performing authority and celebrating Tajikistan’s emergent 
sovereignty” (Heathershaw 2009: 1316). The civil war itself is rarely discussed 
in any detail publically. At the new national museum, for example, after a 
description and photos from the Twelfth Congress of the Supreme Council of 
Tajikistan, which voted for independence in September 1991, the narrative 
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skips the civil war and moves straight to the national reconciliation (vahdati milli) 
process.220 History textbooks briefly discuss the conflict, framing it as being 
driven by “foreign forces.” But they dedicate more space to discussing 
Rahmon’s role in uniting the nation and bringing peace (Blakkisrud and 
Nozimova 2010).  
The memory of the “fratricidal war” (jangi khudkushi) performs a function: it 
serves as a reminder of what happens when religion is mixed with politics. For 
Saidmurod Fattohzoda, first deputy chairman of the ruling People’s Democratic 
Party, the civil war was “a war between two ideologies (jangi du ideologia): 
Communism and Islam”221The current government had to intervene to offer an 
alternative to these opposing values. Rahmon invoked the memory of the civil 
war in six of the nine sampled speeches. His words in Kulob in September 2015 
typify his logic:  
The people of Tajikistan have not forgotten the tragedies (oghozi) of 
the 1990s and therefore value peace (sulkh) and security (aminyat). 
We must remind young people to be thankful for nationhood 
(sohibvatanu) and statehood (sohibdavlati), and peace, stability and 
national reconciliation (sulhu subot va vahdati milli).222 
The official narrative creates a binary division between state-led stability and the 
dangers of the foreign-backed, democratic and radical Islamist forces which 
threaten that stability. Oppositional politics is presented as synonymous with the 
chaos, instability and violence that the country experienced during the civil war. 
State media bombard citizens with images of conflict in the Middle East, a 
warning of what happens when foreign-backed revolutionaries espousing 
democratic values attempt to seize power.  In contrast, the government, 
according to officials, values peace (sulh), stability (subot) and national 
reconciliation (vahdati milli) above all else. Posters praising Rahmon for bringing 
peace festoon public buildings across the republic. Educational institutions and 
the state media extol his achievements in bringing peace to the nation. In 
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December 2015, changes to the Constitution declared Rahmon to be the “leader 
of nation” and “originator of peace and national reconciliation” (asosguzori sulhu 
vahdati milli).223 This codified his position a symbol of peace in the nation. So 
far, I have argued that the Tajik government creates a division between ‘good,’ 
state-controlled, moderate Islam and ‘bad,’ unofficial, extremist Islam. For the 
government, without government regulation religion is socially backwards and 
politically dangerous. Faced with this threat, the government has created a 
secular system. Morally, spatially and temporally, the terrorist threat proceeds 
from the outside.  The framing of the Islamic State threat to Tajikistan is not 
benign. It sets the conditions for transnational authoritarian security governance, 
which I will describe in the next chapter.  Indeed, state terrorism discourses are 
undercut by relations of power. It is to these relations that I now turn. 
State Discourses on Terrorism and Relations of Power 
 
The Tajik state narrative contains all three forms of power identified by Michel 
Foucault. It is sovereign as it aims to protect the government and Tajikistan’s 
territory. It is disciplinary as it calls for the punishment of those who are accused 
of “extremism,” offering a warning to others who may take this path. And it 
involves biopower because it involves discourses about the vital characteristics 
of being human, as well as the management of populations and individual 
subjects through practices of self-regulation. 
 
Sovereign Power 
 
Sovereign power, focuses on maintaining the “safety (sûreté) of the Prince and 
his territory” (Foucault 2003: 65). Sovereign power limits, bans and prevents 
certain behaviours, claiming a monopoly on violence. By framing those who join 
the Islamic State as criminals and traitors who threaten national security, the 
government legitimates exceptional (zururri) measures against them. Such 
measures are justified because they protect the state, its government, territory 
and population. The authorities have used existing state laws, particularly the 
Law on the Fight Against Terrorism (1999), Law on the Fight Against Extremism 
(2003), Law on Parental Responsibility (2011) and Law on Religion (2009), to 
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prohibit and restrict “extremist” actions. Where the legislation failed to cover the 
activities of Tajiks joining the Islamic State, the government amended existing 
legislation and introduced new laws. In the face of rising recruitment, the 
government classified ISIS as a terrorist group in May 2015. In July 2015, the 
government passed amendments to its citizenship law prohibiting its citizens 
from fighting in foreign conflicts in, stripping them of their citizenship if they do 
so.224 But the government has not only framed the actions of those accused of 
‘extremism’ as illegal, it also frames their actions as deviant and abnormal, 
legitimating the use of disciplinary power against them. 
 
Disciplinary power 
  
Disciplinary power attempts to render visible the spatial distribution of bodies in 
order to exert control over them. Elites use disciplinary power to define and 
police the norm; those deviating from the norm – the vagrant, the insane, the 
homosexual, the extremist - are subject to corrective treatment. Disciplinary 
power shapes and normalises subjects. According to Foucault, “discipline 
makes individuals; it is the specific technique of power that regards individuals 
both as objects and as instruments of its exercise” (Foucault 1991: 170).  
The Tajik government’s exercise of disciplinary power is based on its 
division between what is “good,” acceptable Islam and what is “bad,” deviant 
Islam. Those who adhere to “bad” Islam become the objects of discipline. In 
order to be normal, secular subjects, men with beards need to be shaved; 
women with hijabs need to de-veil; mosques need to be tightly regulated; 
Islamic education must be restricted. Disciplinary power dictates what subjects 
should not be, aiming to restrict deviant behaviour. By blurring the distinction 
between being pious and being a terrorist, the government of Tajikistan has 
waged a campaign against unsanctioned forms of religious expression. In 2015, 
police in the southern region of Khatlon shaved 13,000 men with beards. When 
qori Abdulrahmon, who I mentioned in the introduction, travelled back to 
Tajikistan in 2015 he was detained by police. His beard formed the subject of a 
lengthy exchange with his interrogators. “Are you a vovchik (slang for Islamic 
extremist)?” they asked him. “Real Tajik men do not grow beards.  They are 
alien (begona) to our culture and a sign that someone is on the path to 
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extremism.” Abdulrahmon had his beard forcibly shaved. But the Tajik 
government’s counter-terrorism strategy does not stop there; it promotes 
“healthy (solim) and moral (akhloqi) lifestyles (tarsi hayoti).” 225 In doing so, it 
uses power to mould political subjects, engaging in a project that is inherently 
biopolitical in nature. 
 
Biopower 
The final, and most recent, form of power that Foucault examines is biopower. 
This involves the management of populations and individual subjects through 
practices of self-regulation. . Whereas disciplinary power isolates, concentrates 
and is essentially protectionist, by contrast biopower is said to be centrifugally 
oriented in favour of expansion, circulation and movement. In fighting terrorism, 
Tajik officials not only rely on arrests, blocking websites and shaving beards, 
they also place importance on shaping public consciousness (shuur) through 
education. Ultimately, the Tajik government is trying to create political subjects 
that are loyal, secular and therefore unlikely to join radical Islamic groups in the 
first place. As I outlined above, the Tajik government argues that secularism 
(dunyavi) is the only way to guarantee national security in the face of Islamic 
extremism. Leading academic Khudoberdi Kholiqnazar argues that effective 
counter-terrorism rests on educational activities.226 Through the building of 
schools, libraries and youth clubs, the state should promote and build a secular 
(dunyavi) national culture. Educational activities train young people in the “spirit 
of patriotism” (rirhiyai vatandirsti). For Haidar Odinayev, the best way to fight 
extremism is through the “formation of a scientific world outlook (jahonbinii ilmi) 
and political vigilance (zirakii siyosi) amongst young people.”227  
Indeed, it is important that our compatriots (hamvatononi), and in 
particular teenagers and young people (javonon), especially in the 
context of the modern world's most sensitive dangers (nooromu 
hassosi) have the ability to separate truth (haqro) from falsehood. 
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They must always be vigilant (zirak boshand), take the right path of 
life (rohi durusti zindagiro), to study science try to educate 
themselves, and to refrain from any harmful (ziyonovar) acts.228 
 
In an article entitled “Social Consciousness and Societal Security (amniyati 
jam’iyati),” Head of the State Security Committee Saymumin Yatimov, presents 
education as a battle between foreign and national influences. The 
consciousness (shuur) of Tajik citizens is at stake. “In structuring everyday 
consciousness (shuuri rirzmarra), foreign (begona) powers are playing a greater 
role than ever,” Yatimov opens.229 Drawing on Hegel’s arguments about the 
nature of consciousness, in particular the influence of climate on ways of 
thinking, Yatimov argues that a “secure public consciousness (amniyati shuuri 
muqarrari), is the most important component for public safety (amniyati 
jam’iyati).”230  
State institutions – such as schools, universities, the media – play a role 
in shaping and regulating political subjects. But citizens themselves also share 
this responsibility. Officials repeatedly call on citizens to monitor other 
community members and to consciously work on themselves. Not only do Tajik 
citizens have to think about their own beliefs and behaviour, they also need to 
monitor those around them. As the Prosecutor General from Rudaki district 
states, “it is every citizens patriotic duty (fardi vatandirsti) to guide the young 
people towards a democratic society (demokrativu huquqbunyod hidoyat), so 
that they contribute to the stability of their national state.”231 The Committee on 
National Security (GKNB) employs informants to infiltrate and report on migrant 
groups.232 And it also relies on loyal citizens to report suspicious behaviour. The 
Tajik state is not a panopticon; it also relies on horizontal surveillance between 
citizens. It contains similarities with the Soviet system. Oleg Kharkhordin argues 
that the Soviet authorities governed through the notion of mutual responsibility 
(Rus.: krugovaia poruka), in which citizens monitored one another and reported 
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counter-revolutionary behaviour.  As Kharkhordin concludes, “in Russia, there is 
no single Big Brother, but there are many bigger brothers” (1999: 122). This 
combination of sovereign, disciplinary and biopower is not unique to TASG. 
Although it differs from TASG in a number of ways, transnational liberal security 
governance also involves this triangle of power. Liberal approaches often 
reproduce rather than challenge the foundational assumptions of Tajikistan’s 
counter-terrorism policy. 
 
Liberal Approaches to Governing Violent Extremism 
 
Many of the policy-oriented analyses of extremism in Tajikistan remain 
functionalist, offering policies to countering violent extremism in Central Asia.233 
Although they overlap in a number of interesting ways, this Transnational 
Liberal Security Governance (TLSG) differs from TASG in a number of ways.234 
Countering extremism is a priority for a number of external actors, including the 
United States, United Kingdom, Germany, European Union, United Nations and 
OSCE, each of which has funded projects addressing the phenomenon. I 
identify common features relating to the causes, nature and solutions to Islamic 
extremism. My analysis is based on documents relating to six projects led by 
the OSCE, Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia, International Alert, State 
Department, United States Agency for Internetional Development (USAID) and 
UN between 2010 and 2016.235  
Whilst recognising that terms like ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ are 
contested and approaches need to be context-dependent, many western actors 
maintain that these concepts can be objectively defined, measured and 
addressed. Although the government of Tajikistan blames radicalisation on 
greed, a lack of education and treason, western actors have tended to apportion 
some of the responsibility to the government itself (Lemon 2015). USAID, for 
example, lists weak governance, corruption, social marginalisation, poverty and 
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human rights abuses as major “drivers” behind violent extremism (USAID 
2011). TLSG posits policy solutions to radical Islam that resemble TASG. Both 
combine elements of sovereign, disciplinary and biopower. In terms of 
sovereign power, western states support Tajikistan’s security services through 
training and material. Despite criticism from diplomats and government 
agencies over the deteriorating human rights situation in Tajikistan, with the 
ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan, military support has been strengthened.236 
Since 2005, the US government has provided $130 million to support border 
security, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics in Tajikistan.237 Between 2016 
and 2017 the U.S. Department of Defense plans to spend a further $50 million 
countering terrorism in Central Asia, with the majority of funds going to “key 
partner nation in the region” Tajikistan.238 In 2014, the US subsidised 29% of 
Tajikistan’s military budget. The European Union’s BOMCA (Border 
Management in Central Asia) project, implemented between 2003 and 2014 
allocated a further $50 million in assistance to Central Asian security 
services.239  
Whereas defence agencies have focused on building the capacity of 
security services and the military to exercise sovereign power, development 
agencies have promoted community-led solutions to extremism, combining both 
disciplinary and biopower. The strategies for combating extremism that have 
been developed by these agencies inform the approach they have taken in 
Tajikistan. For example, USAID’s “The Development Response to Combating 
Violent Extremism and Insurgency” from September 2011 places importance on 
governing through “institutions, actors, and processes relevant to at-risk 
populations.” These “can be sources of resilience against the influence of 
violent extremist narratives and provide youth, in particular, with a positive role 
and voice in community governance” (USAID 2011: 5). These solutions work to 
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provide bottom-up solutions to counter extremism centred on the logic of 
resilience (Chandler 2014; Reid and Evans 2014). 
Both liberal and authoritarian approaches to extremism are based on a 
secular understanding of politics; religion is only safe if it is monitored by the 
state (Gutkowski 2011). Like the state discourse on religion in Tajikistan, 
transnational liberal security governance is based on the division between 
promoting ‘good,’ moderate Islam, and combating ‘bad,’ extremist Islam (Birt 
2006). Whereas “moderate” voices are to be promoted as a bulwark against 
extremism, those who are deemed “extremist” require disciplining.240 Similar to 
TASG, the solutions provided by liberal security governance are not purely 
state-centric; they involve civil society and citizens. Ultimately, they aim to 
create resilient citizens who both defend religious freedoms and monitor 
themselves, and others, for signs of radicalisation. A call for proposals issued 
by the United States Department of State in March 2016 entitled “Supporting 
Human Rights and Civic Education, and Building Community Resilience in 
Tajikistan” contains a summary of the TLSG approach, calling on NGOs to 
design projects focused on: 
Training local civil society organizations on building community 
awareness about universal human rights, including religious freedom, 
that the Government of Tajikistan has committed to; credible and 
secure documentation of religious freedom abuses, and successful 
communication with and advocacy toward, mechanisms that are 
already in place to address human rights abuses, such as the Human 
Rights Ombudsman and the Detention Working Group; engagement 
opportunities with youth to promote community activism, for example 
through community engagement clubs that create a network of 
civically minded Tajik youth and empower the local community; town 
halls, community theater, and other grassroots activities, can be used 
to open a dialogue with local governments to address political and 
legal protections to religious groups; activities utilizing the role of 
women in building community resilience and serving as gatekeepers 
for preventing radicalization in their families and social networks; and 
international advocacy activities.241 
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The State Department’s calls for projects that address the ‘radicalisation’ of 
young people in particular. It envisages projects that focus on civic education, 
“grassroots” activities, and utilise women to monitor citizens for signs of 
extremism. In other words, it looks to create communities that are resilient to 
both the abuses of the government, and radicalisation. A similar project, 
“Parents against Terrorism” was implemented by the OSCE from 2014 to 2015. 
It aimed to create an “early warning system” by training women to monitor for 
the signs of radicalisation amongst groups deemed to be most at-risk: women, 
young people and migrants. Projects implemented by the Eurasia Foundation 
and International Alert between 2010 and 2012 had a similar focus on civic 
education, youth and community resilience.242 
To summarise, liberal approaches, despite differing from TASG in 
important ways, continue to overlap with it in numerous areas. As I have argued 
throughout this thesis, the government of Tajikistan has mediated the issue of 
foreign fighters, taking advantage of the threat to bolster regime security 
through its governance regimes. To re-inforce my claim that the government is 
scripting and spinning the security discourse, I will now examine the available 
evidence relating to Tajik citizens fighting in Syria and Iraq. 
 
What does the Available Evidence Indicate? 
 
Scant information about the biographies of Tajik militants exists in the public 
sphere. A few common characteristics exist among those who have a public 
profile. Most Tajiks known to be fighting (or to have fought) with ISIS are young 
males aged 18 to 40; few have received formal religious education and the 
majority spent time in Russia before going to Syria or Iraq. While this basic 
profile fits many of those who have travelled to Syria and Iraq, it does not fit all 
of them. Some are highly educated and have university degrees.243 Self-styled 
spokesman of Tajik jihad Abu Mohammed al-Tojiki, for example, studied at the 
Tajik-Slavonic University in Dushanbe.244 Others worked for the government. 
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Former head of the Tajik paramilitary police (OMON) Gulmurod Halimov, who 
defected to ISIS in May 2015, is perhaps the most prominent example of this.245 
Not all of them are employed as soldiers. They are also involved in police work, 
driving and training other recruits. Olim Yusuf, for example, who was arrested 
crossing the Iraqi-Syrian border in 2014, claimed he worked as a driver for 
ISIS.246 A few women have also travelled to Syria and Iraq.247 As such, the 
militaristic term ‘foreign fighter’ obscures the range of different roles that Tajiks 
perform in the Islamic State. Framing them as “transnational activists” rather 
than foreign fighters, better represents this heterogeneity (Moore 2015).  With 
such a range of backgrounds among transnational activists, generalising about 
the causes of radicalization or single, linear pathways to Syria and Iraq remains 
too simplistic. In reality, each transnational activist’s path to Syria and Iraq is 
individual. Farrukh, an IRPT leader in Moscow, summarises what the available 
evidence about Tajik fighters suggests: 
  
ISIS recruitment is driven by issues of social justice (adolat). For 
example, a young person graduates from a university in Tajikistan. 
But there are no jobs. He has family problems. He cannot get 
married. So he leaves for Russia. But he sees injustice here too. He 
is educated but has to work on a building site (Rus.: stroika). He has 
problems with his documents. He has to pay 25,000 roubles for a 
patent (work permit). This is more than one month’s wages. Social 
factors are more important than others. They are told you will have a 
good life, a good future and rai (paradise) if you become a martyr 
(shahid).248 
 
Rather than being driven purely by material gain, transnational acitivists seem 
to be influenced by a mixture of ‘push’ factors associated with social injustice 
and state secular policies, and ‘pull’ factors linked to the idea that paradise is 
being created with their Muslim brothers, and sisters, in Iraq and Syria. I will 
now illustrate this with three example biographies of Tajiks who have gone to 
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fight in Syria and Iraq: Gulmurod Halimov, Abu Mohammed al-Tojiki and Abu 
Holid Kulob.249 
 
Gulmurod Halimov 
 
The defection of Gulmurod Halimov, the former commander of the Tajik 
paramilitary police (OMON), attracted a great deal of attention from the global 
media.250 Born in 1965 in Varzob, just north of Dushanbe, Halimov was revered 
as an accomplished sniper. He joined OMON in 1996, fighting in the Rasht 
valley between 2009 and 2011.251 He was promoted to command OMON in 
September 2012 following the operation in Khorog that summer.252 He received 
counter-terrorism training in the U.S. on at least five occasions between 2003 
and 2007.253 Raised during the Soviet Union, he started praying regularly in 
2001. Halimov disappeared on 23 April 2015, telling his family he was leaving 
for a short business trip. His brother told Radio Ozodi that his phone was 
switched off, but that his personal items, including his passport, were left as if 
he departed in a hurry.254 He flew to Russia on 1 May and was seen in 
Moscow’s Sheremetyevo airport the next day. On 28 May, a ten-minute video 
featuring Halimov was published by Furat Media, the Islamic State’s Russian-
language media service. Halimov was clear why he had left Tajikistan, saying 
that the government “does not permit people to pray and wear Islamic hijabs.”255 
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He also accused the security services paying prostitutes $10 each to appear in 
hijabs in a video that state media had used to discredit Islam. According to 
Halimov, “you [the government] passed a law prohibiting prayer on the streets. 
But God says you can pray anywhere.” Halimov has appeared in at least two 
ISIS videos since then. 
 
Abu Mohammed al-Tojiki 
 
Born Alan Chekranov in 1993, al-Tajiki grew up in Sharituz district in Khatlon, 
located on the border with Afghanistan.256 His father is an ethnic Tajik while his 
mother is an ethnic Ossetian.257 A keen sportsman, Chekranov won three 
wrestling competitions at the national level.258 In 2010, he graduated from high 
school and enrolled at the prestigious Tajik-Slavonic University in Dushanbe. 
Two years later, the university expelled him for missing too many classes. He 
travelled to Russia soon after. One year later, he returned to Tajikistan a 
changed man, according to his friends.259 He wore a beard, only spoke of the 
need for jihad and said he had been socialising with Caucasians in Russia. In 
2013, he travelled to Syria via Turkey. He became one of the most active Tajik 
fighters on social media, appearing in at least 15 videos that sympathizers 
posted on YouTube and Odnoklassniki.260 The videos depict Chekranov 
socializing with other Tajik militants, burning a Shi’a flag and calling on his 
fellow countrymen to join the jihad. As well as producing videos, he engaged 
actively in the Islamic State’s war with the Syrian government and Kurdish 
forces. He was killed fighting Kurdish peshmurga forces near Kirkuk, Iraq on 10 
February 2015.261 
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Abu Kholidi Kulobi  
 
Nusratullo Nazarov, (a.k.a. Abu Kholidi Kulobi and Firkoni Falastin) was born in 
1976 in Charmgaroni Poyon mahalla in the southern city of Kulob.262 He 
commanded the Islamic State’s Tajik fighters in Raqqa, but allegedly did not 
take part in hostilities himself.263 Nazarov stated that he was interested in jihad 
from a young age. He is married with three children. Originally, Nazarov worked 
in a currency exchange office at the bazaar in Kulob, but he later became a 
drug addict and dealer. To pay his debts, he sold his father’s house and moved 
to Russia in 2012. In the summer of 2013, he travelled to Syria. Originally, 
Nazarov fought alongside Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. But he 
soon became disillusioned, stating that “after I learned about their cooperation 
with the West, I quit their ranks”.264 After joining the Islamic State in 2014, he 
became a vocal advocate for jihad. In January 2015, Nazarov threatened to 
bomb the offices of a local newspaper in Kulob over the paper’s negative 
coverage of Tajik militants.265 A few days later, Nazarov’s brother, a taxi driver 
in Kulob, appeared on state television condemning Nazarov and called on him 
to return home to his family.266 Nazarov was killed in July 2015 on the Turkish-
Syrian border. 
These three individuals do not fit the neatly within the government’s 
framing of foreign fighters as irrational, greedy traitors (Lemon 2015). Rather 
than being poor, rural, uneducated young people who were pushed into joining 
Islamic State by greed, they are educated, professional individuals who seem to 
have joined due, in part, to ideological convictions. None of them was forced to 
join ISIS due to their circumstance; joining ISIS, it seems, was a choice for 
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these individuals. The variety of biographic characteristics seen in these three 
examples indicates that generalising from the individual to the population 
remains spurious. For example, many analysts concluded that Halimov’s 
defection represented a wider split within the government; more members of the 
security services would follow in his footsteps (ICG 2015). But this did not turn 
out to be the case and Halimov is better understood as an isolated example of a 
regime insider who joined the Islamic State due in part to what he saw the 
government do. Furthermore, none of them have any formal religious education 
or came from a religious family. This challenges the assumption that 
Islamisation begets radicalisation. Nonetheless, all of them mention the 
government’s secular policies as a reason that they joined militant groups in 
Syria and Iraq. As such, they point towards the potential for counter-productive 
outcomes emerging from TASG.  
 
Conclusion 
State discourses on the Islamic State create the conditions of possibility for the 
governance of the threat. By framing the issue as it does, the Tajik government 
legitimates transnational authoritarian security governance. The framing brings 
into being three key features of this phenomenon. First, the state needs to 
intervene to maintain the natural, secular order by banning practices and 
arresting extremists (sovereign power), disciplining forms of religious 
expression deemed dangerous (disciplinary power) and shaping resilient 
secular citizen subjects with ‘healthy’ lifestyles (biopower). Second, it is not 
solely the government’s responsibility to prevent radicalisation. Patriotic Tajiks 
need to monitor one another and self-regulate so that they conform to the 
government-defined “national culture” and become loyal subjects. Transnational 
authoritarian security governance, then, involves a mixture of public and private 
actors, individuals and institutions, who work together to protect national 
security. Third, by framing the radical Islamic threat as transnational, something 
that emanates from outside the country’s borders, the government legitimates 
the use of security practices amongst migrant communities in Russia and 
Turkey. Having discussed the discursive underpinnings of Tajikistan’s security 
governance, in the next chapter I turn to the security practices themselves. 
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Chapter 5: Operationalisation: Policing the Diaspora: Governing Islam and 
Security 
In governing security, the government of Tajikistan relies on a combination of 
sovereign power, disciplinary power and biopower. But these governance 
regimes do not end at the state’s borders. Increasingly, Tajikistan is deploying 
security practices extraterritorially, outside of its territorial boundaries, in migrant 
communities in Russia and Turkey where over a million Tajik citizens live. 
Despite the fact that they are acting in another jurisdiction, the security services 
use the same tactics – arrests, surveillance, intimidation – often in collusion with 
the Russian and Turkish authorities. Although they cannot act with the same 
impunity as they do in Tajikistan itself, in recent years the security services have 
become bolder, kidnapping citizens, attempting to kill them and threatening their 
families. In this chapter, I examine how the Tajik authorities govern the 
‘extremist’ threat both in Tajikistan and beyond its borders. I base my analysis 
on 49 recorded cases of exceptional extraterritorial security measures since 
2002, which I compiled based on publicly-available sources.267 I supplement 
this with media reports and ethnographic data collected in Moscow and 
Tajikistan between 2012 and 2015. 
 In analysing the transnational authoritarian security governance, I draw 
on the “triangle of power” developed by Michel Foucault (Dean 2010: 122). In 
the chapter, I discuss these three forms of power in turn, drawing on examples 
from within Tajikistan and practices carried out in Tajikistan and amongst 
migrant communities. Transnational authoritarian security governance relies on 
sovereign power. Tajikistan’s authorities have created a legal framework that 
has outlawed groups classified as “extremist,” ranging from Islamic State to 
Salafis, Tablighi Jamoat and the Islamic Renaissance Party. It has also 
introduced laws to tightly regulate mosques, religious groups and banned under 
18s from praying in mosques. Transnational authoritarian security governance 
also draws on disciplinary power. Tajik authorities have drawn the distinction 
between “good,” official, moderate Islam and “bad,” unofficial, extremist Islam. 
Those who are classified as potential extremists – those who have studied 
Islam outside of the country, who wear a beard or hijab – are classified as 
abnormals in need of correction. Police in the country have taken it on 
themselves to enforce this norm, shaving men with beards and “encouraging” 
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women to de-veil. Finally, transnational authoritarian security governance is 
biopolitical. Through state-controlled education and civil society, the 
government promotes a secular subject-position that is intended to form a 
bulwark against extremism.  
 In the chapter, utilising court documents, media reports, interviews and 
ethnography, I discuss these three forms of power in turn. I begin by discussing 
the juridicial system established to govern Islamic extremism and the exercises 
of sovereign power, the arrests, renditions, intimidation, executions and 
closures through which the government enforces this both in Tajikistan and 
beyond its territorial borders. Next, I examine how the government of Tajikistan 
has disciplined adherents of abnormal, bad forms of Islam. I focus specifically 
on the policing of beards, hijabs and the establishment of an official clergy. 
Finally, I examine the ways in which the government of Tajikistan has deployed 
biopower through education and civil society, aiming to create secular subjects 
who remain resilient to extremist messaging. 
  
Sovereign Power 
Bans, Closures, Arrests 
By conflating Islamisation with radicalisation, the government has securitised all 
forms of unsanctioned religious activity. Before moving against individuals and 
organisations labelled extremist, the Tajik government has established the 
necessary legal system to do so. The government classifies at least 15 groups 
as “extremist.”268 These groups can be divided into four types. First, the 
government has outlawed secular opposition movements, such as Group 24 
and Vatandor.269 Second, there are religious groups with questionable links to 
violence, such as the Salafi movement and Tablighi Jamaat. Third, there are 
political Islamic groups like the IRPT, Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut Tahrir. 
Finally, organisations with who have engaged in acts of terrorism, such as the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Jabhat al-Nusra, ISIS, the Taliban and 
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Jamoat Ansarullah.270 Membership of any of these organisations is now 
punishable under Article 307 of the Criminal Code (membership of an extremist 
or criminal organisation). The trials of suspected extremists are opaque, usually 
taking place behind closed doors. If convicted, individuals usually have to serve 
upwards of 17 years in a penal colony. The government has not just outlawed 
groups, it has now outlawed fighting outside of Tajikistan. In the face of a rising 
number of citizens fighting in Syria and Iraq, the government passed 
amendments to its citizenship law prohibiting its citizens from fighting in foreign 
conflicts in July 2015, stripping them of their citizenship if they travel abroad to 
fight.271 
With so many groups and activities banned, the security services have 
been able to detain and arrest hundreds of people. The Ministry of Justice 
charged 309 people for extremism and terrorism offenses in 2014. These 
figures include 74 Islamic State sympathizers.272 The government also 
imprisoned 85 members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 64 members of 
Jamaat Ansurallah, 3 members of the Taliban, 35 Salafis, 14 members of 
Tablighi Jamoat and 11 members of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Although the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs is yet to release statistics for 2015, the arrest figures have 
undoubtedly increased. After the IRPT was banned in September 2015, police 
arrested over 200 members of the party. Police arrested the leader of the Salafi 
movement Muhammadi Rahmatullo in February 2016.273 Whilst IMU arrests 
have fallen, the number of Tajiks charged with membership of ISIS has 
increased. 
Mosques have also been targeted by the government. In early 2016, 
there were 3,390 officially registered mosques in Tajikistan.274 The 2009 Law on 
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Association established a system of 
three types of mosque: central congregational mosques, congregational 
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mosques (masjidi jome’i) and five-time (masjidi panjvaqt) mosques, for 
communities of fewer than 1,000 people.275 Only one congregational mosque is 
permitted in each area of 15,000 or more people. At least 50,000 signatures 
need to be collected to build a new mosque. Mosques need to register with the 
State Committee on Religious Affairs. Since the new law was introduced in 
2009, unregistered mosques have faced closure. In late January 2016, for 
example, the Tajik government announced it is demolishing 39 mosques for 
breaking the rules, with a further 145 being reviewed in the courts.276  
 Although the government has created a legal framework to allow it to 
detain “extremists,” the security services frequently operate outside of the law, 
relying on informal, extra-judicial security practices. These include kidnapping 
suspects living outside of Tajikistan’s jurisdiction, the use of torture as a means 
to extract confessions, extra-judicial executions, and intimidation against the 
families of suspects. As such, the law in Tajikistan is selectively used by the 
government. Whilst opposition members can fall foul of the country’s fluid 
counter-extremism and religious policy, government officials themselves act 
with impunity. 
 
Rendition 
In the pursuit of national security, the government has taken the fight outside of 
state borders. Whereas within Tajikistan itself the government has created a 
legal framework to outlaw “extremist” groups and practices, outside of its 
jurisdiction these laws obviously do not apply. Outside of Tajikistan the 
government has deployed a range of informal security practices. Rendition, or 
the transfer of people or property from one jurisdiction to another, remains the 
most frequently used exceptional measure deployed by the Tajik regime 
(Amnesty International 2013; Hug 2014). Like other governments in Central 
Asia, Tajikistan has attempted to return dissidents to face charges at home. 
Since 2002, I have found 49 cases of exceptional extraterritorial security 
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measures carried out by the Tajik authorities.277 The vast majority (36) of the 
incidents took place in Russia. A smaller number of incidents took place in 
Turkey (5), Ukraine (3), Belarus (2), Moldova (1), Spain (1) and Finland (1). 
While those detained outside of the Russia and Turkey managed to secure their 
release, sometimes after a lengthy period in detention, the Russian and Turkish 
authorities allowed, and in some cases cooperated with, the Tajik security 
services to render individuals back to Tajikistan. In total, 48 of the surveyed 
cases involved attempted extraditions or renditions to Tajikistan.278 Of these 
cases, 17 individuals were forcibly rendered to Tajikistan, one was assassinated 
after a failed extradition attempt.     
I have identified four categories of target: members of the secular 
opposition,279  civil war-era activists,280  Islamic extremists,281 and former regime 
insiders.282 Of the cases that I uncovered, 26 individuals were accused of 
affiliation with secular opposition movements, most prominently Group 24 and 
Youth for the Revival of Tajikistan. Fifteen individuals accused of Islamic 
extremism were the target of extraterritorial security practices. Finally, the 
government targeted five individuals accused of civil war era crimes and three 
former regime insiders. The number of incidents has increased in recent years. 
Where six cases were recorded between 2002 and 2009, since 2010 there have 
been 43 incidents, with 36 of these occurring since 2014. 
Transnational authoritarian security governances operates in two distinct 
levels of the transnational: the regional and the extra-regional. Whilst within the 
authoritarian states of Central Asia, Russia and Turkey, the government of 
Tajikistan has managed to deploy its security apparatus with the acceptance of 
local regimes, outside of this region it has achieved no ‘successes.’ Outside of 
the region it has attempted to use Interpol Red Notices to formally extradite 
opponents. Those detained outside of Russia have managed to secure their 
release. Acting on an Interpol all-points-bulletin, a so-called red notice, the 
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Finnish authorities detained 31-year-old Sulaimon Davlatov on 20 February 
2015. A long-time resident of St Petersburg, Russia, Davlatov was travelling to 
Lithuania when he was seized. The Tajik authorities accused Davlatov of being 
a member of the outlawed Group 24 – and, without publicly presenting 
evidence, of sending citizens to fight in Syria.283 In July 2015, another Group 24 
activist Shabnam Khodoydodova was arrested in Belarus. Held for eight 
months, she was released in February 2016.284 Spanish authorities detained 
and then released Group 24 member Sharofiddin Gadoyev in July 2014.285 
Sobir Valiev, a group 24 leader and deputy head of the newly formed Congress 
of Constructive Forces of Tajikistan,286 was detained in 2015 by Moldovan 
migration police at the request of the Tajik government.287 Later released, his 
family have come under pressure from the authorities due to his activities. 
Inside the former Soviet Union, due to the Minsk Convention - which 
governs cooperation amongst post-Soviet countries in criminal cases - fighting 
extradition is more difficult.288 Although the Minsk Convention does mention 
human rights, extradition in criminal matters takes precedence over these 
concerns. While sixteen citizens remain in pre-trial detention in Russia, fifteen 
have been forcibly returned, either abducted or pressured into returning home 
through threats against their family members. A pattern emerges from the 35 
cases of Tajiks whom the government has attempted to bring back from Russia. 
Following their arrest on a warrant issued by the Tajik authorities, the extradition 
process begins. Most of those with access to lawyers fight this with Article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights which states that individuals cannot 
be extradited to countries where torture and prisoner abuse is documented. 
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Whereas some remain in detention in Russia, ten have been released and 
swiftly abducted by the Tajik security services (Amnesty International 2013).  
Not all of those rendered have been formally detained in Russia. An 
unknown assailant stabbed Maksud Ibragimov, leader of the opposition 
movement Youth for the Revival of Tajikistan in Moscow in November 2014. 
Officers from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation arrested 
Ibragimov in January 2015. They took him to the local Prosecutor’s Office but 
did not formally charge him. When he left the building, he was detained by 
unidentified men who took him to the airport and put him in the baggage hold of 
a plane. Although he renounced his Tajik citizenship in 2004 and became a 
Russian citizen thereafter, he was still rendered back to Tajikistan. The Tajik 
government did not acknowledge that Ibragimov was back in Tajikistan until 
June 2015, when he was sentenced to 17 years in prison on a host of charges 
including extremism.289 
 In two of the documented cases, the Tajik authorities have actually 
admitted to going into Turkish and Russian territory to remove wanted 
criminals.290 Officers from the Tajik Ministry of Internal Affairs arrested medical 
student Shahnoza Bozorzoda in Istanbul in March 2015.291 Born in the southern 
city of Kulob in 1990, Bozorzoda stated on national television that she was 
encouraged to join ISIS and abandon her studies at the Tajik Medical University 
by a man she met on Russian social networking site Odnoklassniki 
(Classmates). After she phoned a friend telling him of her intention to join the 
Islamic State, the Ministry of Internal Affairs sent officers to Turkey to detain her 
and render her back to Tajikistan. Operating across national boundaries and in 
another jurisdiction, the Tajik government violated international law. More 
surprisingly, they openly admitted doing so on national television. In the second 
case, officers from the Ministry of Interior of Tajikistan, in collaboration with the 
Russian police, arrested a 45 year old man from Istaravshan man accused of 
membership of the terrorist organisation Jamaat Ansurallah in St Petersburg in 
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June 2014.292 Rendered to Tajikistan, he was sentenced to nine years in prison. 
The informal dimensions of TASG are not limited to extraordinary rendition, the 
security services have also engaged in assasinations and intimidation. 
 
Extrajudicial Executions 
 
Although Tajikistan outlawed executions in 2004, extrajudicial executions 
remain a tool for removing those people the security services deem to be a 
threat to national security. During the conflict in the Rasht valley in 2011, state 
television showed images of low-level civil war-era commander Ali Bedaki, 
whom the security services claimed to have killed in an operation (Sodiqov 
2011). 293  The bodies of the seven dead militants went missing from a local 
mortuary soon after, leaving questions about the nature of their deaths.  The 
Interior Ministry claimed that they had the right to keep the bodies of “terrorists” 
under article 19 of the “Law on Combating Terrorism.”  One month later a four 
minute video, filmed on a mobile phone, began circulating on the internet.294  It 
showed a half-naked Bedaki, a gun pointing at him, being interrogated in the 
back of a car.  During the conflict in Khorog in 2012 another former commander 
suffered the same fate. Imom Imomnazarov was murdered on 22 August 2012. 
Although the Ministry of Internal Affairs denied involvement,295 his supporters 
claim that the security services murdered him.296 These cases involve sovereign 
power in the purest sense, pertaining to the taking of life. Extrajudicial 
execution, along with the kidnapping discussed in the previous section, point to 
the informal practices through which the government exercises security. Whilst 
the examples discussed so far are all cases of removing opponents in domestic 
settings, the security services have also started using similar tactics 
extraterritorially, in Russia and Turkey.  
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A number of Tajik opposition members have been attacked whilst in 
Russia and Turkey.297 On March 6, 2015 former regime insider turned leader of 
Group 24, Umarali Quvvatov, was poisoned and then shot dead at his Istanbul 
home.298 After leaving Tajikistan in 2011, Quvvatov released files linking state 
officials to corruption and called for protests in Dushanbe in October 2014. The 
Tajik authorities issued an Interpol red notice on embezzlement charges and 
Quvvatov was detained in Dubai in December 2012. Released in August 2013, 
he moved to Istanbul. In December 2014, Turkish police acting at Dushanbe’s 
behest arrested Quvvatov in his Istanbul home.299 Though Turkish police later 
released Quvvatov, Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry sought his extradition at the 
time of his murder.300 Turkish police arrested Suleiman Kayumov, a close 
confidant of Quvvatov who had been dining with him the night of his 
assassination, and charged him with murder. Given that the murder took place 
after so many failed attempts by the Tajik government to render Quvvatov back 
to Tajikistan, analysts have linked the security services to the murder.301 The 
emergent pattern of the use of extrajudicial executions to protect national 
security also suggests that this link is plausible. Thus far, I have discussed the 
paradox at the centre of the government of Tajikistan’s use of sovereign power. 
On the one hand, the government has created a legal system that allows it to 
ban movements, arrest individuals and close places of worship. But whilst the 
law is central to this process, the government has transcended the law, 
kidnapping and executing opponents. This blend of formal and informal 
measures is central to TASG. In the next section, I discuss another example of 
informal security practice, the intimidation of subjects of securitisation and their 
families. 
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Intimidation 
The security services use fear and intimidation to secure the regime. To put 
pressure on those accused of affiliation with the Islamic State and other 
extremist groups, the government targets the family members of those 
suspected of being radical Islamists (Human Rights Watch 2016). Suhrob is a 
follower of the Tablighi Jamoat movement from a village near Vanj, Tajikistan. 
Like many pious Muslims from Tajikistan, he moved to Russia to escape state-
led persecution at home.302 He set up a shop selling perfume at a bazaar in 
Moscow region, dedicating much of his time to proselytizing among the Central 
Asian migrant community and setting up a prayer group with around twenty 
followers. In June 2015, some Tajik-speaking men visited Suhrob’s perfume 
stall and told him to cease his activities or his family back in Tajikistan would 
suffer the consequences. They accused him of being a follower (pairav) of the 
Islamic State. The next day the Russian police visited him to check his 
documents. And a week later he received a call from his parents saying that 
they had been visited by the village’s rais (chief), who told them that their son 
was spreading “extremist” views. Suhrob no longer holds his prayer meetings, 
but maintains links with Tablighi. “Tajikistan may be 4,000 kilometres away. But 
I can still feel its hand!” Suhrob stated shortly after the incident. It was the 
threats against Suhrob’s family back in Tajikistan that led him to take a step 
back from Tablighi Jamaat:  
 
When the police started harassing my family, I knew I had to re-think 
my actions. It is okay to put myself in danger, but not to put my 
parents at risk.303  
 
In this case, the security services used intimidation to secure their objective by 
forcing Suhrob to cease his ‘threatening’ behaviour. Of the 49 cases in the 
database, two form examples of where the security services used intimidation 
and threats against opposition activists, and their families, to implore them to 
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‘voluntarily’ return from abroad.304 The objective of such practices are not only 
political, they are also economic. 
An entire political economy of militant arrests has emerged in Tajikistan 
and Russia. Police detain those suspected of extremism and only release them 
once their family pay a bribe. For example, after Islamic State recruiters 
persuaded 24 year old Abdusami into travelling to Turkey by offers of work and 
forced him to cross into Syria, he escaped and returned to Moscow. But when 
his brother returned to Tajikistan from Russia he was detained by police, 
tortured and only released after the family paid a $3,000 bribe.305 Abdusami has 
not returned to Tajikistan fearing being arrested should he do so. Whether 
implemented for political purposes or for self-enrichment, the effect of 
intimidation remains the same; it instils fear in pious Muslims and their families. 
According to Suhrob: 
 
I know I am being watched. I will never be free (ozod) from them [the 
security services]. I fear for my future and for my family.  
 
Suhrob has become an object of the securitisation of Islam. This discourse that 
is intended to provide security has the opposite effect on him, making his feel 
insecure.  
In its exercise of transnational authoritarian security governance the Tajik 
government does not rely on sovereign power alone. Indeed, Foucault made a 
distinction between the repressive legal sovereign power, on the one hand, and 
the productive, normalising disciplinary power on the other.  For Foucault, “the 
powers of modern society are exercised through, on the basis of, and by virtue 
of, this very heterogeneity between a public right of sovereignty and a 
polymorphous disciplinary mechanism” (Foucault 2001: 74). In the next section, 
I examine how the Tajik government’s exercises control through disciplinary 
power. 
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Disciplinary Power 
 
Policing Displays of Piety 
 
The Tajik government’s exercise of disciplinary power is based on its division 
between what makes a ‘good’ Tajik and what makes a ‘bad’ Tajik citizen and 
thus what is ‘good,’ acceptable Islam and what is ‘bad,’ deviant Islam.306 Those 
who adhere to ‘bad’ Islam become the objects of discipline. In order to be 
normal, secular subjects, men with beards need to be shaved; women with 
hijabs need to de-veil; mosques need to be tightly regulated; Islamic education 
must be restricted. Disciplinary power dictates what subjects should not be, 
aiming to correct deviant behaviour. By blurring the distinction between being 
pious and being a ‘terrorist,’ the government of Tajikistan has waged campaign 
against unsanctioned forms of religious expression. The government of 
Tajikistan has attempted to police abnormal, ‘bad’ Islam through a series of 
practices. Disciplinary power works through institutions and the disciplining of 
the body. In the first section, I discuss the ways in which the government 
attempts to discipline individual bodies. I focus on three examples: names, 
beards and hijabs. In the second section, I shift my attention to how the state 
disciplines citizens through educational and religious institutions. 
 Echoing Soviet concerns for the growing popularity of Islamic names like 
Mohammed and Fatima, the government has created an unclear division 
between Tajik and non-Tajik names. The 2011 Law on Parental Responsibility 
called on parents to give their children names which fit “national values.” In 
2016, lawmakers went a step further, banning Arabic-sounding names such as 
those ending with ‘mullah,’ ‘khalifa,’ ‘shaikh,’ ‘amir,’ and ‘sufi.’307 The State 
Committee for Language and Terminology at the Academy of Sciences 
published a list of 4,000 appropriate names.308 The speaker of the lower house, 
Shukurjon Zuhurov, stressed that the list is not mandatory, but called on parents 
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to pick names that are “compatible with Tajik culture.”  To further this goal, the 
list has been distributed to registry offices across the country. The name list is 
simultaneously about disciplining alien Islamic practices, and promoting Tajik 
national culture. It thus straddles the boundary between disciplinary power and 
the promotion of certain forms of life through biopower. This campaign to 
discipline religiosity has also focused on the visual signs of piety: beards and 
veils. 
For Tajik officials, wearing a beard signifies that someone is a potential 
extremist. Officials often deny that they are engaging in a campaign against 
beards. They frequently claim that they shave people so that their appearance 
matches their passport.309 Yet, many documented examples of this practice 
exist and in some cases police have openly admitted to doing so. 310 In 2015, 
police in the southern region of Khatlon shaved 13,000 men with beards.311 
When qori Abdulrahmon travelled back to Tajikistan in February 2015 he was 
detained by police. His beard formed the subject of a lengthy exchange with his 
interrogators: 
 
Are you a vovchik (slang for Islamic extremist)?312 […] Real Tajik 
men do not grow beards.  They are alien (begona) to our culture and 
a sign that someone is on the path to extremism. 
 
 Abdulrahmon had his beard forcibly shaved. The words spoken by his 
interrogators reflect the strong nationalist current that underlies discourses on 
security and religion in Tajikistan outlined in the previous chapter. Wearing a 
beard is an example of begonaparasti (foreigner-worshipping); young men who 
wear beards are not true Tajiks.313 In fact, they are potentially traitors whose 
beliefs run counter to “national culture” (farhangi milli). This discourse of 
alienness extends to the hijab also.  
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In recent years, the government of Tajikistan has organised a campaign 
against women wearing the hijab in public. It resembles the Soviet assault 
(hujum) against the cotton and horsehair paranja in the 1930s (Kamp 2006; 
Northrop 2004).314 In 2005, the minister of education issued a statement 
banning hijab in schools, and in 2007 it instituted a mandatory dress code that 
reinforced the ban. Police have forced women who appear in public wearing the 
hijab to remove it (Thibault 2013). Since 2009, officials have legitimated these 
practices by arguing that wearing the hijab is “alien” (begona) to Tajik national 
culture and a sign of societal regression. Eshoni Saidjon, the imam-khatib of a 
mosque in Khatlon and deputy at the fatwa-issuing council, the Shuroi Ulemo, 
stated in 2014 that the hijab “is not a Tajik item (tojikon nest) and is taken from 
the culture of other nations, especially Arab, so wearing it does not correspond 
to the Tajik women’s dignity.”315 As Marintha Miles argues, “similar to the 
Soviets before them, for the Tajik elite, hijabi women are seen as the antithesis 
to modernity” (Miles 2015: 376). But hijabs are not only viewed as threatening 
progress, but national security as well. On Mother’s Day in 2015, Rahmon 
accused “strangers” of using Islamic clothes “to promote obtrusive ideas and 
want to create another new extremist trend in our country.”316 Farrukh’s wife 
also had problems when she returned to Tajikistan in 2014: 
My wife went to visit her family in Tursunzoda in September 2014.317 
When she landed at Dushanbe airport, the passport control people 
asked her why she was wearing a hijab, claiming they could not 
identify her. After a few questions about her intentions, they let her 
through (ijozat dodan).318  
  
The hijab ban is not official; the government relies on citizens to police their 
neighbours and themselves. In March 2015, teachers at kindergartens in 
Dushanbe told parents that they must not drop off their children while wearing a 
hijab. Although hijabs are banned at schools, government offices and 
universities in the country, police have also stopped students outside of school 
grounds. In 2015, in Khatlon province alone, authorities “persuaded” 1,700 
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women to remove their veils and closed down 162 shops selling Islamic 
clothing.319   
Three features link these forms of disciplinary power. First, they are all 
undercut by a discourse that contrasts national Islam with foreign Islam. Beards, 
Arabic-sounding names and hijabs are all framed as “alien” (begona) to Tajik 
cultural identity. Second, none of these policies is evenly or formally enforced. 
Adopting a “national” name, shaving your beard and removing the hijab in favour 
of the Tajik rumol, is framed as the obligation of loyal citizens. The government 
thus aims to create subjects who self-regulate and conform to their notion of 
what a citizen should be. When the government does enforce these policies, it 
does so informally, without reference to the law. This fits within a broader 
pattern of informality that I discussed in the previous section. Third, as I will 
discuss in greater detail in Chapter Six, these exercises in disciplinary power are 
somewhat superficial. Forcing someone to shave will change their outward 
appearance, but may have less impact on their thoughts, feelings and opinions. 
Thus far, I have discussed how the government promotes certain forms of ‘good’ 
national subjectivity by policing the bodily signs of piety. I will now switch my 
discussion to the ways in which it uses educational and religious institutions to 
regulate Muslims.  
 
Censoring Literature, Restricting Education 
 
Disciplining religion involves restricting ‘bad’ practices, but also promoting 
‘good’ ones. The government regulates accepted Islamic knowledge and 
practice through the Committee on Religious Affairs and the Council of Ulemo 
(Shuroi Ulemo).320 These organisations censor Islamic literature, regulate 
education and issue rulings on correct religious practice. Essentially, these 
practices are aimed at policing the boundaries of acceptable religious 
behaviour.  
Up until 2010, approximately 2,500 young Tajik citizens were studying 
Islam in Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Pakistan and elsewhere (Abramson 2010). But in 
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August 2010, President Rahmon made a speech accusing foreign madrassas of 
training “terrorists” (Lemon 2014). Following this securitising move, Rahmon 
called on parents to bring back the young Tajiks studying Islam abroad. A year 
later, the Committee on Religious Affairs claimed that 1,950 of these students 
had returned home, with just 129 of them continuing their religious education.321 
The 2011 Law on Parental Responsibility codified the restrictions on studying 
Islam abroad.322 According to the law, those wishing to study Islam abroad need 
to obtain permission from the CRA before starting their studies. These moves 
left a large group of young people interested in studying Islam, but with limited 
opportunities to do so. For qori Abdulrahmon, Islamic education is lacking in 
Tajikistan: 
 
There are not enough places to study religion in Tajikistan. After the 
Soviet Union (vaqti Shuravi), Tajikistan experienced an Islamic revival 
(nahzati). Young people (javonon) especially became interested in 
Islam. But instead of giving people opportunities to study Islam, the 
government did the opposite. After 2009, it began closing schools 
and mosques. I returned from Lahore in 2011. I thought I might have 
a place in the Islamic University [in Dushanbe]. But there was none. 
So I left for Russia after a few months.323 
 
Abdulrahmon was not alone is his disappointment in Islamic education provision 
in Tajikistan. Citizens interested in pursuing religious training in Tajikistan need 
to rely on official institutions there. Religious education provision is limited in 
Tajikistan. Tajiks interested in studying religion can study at one registered 
madrassa or enrol in the Islamic University in Dushanbe, which has places for 
just 900 students.324 The number of madrassas in the country has fallen 
dramatically in recent years. In 2002, 44 registered Islamic schools existed in 
the country (Akbarzadeh 2010: 239). But after Rahmon made a speech 
accusing domestic madrassas of training “terrorists” in 2013 most lost their 
registration. Now there is just one madrassa in the country. In June 2015, the 
government announced that the last madrassa would “temporarily suspend” its 
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activities, as the building is not fit for its purpose.325  The restrictions on Islamic 
education constitute an attempt by the government to monopolise what Tajiks 
can learn about religion. Indeed, for Abdulrahmon, the government’s move 
against religious education, in his opinion, is routed in a fear (tars) of religion 
that is not under its control. But madrassas are not the only place where Tajik 
citizens can learn about religion, the government has also taken interest in 
books and the internet.  
As well as restricting access to education, the government censors 
religious literature and blocks Islamic websites. The government maintains close 
control over the production and distribution of religious literature. Article 22 of 
the 2009 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations stipulates 
that only registered religious organisations can produce, distribute, import or 
export religious literature. All texts must be reviewed by the State Committee on 
Religious Affairs. Although the 2009 law did not outline punishment for those 
who break this law, Article 474.1 of the Code of Administrative Offences, 
introduced in January 2011, stated that those who break the law can be fined up 
to 3,500 somoni ($450).326 Organisations can be fined up to 7,000 somoni 
($900). Since it was introduced, the police have enforced the law, fining 
members of the IRPT, Baptists and Jehovah’s Witnesses for violating the 
rules.327 But increasingly young people are accessing information about religion 
online. In recent years, the internet has replaced print literature as the primary 
concern of the government of Tajikistan. 
 With over 30 per cent of the population, particularly young people, going 
online regularly, the government has become increasingly concerned with online 
radicalisation.328 In a March 2012 speech, Rahmon accused the media of 
engaging in “informational warfare” (jangi ittilooti). He stated that: 
 
I remind you that the media should not abuse their professional 
authority. They must not allow the emergence of material instigating 
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and inciting hate (nizo'angezivu tafriqaandozi), inattention to national 
values and interests (manfiathoi milli), insults and slander in relation 
to distinguished persons, and the promotion of immoral behavior.329 
 
Whilst he was not focusing exclusively on radical Islam, but on the criticism of 
government agencies by the independent media also, his words constitute a 
warning. He is firmly placing the government over the media, re-inforcing its 
right to censor freedom of speech. Concerned by fears of online radicalisation, 
the State Communications Agency regularly blocks “extremist” websites, 
including YouTube, Facebook and Odnoklassniki. Such blockages have usually 
come after events that the government views as a threat to social stability. 
When the independent media criticised the government’s handling of the 2010 
prison break and subsequent conflict in the Rasht valley, the government 
blocked websites and prevented the publication of leading newspapers Faraj 
and Nigoh. After websites challenged the government’s narrative on violence in 
Khorog in August 2012, the government blocked sites once more.330 More 
recently, the government blocked sites after Group 24 called for protests in 
Dushanbe in October 2014 and when former OMON commander defected to 
ISIS and appeared in a propaganda video in May 2015.331 In August 2015, for 
example, it ordered the country’s largest internet provider TCell to block 
Nahzat.tj (the IRPT’s website) and Turajon.org, a website run by the prominent 
Islamic scholars, the Turajonzoda brothers. Until it closed down, Turajon.org 
formed a platform for debating religious issues and seeking guidance from the 
brothers (Epkenhans and Nozimova 2013). Although Islamic groups are 
relocating to social networking sites like Facebook, Odnoklassniki, YouTube 
and VKontakte, the State Communication Committee has taken to blocking 
these sites also. In January 2016, President Rahmon signed a new law 
establishing a central state-controlled hub through which all internet traffic will 
flow. The move will make it easier to monitor citizens and restrict access to 
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websites.332 The government’s inability to completely monopolise the production 
of information in an age of mobility drives its moves to regulate the interent.  
My interviews with senior independent journalists in 2013 reveal that 
government censorship emerges from officials feeling insecure. As the editor of 
a leading independent newspaper told me:  
 
Every day on different television channels we are told: ‘You have 
peace! You have stability! You must endure, endure, endure (Rus: 
terpit’) […] They [the authorities] are scared. They are scared of 
people offering a contradictory opinion.333 
 
Another prominent journalist expressed a similar opinion. According to him, the 
government views the independent media as a potential challenge to their 
narrative. “The potential of the media is more than that of the authorities (Rus: 
gosstruktura). They are scared of its potential,” he said.334 By blocking websites 
and stymying debate, the government makes it difficult for journalists to obtain 
reliable information. As a third journalist stated that, “we [the media] only have 
information from one side (Rus: strana), on the other side we do not have 
information.”335 Ultimately, these moves are an attempt to monopolise the 
production of information and prevent the development of an alternative 
narrative to that forwarded by the government.  
Indeed, this tightening of control over the internet constitutes a 
“networked authoritarianism” (Shafiev and Miles 2015). According to 
Abdulfattoh Shafiev and Marintha Miles, “in the course of just three years, from 
2012 to 2014, Tajikistan’s authorities evolved from maintaining a purely passive 
approach to imposing an assertive ‘networked authoritarianism’ that sought to 
repress the new freedoms the Internet provided” (Shafiev and Miles 2015: 298). 
This networked authoritarianism forms part of TASG; the internet forms a space 
for the deployment of state disciplinary and biopower, and resistance to this. My 
discussion of disciplinary power so far has focused on the ways in which the 
government disciplines ‘bad’ Muslims. As I have shown in this section, the 
government restricts access what citizens can read in newspapers and see 
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online. But it also promotes national Islam through the official clergy. I will now 
turn to this more ‘productive’ aspect of state religious policy. 
Loyal Imams 
 
Official religious leaders in Tajikistan remain firmly under the government’s 
control; they form a crucial institution through which the state controls religion. 
The Committee on Religious Affairs (CRA) controls religious leaders in a 
number of ways. First, it appoints imam-khatibs directly.336 Second, since 2014 
it has paid them a salary.337 Third, each imam-khatib is obliged to re-register 
with the CRA annually and to take courses on Islam run by the Committee. Not 
only does the CRA control who can become an imam-khatib, it also controls 
and regulates what they can say. In 2011, the CRA began publishing an annual 
list of appropriate sermon topics for Friday prayer.338 Whilst those imams who 
are loyal stand a better chance maintaining their position, the government has 
not refrained from removing those who resist. Indeed, the announcement of the 
sermon list proved controversial, with a number of official clerics protesting the 
move.339 Their public dissent provided the Committee on Religious Affairs with 
an excuse to remove them. This purge created a cadre of religious leaders who 
have demonstrated loyalty to the regime. But despite the 2012 purge, the 
authorities have periodically removed potentially ‘disloyal’ imam-khatibs. In 
March 2016, the security services detained six imam-khatibs from the northern 
region of Sughd. All of those arrested studied at the Islamic University at 
Medina in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. The authorities accuse them of being 
members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood.340  Whether they were members 
of the Muslim Brotherhood or not, the incident shows that the government 
remains concerned over any imam whose loyalty may be in question.  
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Imams are expected to create loyal subjects by reproducing the 
government discourse. These moves have made official religious leaders 
reproducers of the governmental narrative on Islam, security and politics. 
Imams played a crucial role in discrediting the IRPT, calling on believers not to 
support them in the March 2015 elections and supporting the government’s ban 
on the party. In one sermon, imams declared "let there be only one effective 
party in Tajikistan." The sermon was signed by Abdulrahmon Mavlanov, a CRA 
employee.341 According to Farrukh, few people respect official religious leaders: 
  
These people are in the pocket (dar kisa) of the government. They do 
their bidding. They tell people to blindly follow orders and obey the 
authorities. Many of them are not knowledgeable (bekhabar) about 
Islam and few people respect them.342 
 
As Farrukh concludes, loyalty rather than religious knowledge is more important 
to maintaining a position as an imam in Tajikistan. The official clergy has 
become a central institution through which the government can promote 
national Islam and discredit foreign Islam. Concerned by the threat posed by 
radical Islam, the Tajik government have securitised mosques, creating an 
infrastructure to closely monitor worshippers. Imams are also responsible for 
monitoring their congregations for the signs of radicalisation. In recent years, 
the government has started to use technology to help them with this task.  
 
Vertical Surveillance 
 
Mosques in Tajikistan remain securitised spaces in which worshippers are 
constantly watched. In Gharm, to help them with this task, the newly built central 
mosque, which opened in 2013, is fitted with CCTV cameras. Walking around 
the mosque with Abdulrahmon, who used to attend juma namaz (Friday prayer) 
at the mosque, he pointed out the cameras, concealed high in the ceiling. 
 
The cameras allow the government to watch people who attend the 
mosque, making sure no extremists hold meetings there. They show 
that the government does not fully trust the imam-khatib. The KGB do 
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not only use cameras, they send agents to the mosque to monitor 
people as well. 
 
Having first installed cameras in the opposition stronghold of the Rasht valley, 
the government has now stated its intention to install cameras in Dushanbe’s 
Central Mosque. In July 2015, police colonel Barotali Hamidzoda, who 
represents the Ministry of Internal Affairs task force on religious extremism, 
warned those praying at Dushanbe’s central mosque that anyone who left early 
would be arrested. He argued that the Ministry of Internal Affairs remains 
committed to "ensuring order and discipline during namaz in all the country's 
mosques and will spare no effort for the sake of peace and security of believers 
during prayers."343 Although framed in the pastoral language of protecting 
worshippers, the move betrays the government’s lack of trust in those who 
attend prayer. Indeed, the surveillance of risky populations is a cornerstone of 
the Tajik government’s exercise of transnational authoritarian security 
governance, but it is not the only place where mosques are subject to 
surveillance. 
 Attending Friday prayer at Moscow’s mosque at Prospekt Mira this is 
panopticism is clearly visible. As those going to prayer approach the mosque, 
they are confronted with airport-style security: metal detectors, security guards 
and bag searches. Once through, believers are confronted with riot police vans 
and rows of officers from Russia’s paramilitary police (OMON). CCTV monitors 
those praying at the mosque. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Muslim's 
Religious Directorate for European Regions, Damir Mukhitdinov, stated that 
these measures were aimed at ensuring “public safety” (Rus.: 
obchshestvennaya bezopasnost’):  
 
They are aimed at preventing any hate crimes (Rus.: prestupleniye 
na pochve nenavisti) against Muslims and so that we can monitor the 
infiltration of radical groups into the mosque.344  
 
But, far from creating a sense of safety for those praying, the measures create a 
sense of insecurity for those attending Friday prayer. During my weekly trips to 
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the mosque, the atmosphere was occasionally tense, with the police pushing 
the sprawling crowds of Muslims back. In September 2014, believers confronted 
police after they detained a man without explanation.345 Farrukh explained his 
feelings whilst attending prayer as follows: 
 
Do you see riot police at Orthodox services? No, of course not. We 
are Muslims. And therefore we are dangerous (khatarnok). That is 
what the Russian government thinks. We are all potential terrorists 
and extremists. We need to be watched (nazorat kardan).346  
 
This policy may be leading to the development of the very ‘underground’ 
groups that both Russia and Tajikistan are seeking to counteract. For 
Abdulrahmon, part of the reason he established his own prayer circle was 
because of the atmosphere in the Prospekt Mira mosque: 
 
When I first came to Russia in 2007, I used to pray at the Olympic 
mosque [the one near Prospekt Mira]. But I stopped going two years 
later. The sermons were in Russian and Tatar. I speak Russian, but 
do not speak Tatar. The police are always watching. How can I pray 
(namoz) and become closer to Allah, peace be upon him, in such an 
atmosphere? This is why I decided to establish my own circle. 
 
Not only are those praying watched by the Russian police, but the group of 
Tajiks with whom I attended prayer said that agents from the Tajik Embassy in 
Moscow also monitor Friday prayer. 
The monitoring of mosques in Tajikistan and Russia is an example of 
vertical surveillance, of the government checking for signs of “radical” 
behaviour. There are two targets of this surveillance: worshippers and imams. 
Like the internet and madrassas, mosques form spaces where the government 
is seeking to monopolise what is talked about and prevent any subversive 
narrative from developing. This exercise of disciplinary power involves 
categorising people as ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal.’ But the Tajik government’s 
counter-terrorism strategy does not stop with monitoring and disciplining 
subjects; it also promotes “healthy (solim) and moral (akhloqi) lifestyles (tarsi 
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hayoti).” 347 In doing so, it uses power to mould political subjects, engaging in a 
project that is inherently biopolitical in nature. Whilst disciplinary power involves 
the regulation and optimisation of individual bodies, biopower involves the 
management of entire populations, their birth rates, life expectancy and public 
health. 
 
Biopower 
 
In its exercise of transnational authoritarian security governance, the 
government of Tajikistan uses biopower. Islam is a way of life; adherence to 
Islam involves certain bodily practices (circumcision, wearing a beard) and 
lifestyle choices (eating halal).  In their study of reproductive politics in Gilgit-
Baltistan, Silvia de Zordo and Milena Marchesi draw a distinction between types 
of population governance and health regulation (biopolitics) that their impetus 
from religion, and those that are based on secular values (De Zordo and 
Marchesi 2016). Where secular development programs call on women to use 
birth control, Islamic values implore women to reproduce as this is the duty of a 
‘good’ wife. By attempting the regulate aspects of Islamic life, whilst promoting 
secular lifestyles, the government of Tajikistan is engaged in a biopolitical 
struggle over how Tajik citizens should live their lives.  
Biopower works in two stages. First, state media and educational 
institutions instil secular values within citizens. Second, once they have 
internalised these ways of thinking and being, these secular Tajik subjects 
monitor one another, and monitor themselves, for signs of 
deviance.  Transnational authoritarian security governance, therefore, 
perpetuates itself; citizens become simultaneously the objects through which 
the polity is secured at the same time as being potential threats to that system.  
Secular biopolitics in Tajikistan centres on four spheres: education, civil society, 
voluntary censorship and horizontal surveillance. 
 
 
Educating Secular Subjects 
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As I illustrated in the previous chapter, the government of Tajikistan argues that 
Tajiks should live their lives according to secular values. Addressing young 
people in Kulob, President Rahmon told them to “study science, culture and 
professional skills, so that you live a life worthy (sazovori) of this nation 
(vatan).”348 Officials repeatedly claim that they are creating “decent living 
conditions” (sharoiti zindagi shoistaro) necessary for a “peaceful life” (zindagi 
oromu).349 State discourses on national development place a great deal of 
importance on biopolitical concerns. President Rahmon stated in 2015 that: 
Educational measures taken by the government (hukumat), lead to 
an improvement in living standards (sathi zindagi), education, life 
expectancy and the progress (peshravii) of society, improving 
societies mind-set (zehniyati) and making a life worthy (sazovori) of 
the population.350 
In keeping with the hegemonic narrative on religion, security and national 
identity outlined in Chapter Four, officials argue that the proper Tajik should live 
their life in a secular, rather than a religious way. As Rahmon contended in a 
speech in late 2015: 
Existing experience in the modern world today has proved once again 
that the choice of the secular state is the correct (durust) and far-
sighted (durbinona) choice, and this idea has become one of the 
main prerequisites for a peaceful life (hayoti osoishtai).351 
According to this narrative, secularism is a prerequisite for citizens living long, 
happy lives and for society to progress. Rahmon frequently states that citizens 
should be “patriotic” (vatanparasti) and “secular.” The state education system 
forms a key institution through which biopower operates.  
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Secular rather than religious values are instilled in pupils at Tajik schools. 
Although the Ministry of Education briefly introduced a course on “Knowledge of 
Islam” (Ma’rifati Islom) in 2009, religion is largely absent from the classroom.352 
According to Helge Blakkisrud and Shahnoza Nozimova, “Islam is either 
described in quite negative terms or is simply ignored in the history textbooks” 
(Blakkisrud and Nozimova 2010: 177). References to Islam frame Mohammed, 
not Allah, as the originator of the religion. Where Zoroastrianism is seen as 
peaceful and forms a connection between Tajiks and their Aryan heritage, Islam 
is portrayed as an external religion enforced on the region by Arab invaders.353 
As one textbook explains, “they [the Arabs] took away the religion of our 
forefathers and forced us to accept their religion called Islam,”354 Many people 
turned to religion for material gain. The textbook alleges that Arab commander 
Qutaibah bin Muslim “gave the order that whoever reads namaz on Friday in the 
mosque should be given two dirhams [...] The impoverished population turned 
to Islam to make money.” 355 Religious leaders have also criticised the teaching 
of religion in school. They argue that the textbooks used to teach religion 
misrepresent it. In 2008, former Deputy Prime Minister and qazi (supreme 
religious leader) Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda raised a debate over the issue when in 
an open letter to the Minister of Education he declared that the history textbook 
authors had taken an “unprofessional, irrational, and sometimes insulting and 
offensive stance” toward Islam and Islamic values. In criticisms carried by Radio 
Free Europe, Turajonzoda stated that “even Soviet-era textbooks, which were 
openly atheistic, didn’t deny historical facts like our current authors do.”356 For 
Abdulrahmon it is clear that the government is trying to denigrate religion: 
 
In our history lessons at school we learnt that religion is a bad thing. 
Islam is foreign (begona) and religion is the cause of conflict (talosh). 
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I remember that I stood up and questioned the teacher: “but Islam is 
part of who we are as Tajiks, how can it be foreign?” The teacher told 
me to sit down.357 
 
Through compulsory and higher education, the government of Tajikistan tries to 
shape resilient secular subjects who do not draw solely on Islam as a source of 
moral guidance and identity. Civil society, in particular non-governmental 
organisations, also play a role in security governance through re-inforcing 
national identity and managing potential conflict. 
 
The Role of Civil Society 
 
State-sponsored NGOs (also known as Governmental Non-governmental 
Organisations or GONGOs) and diaspora groups hold regular events to 
celebrate national culture. These groups forward a Soviet-influenced account of 
the secular, national, internationally-active Tajik subject. In doing so, they 
contrast this with the Western-backed, anti-Tajik Islamist vision for Tajikistan. 
The Moscow-based Tajik Cultural Centre regularly hold events celebrating Tajik 
culture and relations with Russia. At one such gala evening, celebrating the 
poetry of former Soviet minister, Buri Karimov, the speakers frequently invoked 
the Soviet-era notion of “friendship of the peoples” (Rus.: druzhba narodov). 
Ninety one year old Igor, who spent the first 57 years of his life in Tajikistan, 
extolled the hospitality of the Tajik people. Hostess for the evening, Firuza, who 
teaches philology at the Moscow State Technical University concluded the 
evening by saying: 
 
Some people think that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
friendship of the people ended. But we have proven here tonight that 
it is alive and well!358 
 
As she explained to me in a subsequent conversation, “it was an ideology, but a 
healthy (zdoroviya) ideology. After the fall of the Soviet Union, people said that 
friendship of the peoples was a myth. But I think there was friendship of the 
people.”359 For Firuza, friendship of the people involved people speaking to and 
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understanding one another. It centred on a common concept of humanity 
(chelovestvo). This utopian, secular vision draws on a human-centred 
epistemology to solve conflict. It is based on the logic that humans naturally 
have common interests and values that bring them together. Firuza states that it 
is this belief (vera) in human good, rather than organised religion, that should 
unify the Tajik nation, and the global population. 
Two further events drew on this secular notion of unity. At another event 
supported by the Russian World Fund different minorities living in Russia 
celebrated their culture.360 The festival, given the name “Russia – For All” (Rus.: 
Rossiya –Dlya Vsekh), feted the tolerance that minorities experience. According 
to the director, the project aims to spread “propaganda about peaceful (Rus:. 
bezkonfliktnii) life in Russia between representatives of different nationalities, 
cultures and religions.”361 Once again speakers invoked the Soviet legacy of 
druzhba narodov. This impression was on display once more at a training event 
for imams organised by the Spiritual Board of Muslims in Russia in April 2015. In 
his opening speech, Grand Mufti Ravil Gainutdin mentioned the existence of 
“friendship between peoples and religions in Russia” (Rus.: druzhba 
mezhdunarodov i religii). To reflect this harmony, the event was attended by a 
senior rabbi and Orthodox priest. When I interviewed Grand Mufti Gainutdin, he 
elaborated on his views: 
 
We live in a multi-ethnic country (Rus.: mnogoetnicheskaya strana). 
We need a politics based on peace (mir) and agreement (soglasiye). 
The government represents this politics, our politics (nasha politika); 
it supports us as Muslims.362  
 
Whilst the Grand Mufti’s feelings may be sincere, civil society in Russia and 
Tajikistan remains highly politicised. As Igor Savin argues, “the authorities think 
that if there are cultural festivals, then it indicates everything is fine (vsyo 
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normalno).”363 One Russian human rights activist described these cultural 
events as “propaganda” 
They propagate the mythology (Rus: mifologiya) that there is 
harmony in Russia. It is a true democracy, where religions and ethnic 
groups live in peace. These events are highly political. They do not 
mention hate crimes. They do not mention the situation in Dagestan. 
It is all just propaganda. 
This sanitised version of relations between seasonal migrants and Russian 
citizens centres on the notion of friendship and harmony. For Parviz, the 
activities of these GONGOs are part of the Russian and Tajik state’s efforts to 
control public perceptions: 
 
These events give the impression that Russia is a paradise for Tajiks. 
And that they have no problems living here. You can only open an 
NGO if you have government permission.364 
 
During my time in Moscow, Parviz struggled to register his own organisation. He 
had previously been involved in Nur, a political organisation run by the IRPT. He 
had also been an active member of a political discussion club run by leader of 
Tajik Youth in Russia Izzat Amon. But Amon stopped holding meetings after 
Russian police raided his office in June 2014. Parviz explained his idea of a 
debate club to me: 
 
I want to organise a club where Tajik young people can meet and talk 
about politics. At the moment there is little opportunity to do so. 
Regionalism (Rus.: mestnichestvo) and religious extremism exist. But 
there is no-where to talk about them. I want to set up a club where 
secular and religious youth from across the country can talk openly. It 
will not be an anti-government group (Rus.: antipravitelstvennoi 
gruppa). Through dialogue, we can solve our problems.365 
 
Although Parviz found the necessary 120,000 roubles ($1,900) to register his 
group with the Ministry of Justice, it repeatedly blocked his attempts to register 
the organisation. He believes that this is due to the group’s political nature. To 
be able to form an NGO working with migrants in Russia, then, you need to 
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have political connections and the tacit approval of the government of 
Tajikistan. Parviz, with his links to the opposition, did not meet these criteria. 
This example illustrates how biopower in Russia and Tajikistan remains 
exclusionary. Only those individuals and organisations who promote the forms 
of life deemed worth living by the government receive support. Those who 
promote ‘abnormal’ forms of life need to be disciplined. Parviz’s problems 
registering his organisation demonstrate how these forms of biopower and 
disciplinary power work together to shape subjects to fit the narrow confines of 
the hegemonic narrative. Thus far, I have discussed how biopower is deployed 
through two institutions – education and civil society. These institutions promote 
certain secular ways of being. But biopower is also reliant on subjects 
monitoring themselves and others, thus reproducing relations of power. In the 
final section I discuss this horizontal surveillance through a few examples. 
 
Horizontal Surveillance 
 
Intra-community monitoring is a central means through relations of power are 
maintained in Tajikistan. This horizontal surveillance ensures that citizens 
remain loyal to regime, but also mantains patriarchal relations through which 
women are subjugated (Tett 1994; Harris 2004). Muzzaffar, whom I lived with in 
Vanj in the summer of 2013, summarised the logic:  
 
In the village, people always look at one another. If a man’s wife 
behaves in a way that is dishonourable (badnomus), then her 
neighbours will report it to him and he can punish her as he 
chooses.366   
 
This reflects what Gillian Tett found in her study of a Tajik village in the last 
years of the Soviet Union. Tett illustrated how men used the “honour and 
shame” system to control women (Tett 1994). A woman’s behaviour - both 
before and after marriage – reflects on the honour (nomus) of her family.  
Women must regulate their behaviour so as to avoid bringing shame (ayb) on 
their household and family. As Collette Harris argues, “almost anything can be, 
and frequently is, labelled shameful and the fear of attracting this stigma acts as 
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a strong restraint” (Harris 2011: 100). With the encouragement of the 
government and certain international organisations, as argued in the previous 
chapter, this monitoring extends to those who behaviour is deemed to be 
“extremist” or “Wahabbi” (Rasanayagam 2011). Parents, teachers and religious 
leaders are expected to monitor the young people of the community for signs 
that they have radicalised. This surveillance does not stop within communities 
themselves, it has also extended to the internet. 
As I discussed in the previous section, the government of Tajikistan tightly 
regulates internet access and monitors the activities of citizens online. Internet 
governance relies on biopower as well as disciplinary power. Internet 
governance is not purely top-down; the government has enlisted the support of 
“volunteers” in its mission to police the web. In an interview with Radio Ozodi in 
November 2012, Beg Zuhurov, head of the State Communications Service, 
denied that the state employs people to police the internet:  
 
These are people who have lost their loved ones - parents, brothers 
and sisters - during the civil war. And they believe that the media is to 
blame for what happened. I tell them, go and contact Ozodi or Asia-
Plus and express your dissatisfaction to them. And they say, "No, the 
government should control everything.” 367 
 
For Zuhurov, the people demand hegemonic control of the internet, they rely on 
the pastoral care of those in government. But according to Ravshan, this is not 
the case. Whereas not all those who troll the opposition and speak out in favour 
of the government via the social media are government employees, many are 
encouraged to engage in these activities by the government. Ravshan relayed 
the following account of an incident that occurred whilst he was a student in 
2010: 
 
When I was studying at the Law school at the [Tajik] National 
University, we were told to attend a meeting hosted by Sazandagani 
Vatan (the youth wing of the ruling People’s Democratic Party) ahead 
of the 2010 [parliamentary] elections. At the meeting they were 
recruiting volunteers for their informational (ittilooti) campaign. I did 
not volunteer. But my friend did. He said they instructed him to make 
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positive comments about the PDP on Odnoklassniki and Asia Plus, 
and to report people criticising the government.368  
 
The Tajik National University, which has become a primary training ground for 
new officials, is the ideal place to recruit these volunteers. As Zuhurov’s 
comment and this case indicate, the government self-representation of its 
legitimacy remains dependent on demonstrating that the majority of people 
support authoritarian rule as a bulwark against a range of secular and religious 
enemies. But for Ravshan citizens join such campaigns less because of their 
ideological commitment to the party and hatred of its enemies, and more due to 
self-interest: 
Like in Communist times when people joined the Komsomol 
(Communist Youth League), young people who want to be employed 
in the government usually join Sazandagani Vatan. If they uphold the 
party line, then they can hope to find a position [in the government]. 
 
Through such activities, citizens reproduce the relations of power which 
underpin TASG. By reproducing the content and form of the discourse, the 
hegemonic narrative is becoming formalized, standardized and replicated from 
one context to another to the extent that it creates a sense of a monolithic, 
strong state. Yet, because not all of them truly believe what they are saying the 
discourse remains unstable and the attempt to secure the regime will always 
remain an unfinished project.  
Community monitoring is not always nefarious. Being so far from familial 
and social networks, young Tajik men can be more vulnerable to extremist 
messaging. As Parviz explained: 
 
Tajiks in Russia are a long way from their homeland (Rus.: daleko ot 
Rodina). They have no one to guide them. Extremists tell them 
everyone is against you (vse protiv tebya). Both the Russians and the 
Tajik government are infidels (kufr). And sometimes they believe it.369 
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The case of Umed, a twenty-seven year old Tajik from Khujand working on a 
Moscow construction site, typifies this.370 Umed became more interested in 
Islam when living in Russia in 2011 and started attending the Park Pobeda 
mosque in Moscow. Soon after, he was approached by a group of Dagestanis 
after Friday prayer. They invited him to a ‘prayer meeting,’ in which the leader 
talked about the need for jihad against non-believers. Quickly, Umed started 
associating with his old friends less, and began talking of the need for jihad. 
Noticing the change, his friends spoke with him and brought a Tajik mullah from 
his home town to see him. Through a concerted effort, they managed to bring 
him back to the community. Such stories of community-led de-radicalisation are 
not uncommon in Russia.371 
 To summarise, the Tajik state deploys biopower to promote secular 
forms of life. This works through institutions – state education and civil society – 
which aim to create docile secular subjects who are loyal to the regime. 
Ultimately, the government hopes to create subjects who regulate themselves 
and monitor others; this renders TASG a self-perpetuating system which is not 
only enforced from the top-down, but sustained from the bottom-up.  
  
Concluding Remarks: The Paradox of Life under Transnational 
Authoritarian Security Governance 
In this chapter, I have examined the ways in which the government of Tajikistan 
has deployed a range of border-spanning practices to govern the threat posed 
by ‘radical’ Islam. I discussed the ways in which this involves both repressive 
sovereign power, and the moulding of loyal subjects through disciplinary and 
biopower. It is this governance through obedience rather than through freedom 
that separates authoritarian forms of governance from liberal ones. Although I 
examined how the government has created subjects of security, those who the 
government claims to protect, I placed emphasis on the experiences of the 
subjects of securitisation, those who are deemed a threat, such as pious Tajik 
Muslims. For pious Tajik Muslims living in Russia life is paradoxical. On the one 
hand, they have greater freedom to practice their faith. As Farrukh puts it:  
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The situation in Russia is a lot better than Tajikistan. I am not saying 
that it is all just (adolat), but it is better than Tajikistan. There is 
freedom (ozodi). You can pray. Islam is not seen as a threat 
(tahdid).372 
 
But on the other hand, they are subject to the security practices of two states: 
Russia and Tajikistan. According to Farrukh, “the Soviet legacy remains. The 
Tajik and Russian security services are like fingers on the same hand.” Rather 
than being a source of protection and welfare, these institutions are a source of 
insecurity. Like other labour migrants in Russia, Tajiks face police harassment, 
extortion and the difficulties of negotiating cumbersome migration regulations. 
At the same time, they also face surveillance and monitoring from the Tajik 
state institutions. 
Efforts to secure the regime and its concept of society create insecurity 
for many citizens. Despite having moved abroad, the Tajik opposition members 
are far from secure. They would often talk to me about their unease (Taj.: 
noorom) and the uncertainty surrounding their future. Exceptional extraterritorial 
security practices heightened this sense of insecurity. Assassinations and 
abductions are not purely about removing an immediate threat, these practices 
have important symbolic deterrence effects. IRPT member Farrukh feels a keen 
sense of insecurity. After the arrest of ten Group 24 members and murder of 
Quvvatov, Farrukh stated that “we are all scared now. Any of us could be next. 
The government is trying to intimidate us and it is working.”373 Farrukh had the 
appearance of someone who was visibly nervous. Our meetings were always in 
public, usually whilst walking along. He would frequently look over our shoulder 
to see whether we were being followed.  
 Through transnational authoritarian security governance, the Tajik 
government is attempting to create model citizen subjects. These subjects are 
secular rather than religious, apolitical rather than politically active, and 
ultimately loyal to the current regime. But this attempt to mould subjects has not 
been fully successful. Far from being docile recipients of the hegemonic 
narrative, many Tajiks reject the government’s exercise of sovereign power, 
disciplinary power and biopower. In the next chapter, I will examine how 
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religious, and secular, Tajiks negotiate and sometimes resist the government’s 
religious policy and security practices.  
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Chapter 6: Resisting Transnational Authoritarian Security Governance 
How successful is transnational authoritarian security governance in moulding 
obedient secular subjects? If, as Foucault argues, where there is power there is 
resistance, in what ways do individuals and groups negotiate and resist security 
discourses and practices? In this chapter, I will explore how transnational 
authoritarian security governance is received by Tajik citizens. Faced with 
transnational authoritarian security governance citizens have at least two 
options. First, they can negotiate, cope with and, at least tacitly, accept the 
hegemonic narrative and become secular subjects. Second, they can resist 
transnational authoritarian security governance. 
Acceptance involves affirming the government’s assertive secular 
policies, accepting them as the best way to manage state-religion relations. 
Most Tajik citizens publically conform to the hegemonic narrative. As I argued in 
Chapter Four, many citizens – particularly teachers, lawyers and journalists – 
play an active role in producing and affirming the state discourse on religion and 
security. Others are involved as ‘volunteers’ policing the social media or are 
engaged in horizontal surveillance, monitoring their neighbours for signs of 
‘extremism.’ Rather than instilling these policies with positive legitimacy, arguing 
that it is the optimal situation, I contend that most Tajiks see the situation as the 
best it can be. Many come to terms with the present by comparing it temporally 
to the traumas of the past (the Civil War and Soviet Union) and spatially to what 
is going on in the Middle East and the West.  
Resistance involves refuting sovereign, disciplinary and biopower. 
Arguments and acts against sovereign power can be grouped into three 
interlinked groups. First, some people use liberal human rights based 
arguments to label the government’s actions as illegal. Second, some use 
political Islamic arguments to call the government “secular extremists.” Third, 
those affiliated with terrorist groups call for the replacement of the infidel 
government with an Islamic state. Many of those detained outside of Tajikistan 
have used the law to successfully resist being rendered to Tajikistan. Resisting 
disciplinary power involves rejecting the government’s division between “good” 
and “bad” Islam. In some cases, people openly defy government attempts to 
regulate religion, wearing beards and hijabs. These acts, as Marintha Miles 
argues, “although not deliberately political […] [involve] acts of resistance within 
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the cultural hegemony that create a social climate fertile for political Islamism” 
(Miles 2015: 372). Resistance to biopower involves defying government 
attempts to produce secular subjects. I argue that this involves the concept of 
toqat, a Tajik word meaning “patience” and “steadfastness.” By being 
consciously resilient to government attempts to shape subjectivity, many pious 
Muslims find ways to continue to live their lives with morality and dignity. Just 
surviving becomes a way to resist transnational authoritarian security 
governance.  
As I argued in a 2014 article focusing on the conflict in the Rasht valley, 
resistance to the government’s attempt to monopolise the production of truth 
about security and religion does exist in Tajikistan (Lemon 2014). In this 
chapter, I make two overriding arguments about these relations of resistance 
and acceptance. First, these relations of resistance and acceptance are both 
hidden and public. But unlike James Scott, who creates a dichotomy between 
public deference and hidden resistance, I do not create a binary between 
hidden/public (Scott 1990). With the horizontal surveillance described in the last 
section of the previous chapter, this distinction has been broken down. Even 
speaking in front of an audience in private settings, such as the home, could 
potentially result in comments being reported to the local government. Not 
everyone resists TASG privately, whilst conforming to it publically. Some 
publically resist, others privately conform.  
Second, these acts of resistance are dispersed and anti-hegemonic. As I 
reveal in greater detail in this chapter, while those resisting the system are 
united in their rejection of it, they do not agree on why it is wrong, what 
strategies to adopt to change it, and what system to replace it with. This chapter 
contains the views of human rights activists dedicated to the maintenance of a 
liberal secular system, political Islamists calling for religion to play a greater role 
in politics, and terrorists calling for the violent removal of those in power. 
Through a mixture of political ethnography and discourse analysis, I will show 
the dispersed nature of these public and hidden acts of resistance.  
The chapter unfolds as follows: I start by examining how subjects can 
resist sovereign power. I argue that those who have metis, or a sense of the 
game, are more likely to negotiate the dangers of TASG and resist sovereign 
power. Those who have been the subjected to sovereign power – outlawed, 
arrested, rendered - do have opportunities to resist this. I explore how 
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individuals have used the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to resist 
TASG. In the next section, I explore the ways in which subjects can negotiate 
and resist disciplinary power, by questioning being labelled deviant and 
continuing these practices. Having discussed examples of resistance to 
disciplinary power, I examine the often subconscious ways in which subjects 
resist the management of life through biopower. They do so by living their lives 
following their own religious concepts of morality in spite of the government of 
Tajikistan’s promotion of secular forms of life. I conclude the empirical section of 
this thesis by demonstrating the ways in which TASG shapes subjects and how 
they can resist this through the example of Tablighi Jamaat follower Suhrob’s 
prayer group. 
Relations of Resistance and Acceptance 
Resistance to security in Tajikistan is anti-hegemonic; those criticising the 
regime do not agree on why what it is doing is wrong and what the government 
should be doing instead. This fits with Foucault’s idea that discourses are fluid 
and manifold. According to Foucault: 
We must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted 
discourse and excluded discourse, or between the dominant 
discourse and the dominated one; but as a multiplicity of discursive 
elements that can come into play in various strategies (Foucault 
1981: 100). 
Public criticism of the government’s stance towards religion and security takes 
on at least three forms. First, activists have appropriated the language of liberal 
human rights organisations, arguing that Tajikistan is not upholding freedoms 
and civil liberties. Second, accommodational Islamists have rejected the basis 
of the government’s ban on groups and practices based on the religious 
arguments. Third, some confrontational Islamists totally reject the status quo, 
arguing that the government is the enemy of Islam. Three visions of state-
religious relations emerge from these critiques. While the liberal position 
envisions a secular system based on respect for religious and secular values, 
accommodational arguments call for Islam to be given a privileged role in 
government and society, whilst maintaining the secular state. Those associated 
with the confrontational position call for the removal of the current regime and 
the establishment of state based on sharia. The boundaries between these 
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positions are not fixed and many individuals straddle the border between them. 
Muhiddin Kabiri, the leader of the IRPT, for example, draws on 
accommodational political Islam and western liberal discourses in defending his 
party’s right to exist and criticising the government’s religious policy. Individuals 
associated with all three of these categories – liberal, confrontational and 
accommodational – are actively engaged in resisting TASG and the three types 
of power that underpin it.  
  
Sovereign Power 
While resistance to sovereign power rarely manifests itself in obvious ways – 
such as people breaking the law, civic disobedience, protests, rebellions and 
strikes – it nonetheless exists. Most public resistance takes the form of 
comments to the media, articles, blogposts and social media activity.  Resisting 
sovereign power involves criticising the repressive legal framework that the 
government has established to regulate religion. Authors associated with all 
three groupings identified above have criticised the government in this area. 
Political activists and human rights defenders have criticised the government for 
its assertively secular policies.  
A number of Tajik human rights organisations have criticised the 
government for not upholding the rights of those detained on extremism 
charges, highlighting how trials are not open to the public and criticising the 
security services for using torture to extract confessions.374 They have 
highlighted how the government’s action violates the Constitution, domestic 
legislation and international treaties, such as the “International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights” which Tajikistan ratified in 1999. Activists have also 
argued that laws regulating religion, such as the 2009 Law on Religious 
Associations and 2011 Law on Parental Responsibility, violate previous 
legislation that guarantees freedom of association and belief. Activists 
highlighted how the Law on Parental Responsibility, which banned under 18s 
from praying in mosques, violated Article 26 of the Constitution, which 
guarantees the right to worship freely. The IRPT appropriated the language of 
human rights in their criticism of the law. Spokesman Hikmatullo Sayfullozoda 
stated that “this ban violates the rights of children to a religious education and to 
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participation in religious rituals. A child is also a person, and has rights."375 
Human rights based arguments essentially focus on the ways in which the 
government breaks the law. They argue that a secular system should exist, but 
that the government should uphold its legal obligations to protect religious and 
non-religious communities alike. Arguments based on political Islam go further 
and accuse the government of acting illegally, but also of behaving immorally. 
Accommodational Islamists who the government have labelled ‘extremist,’ such 
as members of the Islamic Renaissance Party and the Turajonzoda brothers, 
have turned the government’s discourse against it, accusing the authorities of 
extremism. This forms an example of what Foucault identified as “reverse 
discourse,” using the categories and vocabularies of the dominating force in 
order to contest it (Foucault 1981: 101).376 One term frequently used to describe 
these repressive practices is “secular extremism” (Rus.: svetskii ekstremizm) or 
“radical secularism” (rodikalhoi dunyavi). Opposition activists have pointed to the 
ways in which the state’s assertive secularism creates, rather than prevents, the 
conditions for Islamic radicalisation (Kuru 2007). The leadership of the IRPT has 
frequently used this term to criticise state religious policies377. According to 
Muhiddin Kabiri, “when we talk about extremism, we should not forget that, in 
part, religious extremism emerges from radical secularism (rodikalhoi 
dunyavi).”378 Deputy Chairman of the IRPT Muhamadali Hait has made the 
same claim.379 Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda has argued that the government fears 
(Rus.: pugayet) Islam and criticised the government-enforced anti-Islamic 
campaign (Rus.: antiislamskaya borba) which is tantamount to “secular 
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radicalism” (Rus.: svetskaya radicalisatsiya).380 In an interview with independent 
news agency Asia Plus in March 2014, Turajonzoda elaborated on his position: 
Islam in our country is under pressure from the so-called "secular" 
radicalism (Rus.: svetskii radikalizm). And it's not just empty words 
(Rus.: pustiye slova). Just remember all the policies and decisions by 
the authorities in recent years, aimed at harming believers. What kind 
of radicalization can we talk about when only 5 percent of people go 
to the mosque? 
Yes, we are advocates of an Islamic society, where everyone can 
freely perform their religious needs, but we do not intend to forcibly 
impose its values and ideas of others. Let it be the free choice of 
each person.381 
Turajonzoda envisages a secular system in which religion can be practised 
freely, but not enforced upon people. IRPT activist Farrukh agrees with 
Turajonzoda and Kabiri. For him: 
 
Secular radicalism is a lot stronger than Islamic radicalism. The 
authorities search for those who are religious. They see them as a 
threat. 382 
 
Farrukh questions the government’s portrayal of Islam as inherently threatening 
to society. Farrukh argues that far from being a threat, pious people contribute 
positively to society. According to Farrukh, “religious people can be religious 
without being a threat. Employers like religious people. They do not drink 
vodka.”383 These debates surround the role of religion in Tajik society, whether it 
constitutes a threat or an integral part of social life. Accommodational Islamists 
have criticised the government for being too secular. The people I have 
discussed thus far call for the government to allow Islam to play a larger role in 
society, yet they maintain committed to the secular system. Not all of those who 
resist are so accommodational. Confrontational Islamists have called for the 
government to be removed and replaced with a state based on sharia. 
 Confrontational Islamists remain committed to revolutionary change in 
Tajikistan. Domestic groups have limited their ambitions to the current territory 
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of Tajikistan. These groups include those associated with “local” jihadist groups 
such as the Jamaat Ansurallah and groups of civil war era fighters.384 The Tajik 
citizens who are members of transnational jihadist movements such as Islamic 
State, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizb-ut-Tahrir have also 
criticised the government’s stance on religion, calling for Tajikistan to be 
incorporated into an Islamic caliphate. After the death of opposition warlord 
Mullo Abdullo in April 2011,385 a group calling itself the “Mujahedeen of 
Tajikistan” released a statement criticising the government’s secular policies. 
He banned our sisters, daughters and mothers to wear the 
hijab, because, being a servant of Satan, he hates the hijab. 
In his efforts to build a “civilized” state based on Western model, he 
decided to force Muslim women to undress. This monster believes 
that openness and accessibility of Muslim women is a sign of 
“civilization and progress.” 
The devil's whispers led to a decision by the tyrant Emomali to ban 
children aged less than 18 years to attend the mosques. They 
allegedly skip school lessons because of the prayers. Although, the 
only prayer time that coincides with school classes is the Zuhur 
prayer, held when they all have lunch.386 
 
Rather than focusing on transnational Islamist issues, such as western military 
presence in the Middle East or the need for a caliphate, the statement focuses 
on local issues, primarily the campaign against hijabs and the 2011 Law on 
Parental Responsibility. This points to the way in which assertively secular 
policies can produce counter-productive results, lending legitimacy to extremist 
messages. Another case, that of former commander of OMON, Gulmurod 
Halimov who defected to the Islamic State in May 2015, illustrates this potential 
for backlash against the assertive secularism of TASG. In a video announcing 
his defection posted on the social media, Halimov stated that the government:  
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Does not permit people to pray and wear Islamic hijabs […] The 
government passed a law prohibiting prayer on the streets. But God 
says you can pray anywhere.387  
Halimov, a former regime insider, is in a good position to comment on state 
religious policy. In another part of the video, he discusses how Minister of 
Interior Ramazon Rahimzoda ordered a hijab ban in Dushanbe and paid 
prostitutes $10 to appear in hijabs on national television in March 2015.388 
Halimov is using the repressive practices of TASG as a tool to recruit like-
minded individuals into the Islamic State. Indeed, rather than  offering money, 
as the hegemonic state narrative discussed in Chapter Four argues, Tajik 
fighters promote the caliphate as a brotherhood, where a new society is being 
built.389 Many of the videos produced by Tajik fighters in Syria and Iraq also 
criticise the infidel (kufr) regime of Emomali Rahmon. Abu Muhammad Tojiki, 
who I introduced in Chapter Four, was a vocal critic of the government’s secular 
policies. He not only targets the government, but all those who conform to the 
status quo. Appearing in seven videos, he calls all his countrymen, especially 
those working in Russia, kufr (non-believers):  
How can you not pray five times a day and call yourselves Muslim? 
Join your brothers in the Islamic State!390 
Like other confrontational Islamists, Tojiki calls for the violent overthrow of the 
current secular government of Emomali Rahmon and the establishment of an 
Islamic state in its place. Having outlined the ways in which actors associated 
with the three categories I identified have responded to the sovereign power of 
TASG, I will now explore this further through cases of subjects of securitisation 
who have been targeted by the government. I examine how they resist being 
arrested and rendered back to Tajikistan. 
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Resisting Arrest and Rendition 
 
Resisting sovereign power involves resisting being charged, and in some cases 
extradited, for breaking Tajikistan’s laws on security and religion. Those 
arrested in Tajikistan itself stand a limited chance of successfully defending 
against the charges. Trials of extremists usually take place without external 
observers and bribery is commonplace.391 Although a few human rights lawyers 
have defended suspected extremists, with the system rigged towards 
prosecution almost every suspect is charged. In this section, I discuss two 
strategies of resistance: avoiding being arrested in the first place, and, if 
arrested, using human rights legislation to attempt to secure release. 
Indeed, religious leaders, journalists and opposition activists can adopt 
strategies to prevent themselves being arrested in the first place. Practising 
religion and being active in oppositional politics in Tajikistan requires mȇtis 
(Vernant and Detienne 1974). In other words, it requires that you know the 
“rules of the game,” what you can and cannot do. Mȇtis, a term which descends 
from Ancient Greece, denotes knowledge that is gained from practical 
experience and can be contrasted with formal epistemic knowledge. Marcel 
Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, in Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and 
Society, re-introduced mȇtis to a modern social scientific audience. Although it 
is often translated as ‘cunning,’ this translation is insufficient. Detienne and 
Vernant define mȇtis as:  
  
A type of intelligence and of thought, a way of knowing; it implies a 
complex but very coherent body of mental attitudes and intellectual 
behaviour which combines flair, wisdom, forethought, subtlety of 
mind, deception, resourcefulness, vigilance, opportunism, various 
skills, and experience acquired over the years. It is applied in 
situations that are transient, shifting, disconcerting and ambiguous, 
situations that do not lend themselves to precise measurement, 
exact calculation or rigorous logic (Detienne and Vernant 1991: 4).  
 
Mȇtis can only be attained through practice, in this case by practising politics in 
Tajikistan. As the editor of an independent newspaper told me: 
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As a journalist, you need to know the boundaries (Rus.: granitsi). 
What you can say, and what you cannot say. There are forbidden 
(zapreshenno) areas. You can criticise low level officials, but cannot 
criticise those linked to the President’s family. You cannot question 
the government’s security policy.392 
In my conversations with journalists between 2010 and 2015, it became clear 
that most practised self-censorship as a means of self-preservation. As the 
above quote shows, the rules of the game include a variety of possible and risky 
practices. While criticising lower level bureaucrats is possible, criticising 
ministers and members of the presidential family is informally forbidden. Certain 
topics – such as security policy and the Rogun hydroelectric dam – cannot be 
openly debated.393 Calling for protests against the government or forming new 
political parties is also dangerous. Those who have – such as leader of Group 
24 Umarali Quvvatov, former Minister of Industry Zayd Saidov,394 and leader of 
Youth for the Revival of Tajikistan, Maksud Ibragimov – have been assassinated 
or arrested.395 Those who are involved in oppositional politics need to have a 
krysha – a Russian term literally translated as roof. This refers to paying 
protection money to officials, or having personal contacts in ministries who can 
ensure your safety.  Failure in the political game can stem from two sources. 
First, those who are not skilled players of the political game can fall foul of it. 
Second, changes in the rules can lead players to break them. I will discuss this 
through the examples of Maksud Ibragimov and IRPT leader Muhiddin Kabiri.  
As I discussed in Chapter Five, Maksud Ibragimov established a new 
political movement ‘Youth for the Revival of Tajikistan’ in 2014. He toured 
Russia criticsing the government of Tajikistan and interacting with Tajik labour 
migrants. His activities resulted in him being stabbed in December 2014 and 
then kidnapped and transferred to Tajikstan in January 2015. According to 
Parviz, who knew Maksud Ibragimov before his rendition, he was naïve (Rus.: 
naivnii) and uneducated (Rus.: negramotnii): 
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There are certain things you do not do. If you are sensible, there are 
lines you do not cross. Ibragimov was naïve (Rus.: naivnii). He was 
not a good politician or player of the game (Rus.: igra). He did not 
understand the risk he was taking.396 
According to Parviz, Ibragimov is a man of principle who genuinely wants to see 
democratic change in Tajikistan. But he did not have the necessary metis to 
negotiate the dangers of Tajik politics. He did not have a krysha in Russia, he 
directly criticised the government and called for the overthrow of the 
government. Parviz argues that he did not really understand the risks he was 
taking. Ultimately, this ended with his rendition to Tajikistan. But even skilled 
players of the game can fall foul of TASG. The informality of the rules of the 
political game mean that they are in constant flux.  
Muhiddin Kabiri, who led the IRPT after the death of first leader Said 
Abdullo Nuri in 2006, subtly rather than openly criticised the government. After 
the party gained 8.2 percent of the vote in the 2010 parliamentary elections 
Kabiri criticised the poll, but restrained voices in the party who called for public 
protests.397 Ultimately, he accepted the status quo, two seats in the 63-seat 
chamber. As pressure grew on the party in the years following 2010, he 
continued to call for restraint and engagement with the government (Epkenhans 
2015). Despite playing the game, Kabiri and the IRPT saw the space for the 
opposition recede. The party lost its two seats in parliament in March 2015, the 
Prosecutor General accused Kabiri of fraud in June 2015 and banned the party 
in August 2015.398 Kabiri remains in political exile in Europe. The party’s 
downfall demonstrates the personalised and unpredictable nature of TASG. 
Despite forming an accommodational opposition that played by the rules, the 
IRPT was banned due to shifts in the rules of politics and security in Tajikistan. 
Players, such as the IRPT, are determined by, rather than determine, these 
rules. In this case, a decision was made by those in government to remove the 
party, and no calls for moderation from the IRPT could prevent this from 
happening. These examples reflect how actors can use metis, a sense of the 
game, to negotiate the politics of TASG. In other words, I focused on how they 
use their personal skills and cunning. But individuals can also rely on institutions 
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to resist sovereign power. Using transnational and domestic human rights 
legislation, individuals have resisted being rendered back to Tajikistan. These 
incidences form examples of how the transnational enables resistance not just 
governance. 
Indeed, those detained on arrest warrants outside of Tajikistan, where 
domestic law no longer applies, have more opportunities to resist sovereign 
power. The government of Tajikistan has been successful in rendering 16 of the 
49 people it has targeted outside of the country’s borders.399 This means that 
two thirds of those targeted have managed to resist the government’s efforts. 
Those detained awaiting extradition to Tajikistan have used two principal tools 
to resist sovereign power: domestic law in the country where they were 
detained and international law. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
majority of cases have involved people being detained in Russia. Once they 
have received notification from the Prosecutor General of the Russian 
Federation that it has decided to extradite them to Tajikistan, detainees can 
lodge an appeal against this decision. When this is invariably dismissed by the 
court, they can apply for political asylum with the Federal Migration Service 
(FMS). If denied asylum, they can once again appeal this decision, often with 
the help of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 
Most of those detained were held on a one year arrest warrant. If they have not 
yet been extradited when this expires, they are released. 
Thirteen of those detained on arrest warrants outside of Tajikistan have 
lodged complaints against the governments of Russia and Tajikistan to the 
ECtHR, of which Russia is a member.400 While seven of these cases were 
lodged by those who had already been illegally transferred to Tajikistan, six 
individuals have used the ECtHR to successfully resist Tajikistan’s attempts to 
render them back to the country.401 Those fighting extradition used the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which Russia ratified in 1999. All six 
individuals used Article 3 of the Convention, which states that “no one shall be 
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” to 
appeal against extradition to Tajikistan. In some cases, applicants complained 
under Article 5 § 1 (right to liberty and security) and Article 5 § 4 (right to have 
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lawfulness of detention decided speedily by a court) because they were held 
after the expiration of the extradition detention order. Whilst cases are under 
review at the ECtHR, the court usually issued an interim measure under Article 
39 of the Rules of Court to prevent the individual being extradited before the 
ECtHR made its judgement.402  
 Apart from Russia, Tajikistan has only successfully rendered citizens 
from Turkey. Outside of Russia and Turkey, governments have been unwilling, 
or unable, to send suspects back to Tajikistan partly because of fears that they 
will be tortured. Human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International and the Norwegian Helsinki Committee have pressurised 
governments into releasing those detained on international arrest warrants. 
Pressure from human rights organisations helped secure Quvvatov’s release 
from detention in Dubai in August 2013. He later applied for asylum in Turkey 
through UNHCR. Shabnam Khodoydodova was released from detention in 
Belarus in February 2016, after successfully gaining refugee status. Sharofiddin 
Gadoyev, Quvvatov’s cousin and successor as leader of Group 24, was also 
released in June 2014 after a Madrid court ruled that sending him back would 
violate the UN Convention against Torture.403 So the chances of resisting 
sovereign power are much higher in countries where the Tajik security services 
have fewer links.  But this factor alone does not explain the boundaries of 
TASG.  
This failure of the government of Tajikistan to secure its objectives 
outside of a limited region points to the limits of TASG. Material connections 
between security services alone do not explain this. Deeper connections, or 
disjunctions, between cultures of security determine the boundaries of TASG. 
The government of Tajikistan has managed to deploy its security apparatus in 
Turkey and Russia because these states share a discourse that uses the 
language of security to discredit opponents, and have a culture of security 
where authoritarian practices such as torture, assassination and kidnapping. 
This makes the authorities in these countries more likely to accept the 
sovereign power of TASG. Outside of Russia and Turkey the government has 
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been less successful. While the differences between the culture of security in 
Tajikistan and liberal EU-member states such as Spain and Lithuania are 
clearer, the failures that have occurred in Dubai, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus 
are more difficult to explain. Why was Savriddin Jurayev, who I introduced this 
thesis with, released and kidnapped in Russia in 2013, while Shabnam 
Khudoydodova was released by the Belarussian authorities in 2015 and allowed 
to go free? Both Belarus and Russia are post-Soviet, authoritarian states whose 
and security cultures contain a number of similarities. The explanation could lie 
in the actions of those being targeted. Where Jurayev stayed in Moscow after 
his release, Khudoydodova left for Poland where she has applied for political 
asylum. I will return to this question of the limits of TASG in the conclusion.  
To summarise, in this section I examined how three categories of critic – 
western liberal, accommodational Islamist and confrontational Islamist – 
discursively refute the claims of TASG. I then explored examples of the ways in 
which actors engaged in oppositional politics use metis, a sense of the game, to 
negotiate TASG. Finally, I examined how subjects of securitisation have used 
the transnational to resist the sovereign power of TASG. Throughout I argued 
that subjects of securitisation do have opportunities to resist. In the next section, 
I continue my discussion of acceptance and resistance by looking at disciplinary 
power. 
Disciplinary Power 
As Foucauldian academic Amy Allen succinctly states, “since there is no outside 
to power, freedom always involves strategically reworking the power relations to 
which we are subjected” (Allen 2011: 51). Resistance to disciplinary power 
involves refusing to conform to the dominant subject-positions and continuing 
‘deviant’ practices. Actors have resisted the discourse of disciplinary power in 
three ways. First, human rights activists have highlighted how shaving beards, 
restricting prayers and forcing women to de-veil violates individual religious 
freedoms as provided for in the Constitution and other legislation.404 These 
arguments are based on a clear notion of what is right and what is wrong. 
Second, some academics have gone further and forwarded philosophical 
arguments that question the government’s creation of a simplistic binary 
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between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Islam, arguing that the reality is much more incoherent 
and complex. Third, accommodational Islamists and confrontational Islamists 
have forwarded theological arguments, arguing that policing the signs of piety 
runs counter to the teachings of Islam. I will examine these philosophical and 
theological approaches to resistance in this section.  
Indeed, philosophical resistance to disciplinary power involves actors 
uncovering the spuriousness of the dividing practices upon which its exercise is 
based. As migration expert Sergei Ryazantsev argues, attempts to categorise 
people will inevitably result in a degree of arbitrariness:   
It is difficult to divide (razdelit’) people – in the statistics, research 
methods and in life. Is someone who has lived here for ten years 
temporary or permanent? Is someone who prays five times a day 
religious? Is someone who looks at extremist videos an extremist?405  
TASG is reliant on the objective categorisation of individuals as a means to 
govern them. But Ryazantsev argues against the ability of actors to neatly 
define concepts and classify people. Building on this, a number of academics 
have questioned the simplicity of the foundational dichotomy between ‘good and 
‘bad’ Islam which forms the basis of the disciplinary power of TASG. Parviz 
Mullojanov, a scholar known for his nuanced critiques of Tajik government 
policy told the Institute of War and Peace Reporting in May 2015 that beards 
are not the surest way to tell who is an extremist: 
There are many moderate believers who dress strictly according to 
Islamic standards, yet they have a negative view of radicals. On the 
other hand, members of clandestine extremist organisations have 
learnt to disguise themselves really well. These days, most of them, 
especially the leaders, don’t have an Islamic appearance as they 
don’t want to catch the law enforcement agencies’ eye.406 
Mullojanov’s point raises the question of whether these categories are entirely 
arbitrary or whether visual appearance is used consistently by the security 
services to identify extremism. Rather than reflecting a bottom-up security policy 
by which police use beards as markers of extremism, while those in the 
ministries can clearly distinguish the ‘real’ extremists from those who are not, 
the implementation of TASG is a lot more inexact and arbitrary. The use of 
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visual markers such as beards to detect ‘extremists’ speaks to the lack of 
sophistication in Tajik counter-terrorism strategy. Nonetheless, this strategy has 
real effects; by blurring the boundaries between extremism and piety, this 
makes thousands of individuals potential subjects of securitisation. Some 
academics have resisted this trend. In earlier comments made during a 
discussion in Asia Plus about the so-called “Islamic triangle” in the country’s 
north and east,407 Mullojanov questioned the government’s conflation of 
Islamisation and radicalisation: 
It is not necessary to mix the concepts “religiousness” and 
“extremism”. If a person is religious and strictly observes Shariah 
canons it does not mean that he becomes a member of the extremist 
organization tomorrow.408 
Mullojanov rightly points out that being pious does not directly translate to being 
an extremist. Therefore, the government policy of policing signs of piety will 
remain potentially counterproductive. Mullojanov and Ryazantsev are 
academics, who work to shape the discourse on migration, security and Islam. 
Nonetheless, they are not direct objects of this discourse. Those who have 
been securitised, labelled ‘extremists’ are also engaged in resisting this. 
Resisting disciplinary power involves rejecting the label of being ‘abnormal’ and 
‘bad,’ and sometimes continuing ‘deviant’ practices. For Farrukh, the process by 
which the IRPT came to be labelled a terrorist group was highly politicised: 
I reject the label that we are terrorists. We are not trying to establish 
an Islamic state (davlati Islomi). We just want to raise awareness of 
Islam and build a society where people live moral (man’avi) lifestyles. 
The GKNB need to occupy themselves with providing genuine 
security (amniyati haqiqi), rather than pursuing the opposition.  Every 
country has opposition. It is crucial to the development of the 
country.409  
For Farrukh, the IRPT is involved in Islamising rather than radicalising the 
population. These are two distinct processes; where Islamisation is positive for 
Farrukh, radicalisation is negative. Farrukh argues that security discourses are 
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instrumentalised by the government to pursue its political objectives, in this 
case removing the leading opposition party. This politicisation is not limited to 
the discrediting of the IRPT. Referring to the threat posed by ISIS, Farrukh also 
believes that the security services have politicised the issue for its own gain: 
In principal, it is only a small number [Tajiks who went to fight in Syria 
and Iraq]. It is not a large threat (tahdid). Few will return. Many are 
being killed. They [the government] use Islamic extremists to pursue 
their own goals. Their policy is counter-productive; they will only 
radicalise young people. The government want to link us to this 
group, to blacken our name.410 
For Farrukh, the government is using the threat posed by ISIS to pursue its 
domestic objectives. Farrukh’s critique of TASG runs deeper than the interests 
of the party. He also rejects the government’s policies to closely regulate 
religious beliefs and practices. Farrukh frequently expressed his frustration with 
the situation in Tajikistan. As he stated:    
There are two main points where I disagree with the government. The 
first is that we are told where to pray. But according to our school 
(mahzab) we can pray anywhere. There are people who pray at bus 
stops. They are fined. There are people who have prayed for a long 
time in mosques, but they are not registered. They are fined […] The 
second law that we are opposed to is the law on parental 
responsibility, which says children up to 18 years of age cannot pray 
in mosques. We represent the voice of the people (ovozi milli) who 
are opposed to these laws.411 
The management (idora) of religion in Tajikistan comes from the 
government. The government decides what you can and cannot do. 
But it is not the business of the government. That is a job for Allah. 
They [the government] are doing non-understandable (ne fahmidan) 
acts, forcing men to shave, filming prostitutes in hijabs. People see 
that those who pay prostitutes to wear hijabs are against us (bar ziddi 
mo). 
Farrukh’s comments raise a question that remains central to the politics of 
secularism and religion in Tajikistan. Who has the authority to regulate religion? 
Where the government argues that it has this right, accommodational and 
confrontational Islamists have argued that only God has this authority. Indeed, 
much of the resistance to the disciplinary power is based on theological 
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arguments that centre on the notion that campaigns against the hijab, beard and 
prayer run counter to the teachings of Islam. 
Eshoni Nurridinjon, a popular preacher and the younger brother of Hoji 
Akbar Turajonzoda, made a sermon criticising the Committee on Religious 
Affairs and Council of Ulemo.412 He declared that: 
A beard was worn by Mohammed, peace be upon him […]. And I say 
to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, only God (hudo) can decide who 
wears a beard. […] They say that terrorists wear beards. But 
Mohammed was not a terrorist! I am not, praise be to God, a terrorist. 
The Committee on Religious Affairs has renounced (bezor) [Islam].413 
Nurridinjon argues that styling oneself as a Muslim is a matter of personal, 
spiritual preference. He contends that only God, not the government, has the 
authority to dictate the rules concerning morality. Religious texts are not just 
words on a page, they are examples of the constitutive power of discourse and 
how it shapes social practices. Continuing Islamic bodily practices forms an 
example of what Foucault terms “techniques of the self,” practices through 
which subjects constitute themselves within and through systems of power. 
Whereas these practices cannot be separated from power and often reproduce 
domination, they can also be used to resist domination (Burkitt 2002; Thompson 
2003). They can be used to achieve what Amy Allen terms ‘autonomy’ or “the 
twin capacities to reflect critically upon the power-knowledge relations that have 
constituted one’s subjectivity and to engage in practices of self-transformation” 
(Allen 2011: 44). Individuals are able to modify their subjectivity as a means to 
resist the subjectifying forces of power through alternative modes of self-making. 
The continuance of securitised bodily practices, such as wearing a beard fits 
into this category. Indeed, many pious Muslims continue ‘bad’ Islamic practices, 
arguing that they are merely expressing their faith. Abdulrahmon, for example, 
stated that he would grow his beard again after it was forcibly shaved by police: 
 
I will grow my beard again. Am I displaying my opposition (muqobil) 
to the government? Maybe. But I am also following the teaching 
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(Sunnah) of the Prophet, peace be upon him.  The Messenger of 
Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, beard was thick. For 
me, it is a matter of living according to my faith (din).414 
His wife also wears a veil in an act that also defies the government’s policies.  
She should wear the hijab. It is written in the holy Quran: O Prophet! 
Say to your wives, your daughters that they should let down upon 
themselves their jalabib.415 It is Allah, not the government (hukumat) 
which is the ultimate source of truth (haqiqat).416 
For Abdulrahmon, wearing a beard and his wife wearing a hijab is more of a 
personal, spiritual choice, rather than a political act of defiance. It is about living 
a moral life in the face of adversity. Nonetheless, he still recognises that his 
actions could be interpreted as resistance by the government. Indeed, visible 
displays of piety in a country where the government has waged a campaign 
against them, regardless of their intention, remain acts of resistance (Lilja and 
Vinthagen 2007).  
Others have highlighted how the Tajik government’s attempts to discipline 
Islam could backfire and produce discontent. Shortly after the defection of 
OMON commander Gulmurod Halimov to ISIS, Izzat Amon wrote on 
Facebook:417  
I do not justify the actions of the OMON commander, but I understand 
him. When corruption, regionalism (mestnichestvo), and nepotism is 
rampant in the country and everybody lies, then there is not another 
choice. This is the result of the politics of the ruling group for the last 
25 years. If it continues this way, then even ministers will deliver 
video-messages from ISIS territory. Dear officials, continue your fight 
against the hijab, the beard, Azan and other Islamic attributes. But it 
will certainly come back to you like a boomerang (obernetsya vam 
bumerangom).418 
Indeed, much of the messaging of groups such as Islamic State focuses on the 
government’s regulation of religion (Lemon 2015). Extremists label such 
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practices as anti-Islamic and call for believers to wage a violent jihad against the 
secular regime. 
So far I have discussed how actors can resist the simplicity of the 
philosophical basis of disciplinary power and use theological arguments to 
counter its logic. Rejecting the divide between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Islam, growing a 
beard, wearing a hijab and looking at “extremist” videos all form acts of 
resistance to disciplinary power. But not all Tajik citizens are engaged in 
resisting TASG. Many find ways to accommodate themselves and negotiate the 
repressive politics of transnational authoritarian security governance.  
At least three arguments to justify the government’s disciplining of ‘bad’ 
Muslims exist. First, many people value ‘authority’ (maqomi, Rus.: avtoritet) and 
‘stability’ (ustuvor, Rus.: stablinost’) above democracy and ‘liberty’ (ozodi, Rus.: 
svoboda) (Heathershaw 2009). According to an academic from the Tajik 
Academy of Sciences:  
Our government saw that people were going abroad to Arab 
countries and becoming radicals. So they stopped them. For what, 
does Tajikistan need those kind of people? The Tajik people are 
peaceful.419  
Using the analogy of shepherd and flock, he explained to me that the 
government knows what is best for its people: order and discipline. His views 
are shared by director of a Moscow-based migrant rights NGO Marhabbo. She 
staunchly defends Tajikistan’s “national Islam” (Rus.: natsionalnii Islam) arguing 
that it prevents conflicts. For Marhabbo, religion is a potentially destabilising 
force that requires disciplining. Marhabbo believes that autocracies not 
democracies are the best political system for guaranteeing stability: 
In some countries, like the UK, women go around with their faces 
covered [motions to her face, indicating a slit across her eyes]. But I 
am not democrat. If the result of democracy is the murder (ubistvo) of 
people, I cannot agree with it. Religion needs to be controlled.420 
Marhabbo associates religious tolerance with instability, arguing that a “strong 
(Rus.: zhostkii) secular system” is the best way for a government to provide 
security for its citizens. This reverence for authorian stability is based on 
perceptions of the alternative: anarchy and instability.  
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Second, a tendency exists for people to form their opinion of the current 
political system based on the alternatives to that system. There are two 
principal ways that Tajik citizens come to terms with what is happening through 
difference: temporal and spatial. Temporally, justifying the current policies 
involves comparing perceived traumas of the past unfavourably with the 
present. Two events stand out: the Tajik Civil War and Soviet period. Sipping 
tea in the havli (courtyard) of his home near the district centre of Gharm,421 taxi 
driver from Nurobod, Abdujabbor recounted his own experience of the war: 
We experimented with democracy in 1992. And look where that got 
us. Thousands died. The country destroyed. My brother was killed in 
the war. He fought on the side of the mujahedeen [the United Tajik 
Opposition]. He was a respected fighter with Mullo Quyomuddn’s 
group. I was in the same group. He was killed fighting the 
government in 1994 in Komsomolobod.422 I had my leg blown off.423  
For someone whose brother was killed by government forces, to now support 
the government appears puzzling. But as Abdujabbor explains, his experiences 
fighting made him place greater value on leading a peaceful life:  
We [Tajiks] are tired of war (az jang monda shudaand). I fought the 
government, yes. But I support Rahmon. He is a rock (sangin). He 
provides peace (sulh). We value that above all else.424 
Turning to state religious policy, Abdujabbor also qualifies the 
government’s repressive policy by comparing it to the Soviet Union: 
I am Muslim. I pray. I keep the fast. I grew up in the Soviet Union. 
Namaz was banned. Times are better. Now I can pray. I am free to 
live my life in peace.425  
Abdujabbor has experienced a great deal of trauma and the memory of this 
makes him accept the status quo. While some people look to the past to justify 
the present, others look to other countries, concluding that the situation in 
Tajikistan is better.  
Spatially, individuals contrast the stability that Tajikistan has experienced 
with chaos elsewhere. Where in the quote above Marhabbo comes to terms 
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with the current system by positively contrasting it against what she sees as an 
overly tolerant West, others look to the chaos of the Middle East. Muzaffar, the 
former GKNB colonel with whom I lived in Vanj, justifies the government’s 
heavy-handed policies through the violence experienced in Egypt, Libya and 
Syria: 
They had so-called popular protests in these countries. But there 
were powerful forces behind this. And look what happened: Islamists 
took over and caused bloodshed (khun). We do not need this in 
Tajikistan.426 
Many Tajiks are internalising the hegemonic narrative that links Islam and 
democracy to the conflict in the Middle East. They conclude that for Tajikistan to 
remain stable it needs to reject these foreign (begona) influences. As I have 
demonstrated so far, Tajiks both resist and negotiate TASG. I have examined 
how actors use philosophical and theological arguments to undermine TASG, 
and how some Tajik citizens accommodate themselves with it by contrasting 
authoritarian stability with the anarchy of the Middle East and civil war era.  
Criticisms of transnational authoritarian security governance are not 
restricted to disciplinary and sovereign power. Biopower constitutes the subject 
gradually, progressively and materially. It is a semi or unconscious process 
meaning that those who resist it do not identify what they are resisting. As 
Stellan Vinthagen and Mona Lilja argue “biopower is an advanced form of power 
and poses particular challenges upon resistance” (Lilja and Vinthagen 2014: 
119). But this does not mean that resistance is impossible. Instead, resistance 
involves rejecting control over every aspect of life, and resisting “the managing 
of population policies and institutions by acting differently, in subcultures, and by 
cultivating a different set of values, practices and institutions” (Lilja and 
Vinthagen 2014: 121) In the next section, I discuss how some pious Muslims are 
resisting the government of Tajikistan’s exercise of biopower, the “taking charge 
of life” (Foucault 1981: 143).  
  
Biopower 
 
Resisting biopower involves rejecting the forms of subjectivity engendered by 
the pastoral care of elites and the horizontal surveillance of citizens. Given the 
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often unconscious process through which biopower constitutes subjects, those 
resisting it are unlikely to do so consciously. Resistance is dispersed and anti-
hegemonic; those resisting biopower do not have the ability to replace it with a 
new logic of power. Whereas subjects cannot fully escape the relations of 
power in which they live, they can resist specific aspects of biopower, creating 
spaces in which they can live life on their own terms. The subjects of 
securitisation of TASG subtly resist its biopower by continuing to live their life 
with dignity and morality. Referring to their lives, many of my research subjects 
used the Tajik word toqat. An adjective denoting “patience,” “endurance” and 
“perseverance,” the word roughly equates to the Russian term terpet,’ to 
endure, put up with and suffer, which Tajiks also use. Toqat denotes a life lived 
with honour and dignity in the face of adversity. For pious Muslims, their Islamic 
faith is a source of this endurance. Islam offers a spiritual and moral sanctuary 
for those who adhere to it. First, it places transcendence over immanence, 
allowing the believer to focus on the hereafter. Second, internally, it allows 
believers to focus on an inner struggle within themselves. Third, externally, it 
provides a moral guide for living in and coping with the secular world. By 
focusing on what comes after life, many pious Muslims find solace in their 
current conditions. According to Suhrob: 
 
Life in Tajikistan is tough (mushqil). We do not live. We endure! (toqat 
kardan). First of all, I am interested in Allah, peace be upon him, 
becoming a good Muslim and guiding others. I am less interested in 
the human world, than in what comes after.427 
By placing transcendence over immanence, Suhrob consciously withdraws from 
the secular world and its problems. Like many pious Muslims in Tajikistan, 
Suhrob finds sanctuary in religion; it is through religion that he negotiates the 
hardship of life as a subject of securitisation through TASG. Farrukh also 
eschews confrontation with the government: 
We [the IRPT] are faced with constant government attacks on our 
honour (nomus). We could insult (tahshir) the government in return. 
But we do not. I tell my friends in Tajikistan. If a policeman insults 
you in the street, do not respond to this provocation (Rus.: 
provokatsiya). Just walk away. The government may have all the 
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money and power. But they have no honour. We live our lives to 
glorify Allah, and not our material desires.428 
Farrukh preaches moderation, forgiveness and dignity. Through their faith, 
pious Muslims can separate themselves morally from the government. Indeed, 
for Farrukh being resilient to government policies is not sufficient; Muslims also 
have to fight an inner struggle within themselves. When discussing this process 
of self-reflection and working on the self, Farrukh uses the term jihad: 
No person is united (muttahid). We all have a mixture of feelings and 
impulses. A struggle (jihad) takes place within us of good versus evil. 
I choose to live my life as a Muslim. A religious society is a healthy 
society. Islam guides us in our daily life. But the regime 
misrepresents religion as dangerous and backwards. Our fight 
against injustice in Tajikistan is also jihad.429 
So for Farrukh two types of jihad exist. The first is endogenous to the political 
subject. The second is exogenous and centres on resisting the government’s 
assertively secular policies. For Abdulrahmon toqat refers to being patient; it 
offers a way to cope with the secular world: 
We have a saying: Little by little will become a lot, drop by drop 
(qarta qarta) will become a downpour. We must not become 
obsessed with the present, but think to the future. If we are patient 
(toqat), then over time things will change (taghiir) for the better. We 
cannot expect revolutionary (inqilobi) change. People do not change 
their ways of thinking (fikr) quickly. Change must be gradual (ohista). 
The security services have threatened me. And they have tried to 
make life difficult for me. But I am still here! I live. I work. I have my 
opinions (Rus.: mneniya) And they [the government] will not be able 
to take (zakhvatit’) those away from me. So long as I endure (terpet’) 
through it all, I will win (pobedit’).430 
Religion forms a way for Tajiks to cope with the harshness of their existence. By 
living a religious life, they resist government attempts to mould them into secular 
citizen-subjects. 
 For many young Tajiks religion forms a moral framework through which to 
guide them through the difficulties of everyday life. Farrukh, who describes his 
                                                          
428
 Fieldwork notes, Moscow, June 2015 
429
 Fieldwork notes, Moscow, May 2015. 
430
 Fieldwork notes, Moscow, May 2015. 
  
238 
 
upbringing as “secular,” described to me how he ‘returned’ to religion in his 
thirties:431 
 
I grew up in Shahrinav. My father was a teacher in the middle school. 
My mother worked in a textile mill. We had a secular family, none of 
us were religious. We had no religious education. I began to think 
about God when I came to Russia in 2003. I went to pray with friends. 
When Kabiri became leader [of the IRPT] in 2007, he reformed the 
party. Young people came. I had a friend, also a young man. I used 
to visit his house regularly. I became acquainted with the program of 
the IRPT and liked it.432 
Farrukh told me how Islam is part of his “self” and forms a crucial guide on how 
to live his life. But being religious is not a fixed part of the self, it is a process of 
becoming. “When people think of jihad, they think of war (jang). But no-  jihad 
takes place inside each person. It is your personal battle with desire (khohish).” 
Farrukh told me about how he used to be unfaithful to his wife, but since 
embracing religion he has remained true to her. 
Abdulrahmon expressed a similar view. For him, religion is about being in 
the world and learning about yourself and your relationship with God: 
 
In school we learned about science, history and mathematics. It 
helped my mind (aql) but I did not help my soul. Religion was absent 
from the classroom. So I, like many young boys in my village, studied 
religion after school in a hujra [unregistered religious school]. My 
teacher had studied in a madrassa in Syria. He was knowledgeable 
(bosavod) about the Quran and hadith and spoke Arabic. With him, I 
learned the quran. I learned to live my life for the glory of Allah.433  
 
Rather than actively resisting biopower, many Tajiks simply learn to negotiate it 
on its own terms. As I have argued throughout this thesis, disciplinary, 
sovereign and biopower are not discrete forms of power; they combine in 
varying ways to produce political subjects. To demonstrate how TASG shapes 
subjects and how they can negotiate and resist this, I will conclude with the 
example of a prayer group led by Tablighi Jamaat member Suhrob. 
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In lieu of a Conclusion: Responding to TASG: Suhrob’s Prayer Group 
After becoming a follower of Tablighi Jamaat in 2012, Suhrob spent two years 
learning from his peers and devoting himself to becoming a ‘good,’ practicing 
Muslim in his own personal lives. Having learnt more about Islam, Suhrob 
began to share his religious knowledge with others and started prosteletysing in 
the bazaar in Moscow region where he worked as a perfume seller. Tablighi 
Jamaat members, according to Suhrob, are expected to dedicate two hours 
each day to the movement. His activities focused on dawah, promoting the 
revival of the Islamic faith and calling his fellow Muslims back to orthodox Islam. 
Despite having no official registration – Tablighi Jamaat has been banned in 
Russia since 2009 - Suhrob held his prayer group three times a week in a small 
storage room in the market. In Suhrob’s words, the group primarily focused on 
“enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong,” teaching members about 
Islamic morality and how to become better Muslims.434 His meetings were 
attended by between ten and fifteen migrants each time. Their ages ranged 
from 18 to 45 years old. Lasting for around two hours and usually held in the 
afternoons, at the meetings students read the Fazail-e-Amal, the main book of 
Tablighi Jamaat.435 The meetings focused on religious knowledge and religious 
practice. Everyone, even Suhrob, sat at the same level as a symbol of their 
equality as Muslims. Tajik migrants, especially those from Suhrob’s native Vanj, 
found the group attractive. First, with only a brief break during prayer time, they 
did not have time to travel to one of Moscow’s four mosques, which would take 
them over three hours in total.436 Second, more comfortable speaking Tajik, the 
attendees preferred the sermons given by Suhrob to the Russian and Tatar 
language ones given at local mosques. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, 
the prayer group was interactive, giving them opportunities to discuss moral and 
spiritual issues with Suhrob.  
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Nonetheless, Suhrob’s links to Tablighi Jamaat, an organisation banned 
in Russia and Tajikistan, attracted the attention of the Tajik security services. 
Two men came to visit Suhrob, accusing him of “extremism,” and telling him 
they knew what he was doing and he should stop doing it. After threatening 
Suhrob and his family in Vanj, the security services forced him to cease his 
activities. Although he does not see himself as engaged in a political struggle, 
he nonetheless became an object of security, with the authorities deeming him 
to be a threat and closing down his prayer group. Like the example of Savriddin 
Jurayev, the young Muslim from Isfara whose story I opened this thesis with, 
Suhrob’s local activities became the target of transnational authoritarian security 
governance. His case provides the basis for a discussion of the main themes of 
this thesis: how the forms of power underlying TASG work to govern ‘radical 
Islam,’ how these subjectify those they target and how subjects of securitisation 
can resist this. 
 Despite living in Russia, like many of the individuals described in this 
thesis Suhrob was targeted by the Tajik security services. With his affiliation to 
the outlawed Tablighi Jamoat, Surhob became a subject of sovereign power. As 
a member of a banned group, the security services could threaten Suhrob with 
detention, rendition and imprisonment in Tajikistan. These threats are supported 
by the government’s policies. Since banning the group in 2006, the government 
has arrested scores of suspected followers of the movement, sentencing them 
to up to five years in prison. Suhrob’s family received visits from local 
government officials who suggested they ‘encourage’ him to stop preaching or 
he would face jail.  But the Tajik government’s management of the problem of 
‘radical’ Islam as presented by Suhrob’s group went further than this reliance on 
the deterrent power of the repressive juridical-legal system. Despite styling his 
own activities as apolitical - focusing on morality rather than worldly (dunyo) 
politics – Suhrob’s group existed outside of the state-sanctioned religious 
system and thus constituted part of the “parallel Islam” that is the target of 
disciplinary power. Suhrob’s white robes, skull-cap and beard gave him the 
appearance of a devout Muslim, separating him from the ‘normal’ Tajik migrant 
workers who wear ‘western’ clothes. Suhrob is thus a deviant Muslim who 
needs disciplining. This framing of his activities as ‘bad,’ deviant and anti-Tajik 
became clear when Suhrob received a visit from the Tajik security services in 
June 2015. Suhrob recounts the visit as follows: 
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Two men came to my stall. They said, “are you Suhrob Tojiddinov 
from Sayyod village in Vanj?”437 I asked them who they were. They 
declined to answer. “We know what you are doing here. You want to 
create an Islamic state (davlati Islomi), you want to betray your 
motherland (vatan), you want to allow us to be ruled by foreign 
powers (dasti horiji). What you are doing boy (bacha), will be very 
dangerous (khatarnok) for you.438  
  
This interaction indicates that the hegemonic narrative, which frames radical 
Islam as ‘bad,’ foreign and anti-Tajik is being reproduced at the local level. The 
two men who visited Suhrob framed his actions as a betrayal of the nation, 
justifying any punitive measures taken against him. Due to his actions, Suhrob 
loses his subject status as a loyal citizen and becomes an exiled traitor. He is 
not living a form of life that the Tajik government deems is worth living. Indeed, 
transnational authoritarian security governance shapes Suhrob’s life in a 
number of ways.  
Surveillance forces groups to operate more clandestinely, and thus 
appearing more threatening than they actually are. Due to fear of being 
discovered by the local authorities or infiltrated by the Tajik security services, 
Suhrob changed meeting locations on a weekly basis, using online 
communications app Viber to confirm the location of each meeting on the day 
itself. It thus became an ‘underground’ group. But such practices only feed the 
security services concerns over the dangers posed by “parallel Islam.” By 
operating so clandestinely, like a terrorist cell, the government accusations were 
given greater legitimacy. Other than stopping his activities, this securitisation left 
Suhrob with no safe options. The alternative to operating ‘underground’ was to 
openly declare that his group was Tablighi and admit to breaking the law. 
Ultimately, this dilemma created by government security practices forced him to 
abandon the group. Ceasing his activities did not result in Surhob becoming a 
docile, obedient citizen; he continues to resist TASG.  
Indeed, transnational authoritarian security governance does not go 
uncontested. As the discourse analysis and ethnography in this chapter has 
shown, subjects of securitisation, and some subjects of security, have found 
ways to publically and privately contest government narratives and practices. 
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Such acts of resistance come from a range of subjugated people and are based 
on an array of secular and religious, liberal and illiberal rationales. Many people 
find ways to live their lives with morality and dignity when faced with 
securitisation and security practices. Suhrob is an example of this kind of 
resistance to TASG. He continues to live his life according to the laws followed 
by Tablighi Jamaat; he prays, continues to wear a beard and Islamic clothing, 
and continues his internal jihad against evil: 
Why are we called terrorists? We reject violence as a means of 
spreading the faith (dawah). We call upon Muslims to search inside 
themselves and wage jihad against evil. We do not concern 
ourselves with politics (sisoyat).439 
Unlike confrontational Islamists, who wage jihad against others, for Suhrob jihad 
is a personal process of becoming a good Muslim; it is about how to live life. 
Indeed, whilst the government of Tajikistan is engaged in a struggle over what 
should be like, attempting to promote healthy, secular lifestyles through the 
exercise of biopower, Suhrob’s activities are also focused on how people should 
live their lives. 
 
For the government of Tajikistan, life is about making money (pul), 
accumulating power and other worldy (dunyo) matters. But, for me 
life is about being a Muslim first, and living a life that satisfies Allah. 
When the government threatens me, I am not scared (ne metarsam), 
for I know that I will be in paradise (Arab: Jannah).440 
 
Suhrob’s words point to yet another paradox of the Tajik government’s attempts 
to govern the threat posed by ‘radical’ Islam. The government views certain 
forms of religion as foreign, abnormal and potentially dangerous. It intervenes to 
manage the risk posed by such Islamic practices. Yet for those that it targets – 
the subjects of securitisation – it is this very Islamic faith that gives them the 
fortitude to negotiate and the inspiration to resist TASG.  The belief that what 
they are doing is morally right, regardless of how the government labels their 
practices, gives them confidence that ultimately they will emerge on top. 
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Conclusion 
A serious study of cultural practices and their ethical and moral 
referents, both structured and structuring through the agents’ habitus 
is still a work in progress. This would engage the ‘‘statonational’’ 
obsession of IR literature, where ‘‘national identities’’ are conceived 
as objectifiable elements of territorially bound societies. Moreover, it 
should provide an occasion to test the tools developed by critical 
approaches to security outside the ‘‘Western’’ world and to abandon 
euro- and amerocentric agendas of (in)security (CASE 2006: 470). 
Ten years ago a group of critically-inclined scholars – the C.A.S.E collective - 
assembled to write a manifesto setting a critical agenda for the study of security 
(CASE 2006). As well as giving an overview of critical scholarship to that date, 
the manifesto highlighted a range of potential avenues for future research. In 
this thesis, I have used the case of Tajikistan’s transnational campaign against 
‘radical’ Islam to develop a number of arguments that address the issues raised 
in the quote above. I have made arguments about three phenomena and how 
these relate to (in)security: the transnational, the authoritarian and the secular.  
Transnational Security 
I have worked towards addressing the relative absence of reflection on 
diasporas and transnationalism in security studies (Ragazzi 2009). Rather than 
looking at how receiving states securitise immigrants, or how diasporas shape 
the policy their home state, I have examined how the government of Tajikistan 
governs its security by policing emigrants. These practices have an impact on 
the way we understand transnational security and its relationship to one of the 
foundational concepts of international relations: sovereignty. In his 2009 article 
“Governing Diasporas,” Francesco Ragazzi raises a question that is central to 
our understanding of the relationship between transnational security 
governance and international relations: “How does the theory of the 
international account for practices of sovereignty that go beyond the territorial 
borders that legitimize them?” Ragazzi highlights how transnational security 
practices create a paradox for sovereignty. The “increasing claims by 
governments to monopolies of violence, allocation of resources and “national 
identity” outside of the very border that entitle them to legitimately do so,” pose 
a fundamental challenge to the Weberian state defined by the monopoly of 
violence in a delimited territory (Ragazzi 2009: 383). Of course Ragazzi is not 
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the first to make this claim; much of the critical scholarship in international 
relations has targeted the objective, essentialist definition of the state (Agnew 
1994; Walker 1993; Weber 1994; Bartelson 1995; Onuf 1991). So, how can we 
move beyond the ‘‘territorial trap’’ (Agnew 1994) and develop new topologies of 
the transnational?  
  My Foucauldian analysis of transnational authoritarian security 
governance has captured the multiple levels at which security operates. It is 
both transnational, domestic and everday. Transnational authoritarian security 
governance is ultimately domestic in so far as it is about securing the continued 
existence of the current regime. Through an analysis of the hegemonic 
discourse on security and religion, I have shown the way in which elites frame 
these issues and how this shape transnational governance regimes. I have 
examined these practices through my database of 49 extraterritorial security 
incidents and through semi-structured interviews. But my analysis does not stop 
with a top-down analysis of how security governance emerged, how it is framed 
and how it operates. I also examined local, everyday understandings of 
security, from the perspective of those deemed threatening – the subjects of 
securitisation. Through ethnography, I have demonstrated how the transnational 
politics of security is translated into local settings and shapes people’s everyday 
lives. Indeed, these levels are not discreet; citizens do not purely inhabit the 
local, and elites the transnational. The exercise of power through TASG targets 
individual bodies and the entire population. As such it overcomes the sovereign 
territorial divide, incorporating any Tajik citizen or émigré regardless of where 
he or she lives as its subjects. The transnational has become a site for the 
practice of sovereign, disciplinary and biopower, all of which aim to neutralise 
potential threats to political stability in Tajikistan. The transnational, however, is 
also a space for resistance. In Chapter Six, I showed the ways in which subjects 
of securitisation used the internet and transnational institutions, such as the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to resist TASG. 
  Savriddin Jurayev’s case illustrates these points. He started as the local 
target of the security services in Isfara for his links to mullo Saidullo Marupov. 
But after he fled to Russia, he became the transnational target of TASG. What 
became an issue of local politics relating to the imam of a local mosque, 
became a transnational incident that was heard at the European Court of 
Human Rights. His case demonstrates how the transnational and the local are 
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sites of power and resistance, and how the security practices of TASG span 
and challenge the divisions between the local,  domestic and transnational. My 
analysis of security governance highlighted the ways in which it is transnational, 
but also explored the ways in which it is authoritarian. 
 
Authoritarian Security 
More needs to be done to shift the focus of critical security studies away from its 
origins in Europe and North America, and to examine how concepts and 
approaches ‘travel’ to different political settings (Ayoob 1997; Wilkinson 2007; 
Bilgin 2010). Indeed, the literature associated with the “post-colonial,” “practice,” 
“governance,” and “everyday” turns in security studies, is yet to engage directly 
with authoritarianism. Given that approximately one third of the world’s 
population live in authoritarian states, this lacuna in critical security studies 
certainly warrants greater attention.441 Although a few studies exist that focus 
on security discourses (Vuori 2011; Lewis 2015), peacebuilding (de Oliviera 
2011; Lewis 2010; Heathershaw 2009), experiences of occupation (Ryan 2015; 
Ochs 2011), and conflict management (Piccolino 2015; Smith 2014), my thesis 
has examined how authoritarian security governance operates and what 
everyday life is like for those targeted by it.  
  Although overlaps certainly exist between liberal and authoritarian 
security governance, I argue that they differ in important ways. The security 
culture in Tajikistan – whose president has ruled since 1992, where elections 
are rigged, freedom of speech is severely curtailed, where torture is routinised, 
and opposition parties outlawed – certainly differs from that of say, Great 
Britain.442 Liberal governments certainly engage in illiberal practices, but it is a 
matter of scale; torture, extrajudicial executions, intimidation, extortion by 
security services are more commonplace in authoritarian states. Authoritarian 
security governance involves monopolising control over space and discourse. 
Ultimately, it involves governing through obedience rather than through freedom 
(Dean 2010). Yet, this obedience is not enforced on the population by 
repression alone, my thesis has demonstrated the ways in which security is 
governed by self-regulating citizens who monitor themselves and others for 
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signs of ‘extremism.’ By becoming loyal, secular subjects, these individuals 
become a bulwark against extremism. Indeed, secularism is central to TASG 
and it is to the links between the secular and security that I now turn. 
   
Secular Security 
In this thesis, I have argued that security governance in Tajikistan is based on a 
secular logic; if religion is tightly regulated by the state, then the state can 
manage the threat posed by Islamic ‘extremism.’ Where religion is backwards, 
potentially dangerous, secularism is progressive and provides stability 
(Gutkowski 2014; Mavelli 2012; Bilgin 2007). Rather than providing for freedom 
of religion, the secular becomes a site of exclusion and control (Connolly 1999). 
My thesis has traced the emergence of this association between secularism and 
security back to the Soviet Union and examined how elites have consolidated 
and recontextualised this discourse since independence. I looked at the 
dialectic between discourses and practices, examining how secularism is 
operationalised, shaping policies to manage religion and provide security. 
Finally, I have looked at how pious Muslims respond to attempts to manage 
religion, examining how faith itself is a source of negotiating the hegemonically-
imposed notion that life should be lived secularly. As such, my analysis has 
captured the top-down imposition of secularism, but also how secularism 
shapes everyday life and vernacular understandings of security.  
  I have therefore made a case for enjoining insights from a range of 
approaches within critical security studies. From the ‘Copenhagen School’ and 
post-structural critiques of traditional security studies, I conceptualised security 
as process, how what security is and who it is for is contested by different 
actors. Drawing on insights from the sociologically-inspired ‘Paris School,’ I 
examined security as practice, how discourses shape security practices. 
Security governance, is a concept that links both discourse and practice, 
drawing attention to how security is managed. Rather than being benign, 
security governance is undercut by relations of power. Utilising a Foucauldian 
approach, I conceptualised security as subjectification, how actors govern 
through security by shaping political subjects. Foucault provides the conceptual 
tools to bridge the divide between discourse and practice, the transnational and 
the local. At the beginning of his lecture series at the College de France, 
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Security, Territory, Population, Michel Foucault observed “that the general 
economy of power in our societies is becoming a domain of security” (Foucault 
2007: 10). Power and security are not wielded by elites. They cannot be 
monopolised or controlled, even in authoritarian settings. Instead, there is a 
perpetual struggle over security; there is always resistance to security and this 
impacts on people’s daily lives in important ways. Having situated my findings 
within the academic literature, I will now examine its relevance to policy. 
 
Developing Policies to Govern Security 
Studying transnational authoritarian security governance has never been more 
pertinent; extraterritorial security incidents are occurring more frequently. Of the 
49 cases I found, 36 have taken place since 2014. As I revise the final draft of 
this thesis in June 2016, another two cases involving three individuals have 
occured. In one case, two Tajik citizens were detained on an Interpol Red 
Notice in Kharkiv airport in Ukraine on 24 June 2016. They were both carrying 
“extremist literature” and are suspected of being involved with the Islamic State. 
A Kharkiv court ordered that they be temporarily detained for 40 days on 6 
July.443 In the second case Amriddin Vatanov travelled to Turkey in May 2016 
after he grew suspicious that his son Furkat would cross the border into 
Syria.444 Having reported the incident to the Turkish counter-terrorism police, he 
lost confidence in them, and found his son himself. He handed Furkat over to 
the Tajik law enforcement officers in Istanbul, who rendered him to Tajikistan to 
stand trial on charges under Article 401 of the Criminal Code (illegal 
participation of citizens in armed conflicts in the territory of other countries). 
With continued international interest in the security situation in Tajikistan, 
donors will continue to support projects targeting youth radicalisation, border 
security and counter-terrorism. Although this thesis has largely focused on the 
practices of the government of Tajikistan and its agents, in Chapter Four I drew 
comparisons with neo-liberal attempts to support security governance in 
Tajikistan. I will now briefly outline some of the ways the international 
community could reformulate its support for Tajikistan. 
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Security studies is interlinked with security policymaking; there is no clear 
boundary between theorising security and practising security (CASE 2006). As I 
stated in the introduction, during the process of writing this thesis I have not 
been an objective observer of the events I describe; I have been actively 
involved in the production of a critically-inclined discourse towards what is 
happening in Tajikistan, writing opinion pieces, giving interviews to journalists 
and presenting to policy-makers. A rigorous debate over the usability of the 
knowledge produced by critical security studies scholars has developed 
(Chandler and Hynek 2013). Critical security studies developed from a need to 
provide emancipatory alternatives to the current politics of security (Booth 
1991). As leading proponent Ken Booth concludes: 
For those who believe that we live in a humanly constituted world, 
the distinction between theory and practice dissolves: theory is a 
form of practice, and practice is a form of theory […] it is important for 
critical security studies to engage with the real by suggesting 
policies, agents, and sites of change (Booth 1997: 114). 
Such an account of security should start by examining the (in)security of “the 
poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless” 
(Bellamy and Williams 2007: 7). But for Matt McDonald and Chris Browning, 
CSS has “generally fallen short of providing us with a sophisticated, convincing 
account of either the politics or the ethics of security” (Browning and McDonald 
2013). Becoming “policy-relevant” has become a pejorative term; many of those 
who endeavour to be policy relevant, to co-produce knowledge with policy-
makers, with specific problems in mind, can fall into the traps of essentialism 
and functionalism, re-inforcing taken for granted assumptions. But this need not 
be the case. Becoming critical is about challenging taken for granted 
assumptions and encouraging policy-makers to question the objectivity of social 
categories and reflect on their own positionality. My research highlights the 
“many ways in which Foucault’s rich and diverse writings could inform a search 
for emancipatory alternatives” (Chandler and Hynek 2013: 55). My thesis is not 
aimed directly at policy-makers; it does not suggest ‘quick-fix’ solutions to the 
complex challenges of security governance. Nonetheless, a few suggestions on 
how actors, both external and internal, emerge from the findings of this thesis. I 
will briefly discuss them here. 
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Avoid Simplistic Understandings of Security, Religion and Radicalisation 
Recruitment into extremist organisations is a complex, multi-factor, non-linear 
process. If there is no single pathway into extremism, then there is no single 
solution to the problem. Fundamentally, there is a lack of sufficient evidence to 
give actors a full picture of what is going on. Narratives produced by the 
government and confrontational Islamist groups are highly politicised. As I have 
shown in this thesis, the threat posed by ‘extremism’ forms a rationale that lies 
at the centre of authoritarian governance in Tajikistan. Unfortunately, a 
tendency exists for analysts to reproduce these, concluding that Islamic 
extremism poses a serious threat to Central Asia (Heathershaw and 
Montgomery 2014; Heathershaw and Megoran 2011). Ultimately, there is a 
need for actors to be more humble, to admit that there are still more questions 
than answers when it comes to understanding extremist recruitment. Countering 
terrorism will always be an incomplete project and actors need to be 
circumspect when evaluating what can be achieved. 
Avoid Securitising Young People   
According to the hegemonic discourse, young people are particularly vulnerable 
to extremist messaging and recruitment. Indeed, the available evidence does 
suggest that this is accurate. But the number of young people who have joined 
extremist groups is relatively small. If 1,000 Tajik citizens have travelled to Syria 
and Iraq as the government claims, then this is just one in every 8,000 citizens. 
Yet, the discourse of vulnerability to extremism is a crucial prism through which 
young people in Tajikistan are represented (Roche 2010). This link between 
young people and extremism is also present in development discourses. In 
recent years, a number of projects supported by development agencies have 
targeted ‘youth radicalization.’ Nonetheless, by labelling young people as “at-
risk” leads to further feelings of marginalisation among young people 
themselves.  In 2011, I attended one of the numerous Western donor-
sponsored roundtables focusing on youth radicalisation in Tajikistan. After a 
lengthy discussion about the risk that young people join radical Islamist groups, 
a student from Shurobod stood up. “Why are we framing the issue as we are? 
Why not have more events on positive themes like youth and hope for the 
future?” the student asked. As I have argued throughout this thesis, framing 
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matters; discourses are constitutive of social reality. By framing projects in a 
more positive way, giving young people opportunities to gain employment, 
become involved in their community, extremism can be countered in a more 
indirect way that does not make young people feel stigmatised.  
Strengthening Security Institutions Does not Always Strengthen Security 
Concerned with stability in Tajikistan, which has a 1,344 kilometre border with 
Afghanistan, external actors have spent hundreds of millions of dollars 
supporting the military and security services of the country. Not only has the 
US, EU and OSCE provided support, but Russia and China, with the Collective 
Security Treaty Organisation and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, have as 
well (Cooley 2012). Military aid remains a major source of rent for the regime. 
Instead of being used to counter terrorism, weapons and training have been put 
to use against civilians, most notably in Khorog in 2012. Despite being used 
primarily to secure the regime, and not the people, military assistance has 
continued. As Farrukh states: 
Outside powers see that there is no reform in the country, but they 
still support the government. They may criticise the government for 
its human rights record. But they still send millions of dollars to 
Tajikistan.445 
Whilst the crackdown on opposition in recent years suggests that the state is 
growing stronger not weaker, the security situation for citizens is deteriorating. 
More individuals are becoming the targets of TASG. As long as external actors 
continue to support the security services, whilst occasionally criticising them, 
then this situation will not improve. 
Final Remarks: Three Paradoxes 
This thesis has been replete with seeming contradictions and paradoxes, so it 
seems fitting that I end my discussion by drawing attention to three of them. 
Both have been present, if under the surface, throughout this thesis. As I 
highlighted at the beginning of Chapter One, security and insecurity are not 
opposites; they exist in an agonal relationship. The production of security 
inevitably produces insecurity for some. Through an analysis of the forms of 
power underlying TASG, I have shown the ways in which the security practices 
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 Fieldwork notes, Moscow, May 2015. 
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of the Tajik state create a great deal of insecurity for those they subjectify. From 
being arrested, rendered, intimidated, beaten, surveilled and assassinated, the 
subjects of securitisation live a life fraught with insecurity and fear. The 
transnational politics of security affects almost every aspect of their daily lives.  
  Recently, a journalist emailed me with questions about my research on 
transnational security. For him, it seemed counterintuitive that Tajikistan, the 
weakest state in Central Asia, a state that is barely able to keep order in its own 
borders, is capable of deploying its security apparatus abroad. Indeed, 
Tajikistan is often described as a state that, if not yet failed, is at least “on the 
road to failure,” or at best a “weak” state (ICG 2009; ICG 2016; cf. Heathershaw 
2009; Heathershaw 2012). This state weakness constitutes a key regional 
security concern. In its latest report, published in January 2016, Brussels-based 
think tank International Crisis Group argues that: 
Under the weight of economic crisis and political stagnation, the state 
may continue weakening, perhaps with little impact beyond its 
borders, but its internal and external fragility might also lead to 
instability that would resonate in the broader region (ICG 2016: 2). 
The assumed weakness of the Tajik state, whose government cannot keep 
control of its own borders, runs counter to the finding of this thesis. The banning 
of the IRPT, campaign against Group 24 and the government’s assertively 
secular policies are not symptoms of weakness, but indications that the regime 
of Emomali Rahmon is growing stronger. Contrary to ICG’s conclusion that 
Rahmon is not in a stronger position, “his political and security apparatus is 
fragile,” the emergence and increasing occurrence of extraterritorial security 
incidents indicates that authoritarianism in Tajikistan is becoming stronger. 
Indeed, the emergence and consolidation of TASG is vital to our understanding 
of regime consolidation in Tajikistan. As my Foucauldian analysis of security 
governance in Tajikistan has shown, the state does not rely on repressive 
sovereign power alone; ultimately, it aims to create political subjects that are 
loyal to the regime and therefore keep it secure. Although resistance is always 
possible where there is power, it remains anti-hegemonic, momentary and de-
centralised. The space for resistance in Tajikistan has dwindled since 2010 
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when I first moved to Tajikistan. When authoritarian governments take rights 
away from citizens they rarely give them back.446  
  Rather than ending on this negative resignation, I will end with a quote 
from one of the people most affected by TASG, Suhrob. His endurance, faith in 
God and determination to persevere in the face of the oppressive politics of 
(in)security  
Aki (brother) Edward, when you go back to England, do not just write 
bad things about the situation. For those of us who have faith (din), 
have hope (umed). There is no might nor power except 
in Allah.447 With him, I am strong. 
Thus we come to the final paradox: it is faith in God that makes many the target 
of TASG. But it is this same faith that gives them strength to cope with and 
resist the politics of transnational authoritarian security governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
446
 There are exceptions, such as Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Nigeria and Tunisia.  
447
 This statement is known as the hawqala.  Power, translated from the Arabic hawla, denotes 
transformation and change. 
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Appendix I: Map of Tajikistan 
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Appendix II: Table of Extraterritorial Security Incidents 
Name Affiliation Location of 
Incident 
Date of 
Incident 
Type of Event 
Abdulkhakov, 
Murodjon 
IMU Russia 2011 Rendition 
Abdullojonov, 
Abdumalik 
Former 
opposition 
leader 
Ukraine 2013 Arrest/Detention 
Abdunazarov, 
Sohibnazar 
Youth for 
the Revival 
of Tajikistan 
Russia 2015 Arrest/Detention 
Abdurahmonova, 
Rosiya 
Group 24 Russia 2014 Arrest/Detention 
Akhadov, 
Muhammad 
UTO Russia 2007 Rendition 
Atuvullo, 
Dodojon 
Vatandor Russia 2012 Attack 
Azimov, Ismon IMU Russia 2013 Rendition 
Bafoev, Nuriddin Youth for 
the Revival 
of Tajikistan 
Russia 2014 Arrest/Detention 
Bozorzoda, 
Shahnoza 
ISIS Turkey 2015 Rendition 
Davlatov, 
Sulaiman 
Group 24/ 
ISIS 
Finland 2015 Arrest/Detention 
Firuz, Loic Group 24 Russia 2015 Arrest / 
Detention 
Gadoev, 
Sharofiddin 
Group 24 Spain 2015 Arrest/Detention 
Gaforov, 
Abdurazok 
HuT Russia 2008 Arrest/Detention 
Gilyayev,  
Oyatullo 
Youth for 
Revival of 
Tajikistan 
Russia 2014 Arrest/Detention 
Ibragimov, 
Maksud 
Youth for 
the Revival 
of Tajikistan 
Russia 2015 Rendition 
Iskandarov, 
Mahmadruzi 
DPT Russia 2005 Rendition 
Jabirov,  
Suleiman 
Youth for 
Revival of 
Tajikistan 
 
Russia 2014 Arrest/Detention 
Juraev, 
Nizomkhon 
Former 
insider 
Russia 2012 Rendition 
Juraev, 
Savriddin 
IMU Russia 2011 Rendition 
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Kabiri, Muhiddin IRPT Russia/Turkey 2015 Exile 
Khaydarov, 
Mahmadjon 
UTO Russia 2008 Arrest/Detention 
Khojayev, 
Zikrullokhon 
UTO Russia 2002 Arrest/Detention 
Kholov, Ismoil Group 24 Russia 2015 Arrest / 
Detention 
Kholov, Suhrob UTO Russia 2015 Arrest / 
Detention 
Khudoydodova, 
Shabnam 
Group 24 Belarus 2015 Arrest/Detention 
Khushvakhtov, 
Nasim 
ISIS Turkey 2016 Rendition 
Komilov, 
Sherzod 
Group 24 Russia 2015 “Voluntary” 
return 
Koziyev, Suhrob IMU Russia 2011 Rendition 
Kurbonov, 
Nematullo 
Group 24 Russia 2014 Arrest / 
Detention 
Latipov, 
Abdulvosi 
UTO Russia 2012 Rendition 
Mahmadiev, 
Tagoymurod 
Group 24 Russia 2015 Arrest / 
Detention 
Nasrulloyev UTO Russia 2007 Arrest / 
Detention 
Obidov, Karim Group 24 Russia 2014 Arrest / 
Detention 
Odinaev, Ehson Youth for 
the Revival 
of Tajikistan 
Russia 2015 Rendition 
Quvvatov, 
Umarali 
Group 24 Turkey 2015 Assassination 
Salimov, Yaqub Former 
insider 
Russia 2003 Rendition 
Sattarov, 
Mehrobon 
Youth for 
Revival of 
Tajikistan 
 
Russia 2014 Arrest / 
Detention 
Sattori, Bakhtiyor Training 
Club of 
Tajikistan's 
Future 
Government 
Russia 2013 Attack 
Sharifov, Sulton Group 24 Russia 2016 Arrest/Detention 
Sidiqov, Mr HuT Russia 2010 Arrest/Detention 
Sidiqov, Mrs HuT Russia 2010 Arrest/Detention 
Solihov, 
Umedjon 
Group 24 Russia 2015 “Voluntary” 
Return 
U, R Jamaat 
Ansurallah 
Russia 2014 Rendition 
Unnamed Tajik 1 ISIS Ukraine 2016 Detention 
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Unnamed Tajik 2 ISIS Ukraine 2016 Detention 
Valiev, Sobir Group 24 Belarus 2015 Arrest/Detention 
Vatanov, Furkat ISIS Turkey 2016 Rendition 
Vosiyev, 
Abdurahim 
Group 24 Russia 2014 Arrest/Detention 
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Appendix III: List of Sources for the Discourse Analysis 
Laws 
Republic of Tajikistan, ““Law on the Fight against Terrorism, [Qonuni Jumhirii 
Tojikiston “Dar Baroi Muboriza bar Ziddi Terrorizm”],” 1999, 
http://mvd.tj/index.php/tj/konun/93-onuni-umkhurii-toikiston-qdar-borai-
muboriza-bar-ziddi-terrorizmq 
 
Republic of Tajikistan, ““Law on the Fight against Extremism, [Qonuni Jumhirii 
Tojikiston “Dar Baroi Muboriza bar Ziddi Ekstremizm (ifrotgaroi)”],” 2003, 
http://www.mvd.tj/index.php/tj/konun/92-onuni-umkhurii-toikiston-qdar-borai-
muboriza-bar-ziddi-ekstremizm-ifrotgaroq 
Republic of Tajikistan, “Law of the Republic of Tajikistan on Freedom of 
Religion and Conscience [Qonuni Jumhirii Tojikiston dar baroi Ozodii Vijdon va 
ittihodiyahoi dini],” 2009, http://www.jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=1813 
 
Republic of Tajikistan, “Law on the Republic of Tajikistan on the Parental 
Responsibility [Qonuni Jumhirri Tojikiston dar baroi Mas’uliyati Padaru Modar 
da Ta’limu Tarbiyi Farzand],” 2011, http://kumitaizanon.tj/tj/laws/id/2  
 
Sampled Speeches by President Emomali Rahmon 
 
“Suhanronii Emomali Rahmon, Prezidenti Jumhurii Tojikiston, dar Muloqot bo 
Fa’olon va Aholii Nohiyai Yovon” [Speech of President of the Republic of 
Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon, at a Meeting with Activists and People from 
Yavon, Khatlon], Jumhuriyat, 12 November 2014, 
http://www.jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=16648  
“Payomi Prezidenti Tojikiston Emomali Rahmon ba Majilis Olii Jumhurii 
Tojikiston” [Speech of President Rahmon in Parliament], President.tj, 23 Jan 
2015, http://president.tj/node/8136  
 
“Sukhanroni ba Munosibati 18-solagii Ruzi Vahdati Milli” [Speech on the 18th 
Anniversary of National Reconciliation], President.tj, 26 June 2015, 
http://president.tj/node/9240 
 
“Payomi Tabriki ba Munosibati Idi Saidi Fitr” [Congratulatory Speech on the 
Occasion of Ramadan], President.tj, 16 July 2015, http://president.tj/node/9428 
 
“Suhanronii Emomali Rahmon, Prezidenti Jumhurii Tojikiston, dar Amfiateatri 
Shahri Kulob” [Speech of Emomali Rahmon, President of the Republic of 
Tajikistan, in the Amphitheatre in Kulob,” Jumhuriyat, 31 August 2015, 
http://jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=20641 
 
“Suhanronii Emomali Rahmon, Prezidenti Jumhurii Tojikiston, Bakhshida ba 
Ruzi Donish va 70-solagii Ta’sisi Donishgohi Davlati Kulob ba Nomi 
Abduabdullohi Rudaki” [Speech of Emomali Rahmon, President of the Republic 
of Tajikistan, Dedicated to Knowledge Day and the 70th Anniversary of Kulob 
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State University Named After Abduabdullohi Rudaki], Jumhuriyat, 1 September 
2015, http://jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=20642 
 “Suhanronii Emomali Rahmon, Prezidenti Jumhurii Tojikiston, ba Munosibati 
20-umin Solgardi Ta’sisyobi Gvardiyai Milli Jumhurii Tojikiston, Shahri 
Dushanbe” [Speech of Emomali Rahmon, President of the Republic of 
Tajikistan, at the 20th Anniversary of the National Guard], Jumhuriyat, 4 
September 2015,  http://www.jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=20732 
  “Payomi Emomali Rahmon, Sarvari Davlati Tojikston, ba Munosibati Solgardi 
24-umi Istiqloliyati Davlati, Shahri Dushanbe” [Speech of Emomali Rahmon, 
Leader of the Republic of Tajikistan, on the 24th Anniversary of Independence], 
Jumhuriyat, 8 September 2015, http://jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=20766 
 
 “Sukhanroni Emomali Rahmon, Sarvari Davlari Tojikiston Zimin Vohyori  bo 
Afcaronu Sarbozoni Juz’u Tomhoi Quvvahoi Mussalah va Maqomoti Hifzi 
Huquq, Shahri Dushanbe” [Speech of Emomali Rahmon, Head of State, During 
a Meeting with Soldiers of the Armed Forces and Law Enforcement Agencies, 
Dushanbe], Jumhuriyat, 25 September 2015, 
http://jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=21053 
 
Sampled Articles 
 
Soviet and Early Independence 
 
1. “Interview with Soviet Moslem Leader,” Hungarian Public Radio, 21 April 
1979. 
2. “Marx's Moslems,” The Economist, 8 September 1979, p.54.  
3. Klose, K. “Soviet Moslem Areas Show Little Interest in Islamic Revival,” 
The Washington Post, 5 December 1979, p.A20. 
4. Mukhammadiyev, F. “Yesli My ne Sdelayem. Kto Budet?” (If We Do not 
Do It, Who Will?'), Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 3 August 1983, p.5. 
5. Tkacz, A. “Growing Number of Ethnic Moslems are a New Factor in 
Soviet Makeup,” United Press International, 19 November 1983. 
6. Redzhepova, O. “Antikommunizm” (Anti-Communism) 'Turkmenskaya 
Iskra, 30 June 1984 
7. Rabiyev, V. “V Klasse … s Koranom.”(Into the Classroom with a Koran?), 
Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 31 January 1986. 
8. Rabiyev, V, “Posle Suda: Nikuda” (After the Trial: Going Nowhere), 
Kommunist Tadzhikistana, 12 February 1986, p. 3. 
9. Sanginov, A. Tajikistan-i Sovetii, 24 November 1986, p.3 
10. Tursunov, A. “Voprosy Teorii: Ateizm I Kul’tury’” (Questions of Theory: 
Atheism and Culture), Pravda, 16 January 1987, pp. 2-3. 
11. Martin, L. “Battle Lines: Growing Strength of Islam Challenges Soviet 
Atheism,” The Globe and Mail, 7 February 1987. 
12. Alimov, A, “Biznes Opiuma,” (The Business of Opium), Kommunist 
Tadzhikistana, 13 May 1988. 
13. Belyayev, I, ''Islam I Politika” (Islam and Politics), Literaturnaya Gazeta, 
30 May 1987, pp.13-14. 
14. Usmankhodzhayev, I.B. “Zadachi Partinikh Organizatsii Respubliki v 
Dalnyeishem Sovershestvovanii Effektivnost’ Ideologicheskoi Roboty v 
Svete Trebovanii 27-Kongress KPSS” (The Tasks of The Republic's 
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Party Organizations in Further Improving the Effectiveness of Ideological 
Work in Light of the Demands of the 27th CPSU Congress), Pravda 
Vostoka, 5 October 1987, p.1. 
15. Taubman, P. “Gorbachev Is Feeling the Heat from the South,” The New 
York Times, 6 March 1988, p.3. 
16. Hetmanek, A, “The Mullahs vs. Moscow; Armenia May Be Just the 
Beginning for Gorbachev,” Washington Post, 25 September 1988, p.c1. 
17. Achildiyev, I. “Garantii Svobody’,” (Guarantees of Freedom), Nauka i 
religia, 11, November 1988, pp. 21-23. 
18. “In the Tajik Republic State Security Committee,” Kommunist 
Tadzhikistana, 10 March 1989. 
19. “Blood and Guts,” The Economist, 17 February 1990, p.52. 
20. Aikman, D, “Karl Marx Makes Room for Muhammad,” Time, 12 March 
1990, p.44. 
21. Ponomarev, V, “Kolokola Nadezhdy’” (The Bells of Hope), Pravda, 11 
May 1990, p.5. 
22. Karpov, A. “Kto Planiroval Tragediyu Fevralya?” (Who Planned the 
February Tragedy?), Izvestia, 27 August 1990, p. 2 
23. Karasik, T. “The Crescent Ascends; Tadzhikistan's Muslims Flex Their 
Political Muscle.” Armenian International Magazine, 2, (11), 1991. 
24. Carley, J. “Massacre Haunts Soviet Moslems of Tajikistan,” Financial 
Times, 15 February 1991, p.8. 
25. Babakhanov, U. “Zelyenii Chai v Krasnoi Chaikhana” ( Green Tea in a 
Red Tea House), Komsomolskaya Pravda, 16 July 1991, p.2. 
26. Rotar, I. “Neocommunism or Islam? Elections against the Backdrop of a 
Struggle among Clans.” Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 September 1991, p. 3.  
27. Ljungren, D. Opposition in Tadzhikistan Rejects Islamic Fundamentalism. 
Reuters, 25 September 1991. 
28. “Tajik Spiritual Leader Turadzhonzoda: Tajikistan Must be Secular and 
Democratic.” Narodnaya Gazeta, 4 October 1991. 
29.  “Interview with Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda,” Narodnaya Gazeta, 4 October 
1991, p.4. 
30. Vyzhutovich, V. “Krasnoye Znamya Kommunizma ili Zeleny Znamya 
Islama?” (Red Banner of Communism or Green Banner of Islam?), 
Izvestiya, 5 October 1991, p. 2. 
31. Skosyrev, V. Islamskaya  Revolutsiya:Mozhet Eksportirovany v SSSR?” 
(The Islamic Revolution: Can It Be Exported to the USSR?), Izvestiya, 8 
October 1991, p. 6 
32. Fineman, M. “Tide of Islam Stirs Forces in Soviet Asia,” LA Times, 5 
November 1991. 
33. Rotar, I. “A Miracle did not Happen: Rahmon Nabiyev is President of 
Tadzhikistan.” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 27 November 1991: 3.  
34. Trevelyan, M. “Soviet Moslems Rediscover Faith, Traditions In Central 
Asia,” Reuters, 1 December 1991. 
35. Rashid, A. “Backward Tajikistan Moves Towards Islamic Future.” The 
Independent, 30 December 1991, p.8. 
36. Skosyrev, V. “Ne Budet ne Kakikh Islamskaya Respublika v 
Tadzhikistane- Do Sikh Por” (There Will Be No Islamic Republic 
in  Tajikistan  -- So Far),  Izvestiya, 22 April 1992, p.2. 
37. MacWilliam, I.  1993. “Under the Banner of Islam.” The Middle East, 221, 
p.16.; 
38.  “Valley of Fear.” The Economist. 30 January 1993 
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39. Neier, A. “Watching Rights.” The Nation, 26 July 1993, p.129;  
 
Contemporary 
 
1. Kamurattuloh Abdulaev, “Islomro az Siyosat Chudo Boyad Kard!” [Islam 
Should be Separated from Politics], Jumhuriyat, 23 November 2013, 
http://www.jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=11994 
2. Kamurattuloh Abdulhaev, “Dunyaviyat ba Din Muqobil Nest” [Secularism 
is Not Opposed to Religion], Jumhuriyat, 9 January 2014, 
http://jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=12422 
3. Jamoliddin Homushi, “Islom Dini Vahdat Ast” [Islam is the Religion of 
Reconciliation], Jumhuriyat, 6 March 2014, 
http://jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=13266 
4. Nozir Shamsullahoi, “HNIT Bakhshi <Ikhvonulmusilmin> Ast?” [Is the 
IRPT Similar to the Muslim Brotherhood?], Jumhuriyat, 9 April 2014, 
http://www.jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=13669 
5. Akbar Mansuri, “Kabiri Rahbari Hamai Musulmonho Shudanist,”[Is Kabiri 
the Leader of All Muslims?], Jumhuriyat, 24 June 2014, 
http://www.jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=14729 
6. Davron Kurbanov, “HNIT Yacheikai <Jamoati Ansorulloh>” [IRPT Cell of 
Jamoat Ansorulloh], Jumhuriyat, 17 July 2014, 
http://www.jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=15083 
7. Karamatullo Abduhalil, “Dunyaviyat – Kagili Amnu Osoishtagi” 
[Secularism the Guarantor of a Stable Peace], Jumhuriyat, 17 July 2014, 
http://www.jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=15090 
8. Samariddin Kiyom, “Naqshahoi Pinhonii HNIT” [The IRPT’s Secret 
Plans], Jumhuriyat, 19 August 2014, 
http://jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=15538 
9. Yormuhammad Niyozi, “Chehrai  Rasonaii Muhiddin Kabiri” [The Media 
Face of Muhiddin Kabiri], Jumhuriyat, 20 August 2014, 
http://jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=15563 
10. Kamurattuloh Abdulhaev, “Reshai Dunyaviyat dar Zehnhost” [The Root 
of Secularism is in the Mindset], Jumhuriyat, 17 October 2014, 
http://www.jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=16275 
11. “Islamgaroyoni Ifroti Kinaho bar Sinaho Mezenand” [Islamist Extremist’s 
Fury], Jumhuriyat, 24 October 2014, 
http://www.jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=16362 
12. Luqmon Kurbon, “Muhojir Boyad Ogohona Boshad” [Migration Should be 
Deliberate], Jumhuriyat, 18 December 2014, 
http://www.jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=17159 
13. Shodi Atoi, “Husdori Islomi Siyosi” [The Danger of Political Islam], 
Jumhuriyat, 28 December 2014, 
http://www.jumhuriyat.tj/index.php?art_id=17002 
14. Haramguli Kodir, “Oseboazarii Javonon az Hatarhoi Ifrotgaroi” [The 
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4. Editor-in-chief of an independent newspaper, Dushanbe, 29/07/2013. 
5. Prominent journalist, Dushanbe, 24/07/2013. 
6. Media consultant, Dushanbe, 26/07/2013. 
7. Former editor of an independent newspaper, Dushanbe, 29/07/2013. 
8. Independent journalist, Dushanbe, 29/07/2013. 
9. Sergei Abashin, European University of St Petersburg, 12/07/2014 
10. Vladimir Mukomel, Head of Department, Institute of Sociology, 
18/07/2014 
11. Vera Peshkova, Institute of Sociology, 23/01/2015 
12. Vladimir Pryakhin, Professor at the Russian State University for the 
Humanities, Moscow, 27/01/2015 
13. Project Manager, IOM, Moscow, 26/02/2015 
14. Lawyer, IOM, Moscow, 26/02/2015 
15. Director, Migrant-focused NGO, Moscow, 26/02/2015 
16. Researcher at the Higher School of Economics, Moscow, 06/03/2015 
17. Dmitry Poletaev, Director, Centre for Migration Research, Moscow, 
06/03/2015 
18. Human rights activist, Moscow, 07/03/2015 
19. Lawyer at the Muftiate, lawyer, 27/04/2015 
20. Damir Mukhtidinov, Deputy Chairman of the Muftiate of European 
Russia, 27/04/2015 
21. Yevgeny Satanovsky, Director of the Middle East Institute, Moscow, 
26/04/2015 
22. Migrant rights activist, Moscow, 12/03/2015 
23. Legal monitor, Moscow, 13/05/2015 
24. Sergei Ryantsev, RAN, Moscow, 15/05/2015 
25. Tajik academic, RAN, Moscow, 15/05/2015 
26. Igor Savin, Institute of Orientology, 20/05/2015 
27. Aziz Niyazi, Institute of Orientology, 03/06/2015 
28. Employee, FMS, Moscow, 01/06/2015 
29. Tajik mullah, Moscow, 02/06/2015 
30. Director, Migration-focused NGO, Moscow, 09/06/2015 
31. Former Tajik presidential candidate, 12/06/2015 
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Appendix V: List of Cases Brought to the European Court of Human 
Rights by Tajik Citizens 
 
1. Nasrulloyev v. Russia, no 656/06, 11.10.2007  
 
2. Khodjaev v. Russia, no. 52466/08, 12.05.2010 
 
3. Iskandarov v. Russia, no. 17185/05, 23.09.2010  
 
4. Khaydarov v. Russia, no. 21055/09, 04.10.2010 
 
5. Koziyev v. Russia, no. 58221/10, 08.10.2010. 
 
6. Gaforov v Russia, no. 25404/09, 21.10.2010. 
7. Abdulkhakov v. Russia, no. 14743/11, 02.10.2012448  
 
8. Azimov v. Russia, no. 67474/11, 18.04.2013 
9. Savriddin Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 71386/10, 25.04.2013  
 
10. Sidikovy v. Russia, 73455/11, 20.06.2013 
 
11. Nizomkhon Dzhurayev v. Russia, no. 31890/11, 03.10.2013 
 
12. Latipov v. Russia,.no.  77658/11, 12.12.2013 
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 Note that Abdulkhakov is an Uzbek citizen, but was extradited from Russia to Tajikistan in 
August 2011. 
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Glossary 
Amniyat –‘security’ or ‘safety’ 
Avlod – extended family 
Begonaparasti –  ‘foreigner-worshipping.’  A word used by the government of 
Tajikistan to discredit those who adhere to Islamic and western values. 
Choihona – ‘tea house’ (Rus:. chaikhana) 
Eid al-Fitr [Arabic] - Festival of Breaking the Fast at the end of Ramadan 
Hajj [Arabic] – annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca 
Halal [Arabic] – an object or an action which is permissible to use or engage in, 
according to Sharia.  
Haram [Arabic] –‘forbidden,’ acts that are forbidden by Allah. 
Hizb-ut Tahrir [Arabic] – Party of Liberation 
Hoji – honorific title for someone who has been on the hajj. 
Hujum [Uzb.] –  ‘attack.’ The anti-veil campaign in the early Soviet Union. 
Hukumat – ‘administrative organ,’ government 
Imam [Arabic] – state-appointed religious leader 
Ishan or Eshon – form of address for Sufi leaders 
Jamaat Ansurallah [Arabic] – Society of Allah's Soldiers 
Jangsollor – ‘warlord,’ ‘commander’ 
Kalon – ‘large,’ ‘great’ 
Krysha [Rus.] – ‘roof,’ used to denote cover or protection against punishment 
Kufr [Arabic] – ‘denial of truth,’ a person who rejects or disbelieves in God 
Madrasa [Arabic] – religious school 
Mahalgaroi – ‘regionalism’ 
Majlisi Oli – Tajik parliament 
Maktabi Hanafi - school of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), the largest in the Sunni 
school. 
Masjid – ‘mosque’ 
Muallim – ‘teacher’ 
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Mufti – ‘supreme Islamic leader’ 
Mullo – a religious leader  
Namaz – Persian-derived term for prayer (Salat in Arabic). 
Niqoh – religious wedding ceremony 
Qazi – a judge with superior knowledge of Islam 
Qishloq - ‘village’, ‘settlement’ 
Qori – a Quran reader, someone who has memorised large parts, or all, of the 
Quran. 
Rais – ‘head’ or ‘chief’ 
Salafi [Arabic] – ‘pious ancestors,’ fundamentalist movement, emulating the 
Prophet Muhammed and his followers. 
Satr – Tajik word for the hijab, the veil that covers the head and neck 
Shahid [Arabic]  - martyr 
Sharia [Arabic] – the religious legal system governing the members of the 
Islamic faith 
Shuroi Ulemo – Council of Ulemo,  
Sunnah [Arabic] – verbally transmitted record of the sayings, teachings and 
deeds of the Prophet Muhammed. 
Tablighi Jamaat [Urdu] – Society for Spreading Faith 
Ustod –‘respected master’ or ‘teacher’ 
Vlast’ [Rus.] – ‘power,’ ‘authorities’ 
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